




# The Inner Workings of the Windows Runtime

James Forshaw @tiraniddo

# Who am I?

- Researcher in Google's Project Zero
- Specialize in Windows
  - Especially local privilege escalation
  - Logical vulnerability specialist
- Author of a book on attacking network protocols
- @tiraniddo on Twitter.



# Why Talk About Windows Runtime?

Understand the Technology

Aid to Reverse Engineering

Improve Security Research

# Background Research



[https://www.troopers.de/downloads/troopers17/TR17\\_Demystifying\\_%20COM.pdf](https://www.troopers.de/downloads/troopers17/TR17_Demystifying_%20COM.pdf)

Windows RunTime  
Hack In The Box 2012

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**QUARKSLAB**  
INNOVATIVE SECURITY

This Talk is based  
on Windows 10  
**1803/1809**

# OleViewDotNet

The screenshot shows the GitHub repository page for `tyranid / oleviewdotnet`. At the top, there are navigation links for Code, Issues (2), Pull requests (0), Projects (0), Wiki, Insights, and Settings. The repository description is "A .net OLE/COM viewer and inspector to merge functionality of OleView and Test Container". Below this, there are statistics: 506 commits, 2 branches, 4 releases, 2 contributors, and GPL-3.0 license. A green progress bar is visible. The main content area shows a list of commits, with the most recent one by `tyranid` titled "Added method to create the Publisher ID from a Publisher Name," committed 15 hours ago. Other commits include "Added method to create the Publisher ID from a Publisher Name," "Fix naming issues," "Cleanup for assembly information," and "Updated gitignores and output file to a common location in release bu...".

tyranid / oleviewdotnet

Unwatch 39 Star 312 Fork 59

Code Issues 2 Pull requests 0 Projects 0 Wiki Insights Settings

A .net OLE/COM viewer and inspector to merge functionality of OleView and Test Container

Manage topics

506 commits 2 branches 4 releases 2 contributors GPL-3.0


Branch: master New pull request Create new file Upload files Find file Clone or download

tyranid Added method to create the Publisher ID from a Publisher Name, Latest commit acca9d1 15 hours ago


OleViewDotNet.Main	Added method to create the Publisher ID from a Publisher Name,	15 hours ago
OleViewDotNet.PowerShell	Fix naming issues,	3 days ago
OleViewDotNet	Cleanup for assembly information,	a month ago
.gitignore	Updated gitignores and output file to a common location in release bu...	3 months ago

<https://github.com/tyranid/oleviewdotnet>

# What's the Windows Runtime (WinRT)?



# COM Joins Everything Together



# Inspectable the New Root of Evil

```
MIDL_INTERFACE("AF86E2E0-B12D-4c6a-9C5A-D7AA65101E90")  
IInspectable : public IUnknown {  
public:  
    HRESULT GetIids(  
        ULONG *iidCount,  
        IID **iids);  
    HRESULT GetRuntimeClassName(  
        HSTRING *className);  
    HRESULT GetTrustLevel(  
        TrustLevel *trustLevel);  
};
```

Get a list of interface IDs supported by class.

Get class name.

Get class trust level.

# Activation Factories


- Component classes can't be directly 'newed' so WinRT defines a factory interface, *IActivationFactory*. Does not use *IClassFactory*.

```
DEFINE_GUID(IID_ActivationFactory,  
            "00000035-0000-0000-C000-000000000046");  
struct IActivationFactory : public IUnknown {  
    HRESULT ActivateInstance(  
        IInspectable **instance  
    );  
};
```

# Activation Factories and Instances

```
HRESULT RoGetActivationFactory (  
    HSTRING          activatableClassId,  
    REFIID          iid,  
    LPVOID*         factory);
```

Abbreviated as  
ACID



```
HRESULT RoActivateInstance (  
    HSTRING          activatableClassId,  
    IInspectable**  instance,  
);
```

Example ACID: “**Windows.Foundation.Uri**”

# Runtime Class Registry Keys

System  
Windows Runtime  
Classes

HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\Software\Classes

Per-App Runtime  
Extension Classes

HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER\Software\Classes

Per-App Runtime Classes

%ProgramData%\Package\ActivationStore.dat

# Runtime Extension Classes

<b><i>Contract ID</i></b>	<b><i>Description</i></b>
Windows.Launch	Default Application Launch
Windows.Protocol	URI Protocol Handler
Windows.BackgroundTasks	Background Task
Windows.File	Launch and pass a file object
Windows.Search	Search request

