

# Page Fault Liberation Army



Sergey Bratus  
Julian Bangert

Trust Lab  
Dartmouth College



**“No instructions were  
harmful in the making  
of this talk”**

# Disclaimer

- ***Turing complete*** it's just a way of describing what kind of computations an environment can be programmed to do (T.-c. = any kind we know, in theory)
- Wish we had a more granular scale better suited to exploit power

# Today's Slogan



**Any input is a program.**

Any sufficiently complex input is indistinguishable from byte code;  
any code that takes complex inputs is indistinguishable from a VM.


# Intro Example: ABI Metadata Machines



Sarah Inteman/John Kiehl



# ELF relocation machine



# ELF metadata machines

Relocations + symbols:

a **program** in ABL for automaton to patch images loaded at a different virtual address:


```
typedef struct {  
    Elf64_Addr r_offset;  
    uint64_t r_info; // contains type and symbol  
    int64_t r_addend;  
} Elf64_Rela;
```

```
typedef struct {  
    uint32_t st_name;  
    unsigned char st_info;  
    unsigned char st_other;  
    uint16_t st_shndx;  
    Elf64_Addr st_value;  
    uint64_t st_size;  
} Elf64_Sym;
```

Num:	Value	Size	Type	Bind	Vis	Ndx	Name
7407:	00000000000376d98	8	OBJECT	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	31	stdin
7408:	000000000000525c0	42	FUNC	GLOBAL	DEFAULT	12	putc

# Relocation arithmetic:

```
typedef struct {  
    Elf64_Addr r_offset;  
    uint64_t r_info; // contains type and symbol  
    int64_t r_addend;  
} Elf64_Rela;
```



Name	Value	Field	Calculation
R_386_NONE	0	none	none
R_386_32	1	word32	$S + A$
R_386_PC32	2	word32	$S + A - P$
R_386_GOT32	3	word32	$G + A - P$
R_386_PLT32	4	word32	$L + A - P$
R_386_COPY	5	none	none
R_386_GLOB_DAT	6	word32	$S$
R_386_JMP_SLOT	7	word32	$S$
R_386_RELATIVE	8	word32	$B + A$
R_386_GOTOFF	9	word32	$S + A - GOT$
R_386_GOTPC	10	word32	$GOT + A - P$

**R\_X86\_64\_COPY:**

`memcpy(r.r_offset, s.st_value, s.st_size)`

**R\_X86\_64\_64:**

$*(base + r.r\_offset) = s.st\_value + r.r\_addend + base$

**R\_X86\_64\_RELATIVE:**

$*(base + r.r\_offset) = r.r\_addend + base$

See 29c3 talk by Rebecca “**.bx**” Shapiro,

<https://github.com/bx/elf-bf-tools>



# Example for Today:

## Page Fault Liberation Army (PFLA)\*



*“Input is (still) a program!”*

\*) In the x86 manuals it stands for  
“Page Faulting Linear Address”,  
but our version is more interesting

# “Page Fault Liberation”



Let's take an  
old and known  
thing...







# “Page Fault Liberation”



...and see  
how far we  
can make it  
can go!



# “Page Fault Liberation”



and perhaps  
others can  
take it  
further!

# “Page Fault Liberation”

- The x86 MMU is not just a look-up table!
- x86 MMU performs complex logic on complex data structures
- The MMU has **state** and **transitions** that brilliant hackers put to unorthodox uses.
- Can it be **programmed** with its input data?



# “Hacking is a practical study of computational models’ limits”

- [Apologies for repeating myself]
- “What Church and Turing did with theorems, hackers do with exploits”
- Great exploits (and effective defenses!) reveal truths about the target’s **actual** computational model.

# CPU

```
graph TD; subgraph CPU; MMU; end; IDT_GDT[IDT GDT]; Page_tables[Page tables]; Stack; IDT_GDT -- Read --> MMU; Page_tables --> MMU; MMU -- Write --> Stack;
```

MMU

Read

Write


IDT  
GDT

Page  
tables

Stack



- unmapped/bad memory reference **trap**, based on **page tables** & (current) **IDT**
- hardware **writes fault info** on the stack - where it **thinks** the stack is (address in TSS)
- If we point “**stack**” into **page tables**, **GDT** or TSS, can we get the “tape” of a Turing machine?




# The devil's in the details


## trapping bits



# Segment descriptor:



Default  
segment  
selector




Global Descriptor Table  
(GDT)

Address ("offset")  
must lie within  
segment limit

From: [duartes.org/gustavo/blog/](http://duartes.org/gustavo/blog/)

# Virtual Address Translation



- All **P** bits set
- Ring 3: All **U/S** bits have to be set
- Write: All **R/W** bits have to be set
- What if we violate these rules?