# Class Trust Levels

```
HRESULT GetTrustLevel(TrustLevel *trustLevel);
```

**Full Trust**

Can only be created in a fully trusted context


**Partial Trust**

Can be created in a sandbox context through a broker


**Base Trust**

Can be created in any context

# Base Trust Class



# Partial Trust Class



# DEMO 1

# Application Manifest XML

<Package>

```
<Identity Name="Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge"
  Publisher="CN=Microsoft Corporation, ..."
  Version="44.17763.1.0"
  ProcessorArchitecture="neutral"/>
```

Package  
Identity

<Applications>



```
<Application Id="MicrosoftEdge"
  Executable="MicrosoftEdge.exe"
  EntryPoint="MicrosoftEdge.App">
  ...
</Application>
```

Application  
Launch

</Applications>


</Package>

# Application Activation




Call  
ActivateApplication  
over DCOM


# Application Activation



# Application Activation



# Application Activation



# WinRT Activation Properties

## ActivationPropertiesIn



```
struct ComWinRTActivationPropertiesData {  
    HSTRING    activatableClassId;  
    HSTRING    packageFullName;  
    ULONGLONG  userContext;  
    PBLOB      rtbProcessMitigationPolicyBlob;  
};
```


```
struct ExtensionActivationContextPropertiesData {  
    ULONGLONG  hostId;  
    ULONGLONG  userContext;  
    GUID       componentProcessId;  
    ULONGLONG  racActivationTokenId;  
    PBLOB      lpacAttributes;  
    ULONGLONG  consoleHandlesId;  
    ULONGLONG  aamActivationId;  
};
```

# Extension Activation

```
// Exported as Ordinal #65
HRESULT RoGetExtensionRegistration(
    HSTRING contractId,
    HSTRING packageId,
    HSTRING activatableClassId,
    IExtensionRegistration **extensionRegistration);
```

```
IExtensionRegistration* reg =;
RoGetExtensionRegistration("Windows.Launch",
    "Pkg_1.0.0.0_XXXXXXXXXX", "App", &reg);
reg->set_HostId(12345678);
IInspectable* obj;
reg->Activate(&obj);
```

# AppContainer Access Token Attributes



Caller needs SeTcbPrivilege to add or modify security attributes.

Application Host ID

System Application ID

Package Flags

Low Privilege App Container

# Building the System Application ID

<b><i>Component</i></b>	<b><i>Example</i></b>
Package Name	<i>Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge</i>
Publisher ID	<i>8wekyb3d8bbwe</i>
Package Family Name	<i>Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe</i>
Package Full Name	<i>Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_44.17763.1.0_neutral__8wekyb3d8bbwe</i>
Package Moniker	Same as Package Full Name
Package-Relative App ID	<i>App</i>
Application User Model ID	<i>Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe!App</i>

# AppContainer SID and Capabilities

Package Family  
Name and  
Package SID

```
<Capabilities>  
  <Capability Name="internetClient"/>  
  <Capability Name="privateNetworkClientServer"/>  
  <rescap:Capability Name="childWebContent"/>  
  <rescap:Capability Name="confirmAppClose"/>  
  <rescap:Capability Name="lpacCom"/>  
  ...  
  <DeviceCapability Name="location"/>  
  <DeviceCapability Name="microphone"/>  
  <DeviceCapability Name="webcam"/>  
</Capabilities>
```

MicrosoftEdge.exe:3632 - User CALCITE\admin - TokenId 0000000...

Main Details Groups Privileges App Container Default Dacl Misc Operations Security

Package Name: microsoft.microsoftedge\_8wekyb3d8bbwe

Package SID: S-1-15-2-3624051433-2125758914-1423191267-174


App Container Number: 5

Name	Flags
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY:Software and hardware certificates or a smart card	Enabled
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY>Your home or work networks	Enabled
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY>Your Internet connection	Enabled
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY>Your pictures library	Enabled
APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY>Your Windows credentials	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Cellular Data	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Child Web Content	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Confirm App Close	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Cortana Settings	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Enterprise Cloud S S O	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Enterprise Data Policy	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Extended Execution Background Audio	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Extended Execution Unconstrained	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Feature Staging Info	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Graphics Capture	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Hevc Playback	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!ID_CAP_CAMERA	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!ID_CAP_LOCATION	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!ID_CAP_MICROPHONE	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Live Id Service	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Location	Enabled
NAMED CAPABILITIES!Lpac App Experience	Enabled

# DEMO 2

# Reverse Engineering Native Components

# Windows Metadata



The screenshot shows the ILSpy .NET 4 (WPF) interface. On the left, the 'References' tree is expanded to show the 'Windows.Foundation' namespace, with the 'Deferred' class selected. On the right, the source code for the 'Deferred' class is displayed, showing its inheritance from 'IDeferred' and 'IClosable', and its implementation of 'Complete()' and 'Close()' methods.

```
1 // Windows.Foundation.Deferred
2 using ...
3
4
5
6 [MarshalingBehavior(MarshalingType.Aggressive)]
7 [DualApiPartition(version = 167772160u)]
8 [Activatable(typeof(IDeferredFactory), 65536u, "Windows.Foundation.FoundationContract
9 [ContractVersion(typeof(FOUNDATIONCONTRACT), 65536u)]
10 public sealed class Deferred : IDeferred, IClosable
11 {
12     public extern Deferred([In] DeferredCompletedHandler handler);
13
14     public extern void Complete();
15
16     void IDeferred.Complete()
17     {
18         ...
19     }
20
21
22     public extern void Close();
23
24     void IClosable.Close()
25     {
26         ...
27     }
28 }
29
30
```

C:\Windows\System32\WinMetadata

# Combining Interfaces

```
class RuntimeClass {  
    // Default constructor.  
    public RuntimeClass();  
    // Constructor with parameter.  
    public RuntimeClass(int p);  
    // Static method.  
    public static int A();  
    // Instance method.  
    public int B();  
}
```

Factory Object

Instance Object

# Combining Interfaces

```
class RuntimeClass {  
    // Default constructor.  
    public RuntimeClass();  
    // Constructor with parameter.  
    public RuntimeClass(int p);  
    // Static method.  
    public static int A();  
    // Instance method.  
    public int B();  
}
```

## Factory Object

```
interface IActivationFactory {  
    HRESULT ActivateInstance(  
        IInspectable **instance  
    );  
}
```

## Instance Object

```
interface IRuntimeClass {  
    HRESULT B(int* retval);  
}
```

# Combining Interfaces

```
class RuntimeClass {  
    // Default constructor.  
    public RuntimeClass();  
    // Constructor with parameter.  
    public RuntimeClass(int p);  
    // Static method.  
    public static int A();  
    // Instance method.  
    public int B();  
}
```

## Factory Object

```
interface IActivationFactory {  
    HRESULT ActivateInstance(  
        IInspectable **instance  
    );  
}
```

```
interface IRuntimeClassFactory {  
    HRESULT ActivateInstanceWithParam(  
        int p,  
        IRuntimeClass** instance);  
}
```

```
interface IRuntimeClassStatics {  
    HRESULT A(int* retval);  
}
```

## Instance Object

```
interface IRuntimeClass {  
    HRESULT B(int* retval);  
}
```

# Finding the Implementation Binary

Get object for the class

```
PS> $cls = Get-ComRuntimeClass -Name "Class.Name"
```

If In-Process get DLL path

```
PS> $cls.DllPath
```

If OOP NormalExe get Server Exe Path

```
PS> $cls.ServerEntry.ExePath
```

If OOP service get Service name

```
PS> $cls.ServerEntry.ServiceName
```

# Activation Entry Points

Exported from a DLL

```
HRESULT DllGetActivationFactory(  
    HSTRING          activatableClassId,  
    IActivationFactory **factory  
);
```

Called in an EXE

```
HRESULT RoRegisterActivationFactories(  
    HSTRING          *activatableClassIds,  
    PFNGETACTIVATIONFACTORY *activationFactoryCallbacks,  
    UINT32          count,  
    RO_REGISTRATION_COOKIE *cookie  
);
```