ITS A TRAP

# OpenWall

- Solar Designer, 1999
  - cf. "Stack Smashing for Fun and Profit"
- **CS limit** is 3GB - 8**MB** (for stack)
- Code **fetch** from the stack is trapped
- See if the current instruction is a **RET**
- Very specific threat, allows JIT, etc.
- (And many other hardening patches)



# PaX

- PaX is an awesome Linux hardening patch
- Many 'firsts' on real-world OS's, e.g. **NX** on Intel and ASLR (PaX in 2000, OpenBSD in 2003)
- PaX has **NX** on all CPUs since the Pentium (Intel has hardware support since P4)
- SEGMEXEC and PAGEEXEC
- Leverages difference between instruction and data memory paths




# PaX **NX**: SegmExec

- Instruction: Virtual address = Linear + CS.base
- Data: VA= Linear + {DS,ES,FS,GS,SS}.base
- 3GB user space
- Set all segment limits to 1.5 GB (so all pointers are less than 1.5GB)
- Data access goes to lower half of VA space
- Instruction fetch goes to upper half of VA space




# PaX **NX**: PageExec

- “**split TLB**” (iTLB for fetches, dTLB for loads)  
[Plex86 1997, to detect self-modifying code:  
<http://pax.grsecurity.net/docs/pageexec.old.txt>]
- TLBs are **not** synchronized with page tables in RAM (manually flushed every time tables change)
- NX ~ User/Supervisor bit



# PageExec data lookup




# OllyBone:

## Trap on end of unpacker

- Same TLB technique as PaX
- Debugger plugin to analyze (un)packers
- Want to break execution on a memory range (so you trap every time you exec after writing)
- The idea goes back to Plex86 (before PaX) who tried to do virtualization that way

# ShadowWalker

- When a rootkit detector **scans** the code (as **data!**), why not give a different page than when the code is executed?
- Instead of having different User bits, we could also have different **page frame numbers** (trap on P=0 in pagetables)



# Trap-based “Design Patterns”

- **Overloading #PF** for security policy, labeling memory (e.g., PaX, OpenWall)
- **Combining** traps to trap on more complex events (OllyBone, “fetch from a page just written”)
- Using **several** trap bits in different locations to label memory for **data flow** control (PaX UDEREF, SMAP/SMEP use)
- Storing **extra state** in TLBs (PaX PageExec)
- “Unorthodox” breakpoints, control flow, ...





What's in a trap handler  
(let's roll our own)



IDT  
entries:

...  
8: #DF  
...  
14: #PF  
...


### Task Gate




### Interrupt Gate



### Trap Gate




# Call through a Trap Gate



Like a FAR call of old. If the new segment is in a lower (i.e. higher privilege) Ring, we load a new SP.



# Pushes parameters to “handler’s stack”



“IRET” instruction can return from this

# What if this fails?


- Stack invalid?
- Code segment invalid?
- IDT entry not present?

Causes “**Double Fault**”(#8). “Triple fault” = Reboot

Usually DF means OS bug, so a lot of state might be corrupted (i.e. invalid kernel stack)

# Hardware Task Switching


Can use it for #PF and #DF traps instead of Trap Gates






# Task gate

- (unused) mechanism for **hardware** tasking
- Reloads (nearly) all CPU state from memory
- Task gate causes **task switch** on **trap**




# IDT



# GDT

(addressed indirectly through GDT)



- AVL Available for use by system software
- B Busy flag
- BASE Segment Base Address
- DPL Descriptor Privilege Level
- G Granularity
- LIMIT Segment Limit
- P Segment Present
- TYPE Segment Type

# IDT-> GDT->TSS

## It still pushes the error code

31	15	0	
I/O Map Base Address		Reserved	T
Reserved		LDT Segment Selector	
Reserved		GS	
Reserved		FS	
Reserved		DS	
Reserved		SS	
Reserved		CS	
Reserved		ES	
EDI			
ESI			
EBP			
ESP			
EBX			
EDX			
ECX			
EAX			
EFLAGS			
EIP			
CR3 (PDBR)			
Reserved		SS2	
ESP2			
Reserved		SS1	
ESP1			
Reserved		SS0	
ESP0			
Reserved		Previous Task Link	

# Interrupt to Task Gate

1. Save state to location pointed to by TR
2. Find Task (GDT), validate + check Busy=0
3. Load new state
4. Push error code



```
graph TD; Title[Interrupt to Task Gate] --> Step1[1. Save state to location pointed to by TR]; Title --> Step2[2. Find Task (GDT), validate + check Busy=0]; Title --> Step3[3. Load new state]; Title --> Step4[4. Push error code]; Step4 --> Doublefault[Doublefault]; Doublefault --> Title; Step4 --> EIP[Begin executing new EIP];
```

Begin executing new EIP

Doublefault



# Brief digression

## Intel Manual:

- Avoid placing a page boundary in the part of the TSS that the processor reads during a task switch (the first 104 bytes). The processor may not correctly perform address translations if a boundary occurs in this area. During a task switch, the processor reads and writes into the first 104 bytes of each TSS (using contiguous physical addresses beginning with the physical address of the first byte of the TSS). So, after TSS access begins, if part of the 104 bytes is not physically contiguous, the processor will access incorrect information without generating a page-fault exception.