# C++ Application Frameworks

## C++/CX (Custom C++ dialect)

```
void App::OnLaunched(LaunchActivatedEventArgs^ e) {  
    Handler^ handler = ref new Handler();  
    handler->HandleLaunch("Launched");  
}
```

## C++/WRL (C++ 11)

```
HRESULT App::OnLauncher(ILaunchActivatedEventArgs* e) {  
    ComPtr<IHandler> handler;  
    HRESULT hr = Make<Handler>(&handler)  
    if (FAILED(hr))  
        return hr;  
    HStringReference str(L"OnLaunched");  
    return handler->HandleLaunch(str.Get());  
}
```

## C++/WINRT (C++ 17)

```
void App::OnLaunched(LaunchActivatedEventArgs const& e) {  
    Handler handler = Handler();  
    handler.HandleLaunch(hstring(L"Launched"));  
}
```

# IDL File

```
namespace WRLClass {
    [uuid(E74F1CF0-59C7-4CA6-BDE5-0F9DED9B4EF7),
     version(1.0), exclusiveto(WinRTClass)]
    interface IWinRTClass : IInspectable {
        HRESULT Add([in] int a, [in] int b,
                    [out, retval] int* value);
    }

    [version(1.0), activatable(1.0)]
    runtimeclass WinRTClass {
        [default] interface IWinRTClass;
    }
}
```

# C++/WRL Implementation

```
class WinRTClass : public RuntimeClass<IWinRTClass> {  
   InspectableClass(L"WRLClass.WinRTClass", BaseTrust)  
public:  
    HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE Add(  
        /* [in] */int a,  
        /* [in] */int b,  
        /* [retval, out] */int * value  
    ) override {  
        *value = a + b;  
        return S_OK;  
    }  
};
```

Define base  
implementation of  
Inspectable

Interface  
Implementation

Define  
ActivationFactory

```
ActivatableClass(WinRTClass);
```

# Finding Implemented Interfaces

```
HRESULT QueryInterface(REFIID riid, void** ppv) {  
    bool handled = false;  
    HRESULT hr = CustomQueryInterface(riid, ppv, &handled);  
    if (FAILED(hr) || handled)  
        return hr;  
  
    return Super::AsIID(this, riid, ppv);  
}
```

Overridable  
Custom QI

Call AsIID  
helper  
method

# AsIID Helper

Variadic  
Template

Handle Base  
Case

```
HRESULT AsIID(RuntimeClass<IT...>* implements,
              REFIID riid, void **ppv) {
    HRESULT hr = E_NOINTERFACE;
    if (riid == __uuidof(IUnknown)
        || riid == __uuidof(IInspectable)) {
        *ppv = implements->CastToUnknown();
        hr = S_OK;
    } else {
        hr = implements->CanCastTo(riid, ppv);
    }
    if (SUCCEEDED(hr))
        static_cast<IUnknown*>(*ppv)->AddRef();
    return hr;
}
```

Specific  
CanCastTo

# CanCastTo Helper

Variadic  
Template  
Expanded

```
HRESULT RuntimeClass<I1, I2, I3> CanCastTo(REFIID riid,  
                                             void* ppv) {  
    if (riid == __uuidof(I1)) {  
        ppv = static_cast<I1*>(this);  
    } else if (riid == __uuidof(I2)) {  
        ppv = static_cast<I2*>(this);  
    } else if (riid == __uuidof(I3)) {  
        ppv = static_cast<I2*>(this);  
    } else {  
        return E_NOINTERFACE;  
    }  
    return S_OK;  
}
```

Test Each  
Interface

# String Handles (HSTRING)

```
typedef struct HSTRING__ {  
    int unused;  
} HSTRING__;
```

Opaque string handle structure.

```
// Declare the HSTRING handle for C/C++  
typedef HSTRING__ * HSTRING;
```

```
WindowsCreateString(  
    PCNZWCH sourceString,  
    UINT32 length,  
    HSTRING *string  
);
```

Reference counted on the heap.

```
WindowsCreateStringReference(  
    PCWSTR sourceString,  
    UINT32 length,  
    HSTRING_HEADER *hstringHeader,  
    HSTRING *string  
);
```

Scoped on the stack.