# Brief digression

## Intel Manual:

- Avoid placing a page boundary in the part of the TSS that the processor reads during a task switch (the first 104 bytes). The processor may not correctly perform address translations if a boundary occurs in this area. During a task switch, the processor reads and writes into the first 104 bytes of each TSS (using contiguous physical addresses beginning with the physical address of the first byte of the TSS). So, after TSS access begins, if part of the 104 bytes is not physically contiguous, the processor will access incorrect information without generating a page-fault exception.

Bypass (all) paging from the kernel?  
VM Escape?  
Wouldn't that be nice?







Maybe we should actually verify it..

CPU translates DWORD by DWORD





(CC-BY-SA)Lizzie Bitty/DevianArt



**Look Ma, it's a machine!**

# A one-instruction machine

Instruction Format:  
Label = (X <-Y,A,B)

Label:

X=Y

If X<4:

Goto B

Else

X-=4

Goto A

- “Decrement-Branch-If-Negative”
- Turing complete (!)
- “Computer Architecture: A Minimalist Perspective” by Gilreath and Laplathe (~\$200)
- Or Wikipedia :)

# Implementation sketch:

- If EIP of a handler is pointed at invalid memory, we get another **page fault** immediately; keep EIP invalid in all tasks
- Var Decrement: use TSS' SP, pushing the stack decrements SP by 4.
- Branch:  $<4$  or not? Implemented by **double fault** when SP cannot be decremented



# Dramatis Personae I

- One GDT to rule them all
- One TSS Descriptor per instruction, aligned with the end of a page
- IDT is mapped differently, per instruction
- A target (branch-not-taken) in Int 14, #PF
- B target (branch taken) in Int 8, #DF


# Dramatis Personae II

- Higher half of TSS (variables)
  - Map A.Y, B.Y (the value we want to load for next instruction) at their TSS addresses
  - map X (the value we want to write) at the addr of the current task
- So we have the move and decrement

- We split these TSS across a page boundary
- Variables are stack pointer entries in a TSS →
- Upper Page: ESP and segments
- Lower Page: EAX, ECX, EIP, CR3 (page tables) →

Labels: A, B, C, ... →


31	15	0	
I/O Map Base Address		Reserved	T 100
Reserved		LDT Segment Selector	96
Reserved		GS	92
Reserved		FS	88
Reserved		DS	84
Reserved		SS	80
Reserved		CS	76
Reserved		ES	72
EDI			68
ESI			64
EBP			60
ESP			56
EBX			52
EDX			48
ECX			44
EAX			40
EFLAGS			36
EIP			32
CR3 (PDBR)			28
Reserved		SS2	24
ESP2			20
Reserved		SS1	16
ESP1			12
Reserved		SS0	8
ESP0			4
Reserved		Previous Task Link	0







# Let's step through an instruction


(Some details glossed over;  
think of it as a fairy tale, not a lie)




# Instruction by the numbers (or, “PFLA fetch-decode-execute” loop)











CPU state is saved to current task






CPU loads interrupt task



# “Implementation Problem”



# I bit(ch) of a bit(ch)




CPU won't load task if this is set

AVL	Available for use by system software
B	Busy flag
BASE	Segment Base Address
DPL	Descriptor Privilege Level
G	Granularity
LIMIT	Segment Limit
P	Segment Present
TYPE	Segment Type



# I bit(ch) of a bit(ch)




CPU won't load task if this is set


AVL Available for use by system software  
B Busy flag  
BASE Segment Base Address  
DPL Descriptor Privilege Level  
G Granularity  
LIMIT Segment Limit  
P Segment Present  
TYPE Segment Type

We need to overwrite it. Luckily, the CPU always saves all the state (even if not dirty).


So: map the lower half of TSS over GDT, so that saved EAX,ECX from TSS overwrite descriptor; same content, only busy bit cleared.


Dealing with that bit  
needs a nuclear  
option...















# And now to face the uglier truth...







IDT trick must take care of  
task switch logic checking TR contents  
=> must duplicate GDT descriptors

# Meanwhile, on the FSB

(Slightly redacted)

Write 0x8	0xFFFF 0000
Read 0x1008	0x4
Write 0x2008	0x0
Read 0x8	0xFFFF 0000

And they all compute happily ever after  
(for all we know)

# What restrictions do we have?

- Needs kernel access to set up :)
- No two double faults in a row
- Can only use our one awkward instruction
- Can only work with SP of TSS aligned across page (very limited coverage of phys. mem)



In Soviet Russia,  
Red Pill takes you



# White Hat Takeaway

- Check how your tools handle old/unused CPU features
- Don't trust the spec

# Black Hat Takeaway

- A really nice, big Redpill
- With more work, you can probably make it work differently in Analysis tools
- Or just shoot down the host

# Strawhat Takeaway

- It's a weird machine! (And we like them)
- We are working on 64 bit, better tools
  - Compiler, debugger
- See how it works on different hardware?

“There is never enough time.  
Thank you for yours!”

*--Dan Geer*



# “I have a dream”

- of a world where a hacker isn't judged by the color of his hat, but the weirdness of his machine
- of a world where a single step in can change your world completely
- of a world where we strive to understand what dragons sleep in seemingly innocent systems