# The Real HSTRING

```
struct HSTRING_HEADER_INTERNAL {  
    WINDOWS_RUNTIME_HSTRING_FLAGS flags;  
    unsigned int length;           Used for stack scoped  
    unsigned int padding1;        "reference" strings.  
    unsigned int padding2;  
    const wchar_t *stringRef;  
};
```

```
struct STRING_OPAQUE {  
    HSTRING_HEADER_INTERNAL header;  
    volatile int refcount;  
    wchar_t string[1];           Inline string data and  
                                reference count for use  
                                on the heap
```

```
PCWSTR WindowsGetStringRawBuffer(  
    HSTRING string,  
    UINT32 *length  
);
```

Call to get raw  
buffer and length.

Create a new instance of a COM object.

```
PS> $obj = New-ComObject -Class $cls
```

Get all known interfaces for a class.

```
PS> $intf = Get-ComClassInterface $cls
```

Get proxy information for a list of interfaces.

```
PS> $prx = $intf | Get-ComProxy
```

Format the COM proxies as text.

```
PS> $prx | Format-ComProxy
```

# Debugging Applications

Get all registered Windows.Launch Extensions

```
PS> Get-ComRuntimeExtension -Launch | `
      Select PackageId, AppId
```

Start a package and debug it.

```
PS> windbg.exe -p!mPackage PKGID -p!mApp APPID
```


Enable debugging for a package

```
PS> plmdebug.exe /enableDebug PKGID DBGPATH.EXE
```

# DEMO 3

# Windows Runtime Security

# Sandbox Escape OOP Attack Surface



Get list of partial trust classes

```
PS> Get-ComRuntimeClass -TrustLevel PartialTrust
```

Get Interactive User classes

```
PS> Get-ComRuntimeServer -IdentityType SessionUser `
| Select -ExpandProperty Classes
```

Get svchost hosted classes

```
PS> Get-ComRuntimeServer -ServerType SvchostService `
| Select -ExpandProperty Classes
```

Get EXE hosted classes

```
PS> Get-ComRuntimeServer -ServerType ExeService `
| Select -ExpandProperty Classes
```

# Partial Trust Class Default Permissions

```
PS> Show-ComSecurityDescriptor -RuntimeDefault
```

The screenshot shows the 'Launch Security' dialog box with the following details:

- Owner: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- Group: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- Integrity: Low
- DACL | SACL

The ACL Entries table is as follows:

Type	Account	Access	Flags	Condition
Allowed	APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\SELF	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
AllowedCallback	NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	!(WIN:/IS

The Specific Access section is as follows:

Name	Access Mask
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Execute	0x00000001
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Execute Local	0x00000002
<input type="checkbox"/> Execute Remote	0x00000004
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Activate Local	0x00000008
<input type="checkbox"/> Activate Remote	0x00000010

Allows all AC at the same user to access the class.

# Class Specific Permissions

```
PS> Show-ComSecurityDescriptor $cls
```

The screenshot shows the 'Launch Security' properties window for 'Windows.ApplicationModel.AppExtensions.AppExtensionCatalog'. The 'ACL Entries' section contains a table with the following data:

Type	Account	Access	Flags	Condit
Allowed	NAMED CAPABILITIES\Ipac App Experience	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\SELF	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	
Allowed	NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE	Execute, ExecuteLocal, ActivateLocal	None	


The 'Specific Access' section is also visible, showing a list of permissions with checkboxes:

Name	Access Mask
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Execute	0x00000001
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Execute Local	0x00000002
<input type="checkbox"/> Execute Remote	0x00000004
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Activate Local	0x00000008
<input type="checkbox"/> Activate Remote	0x00000010

Adds the *IpacAppExperience* capability

# Finding Accessible Classes

```
PS> Get-ComRuntimeClass | Select-ComAccess -pid X
```



```
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
PS C:\> Get-ComRuntimeClass | Select-ComAccess -pid 16324 | select Name
Name
----
Windows.ApplicationModel.AppExtensions.AppExtensionCatalog
Windows.ApplicationModel.Internal.DataTransfer.ClipboardBrokerProvider
Windows.ApplicationModel.Internal.PackageCatalogInternal
Windows.ApplicationModel.PackageCatalog
Windows.ApplicationModel.Payments.Internal.PaymentModalDialog
Windows.Devices.Enumeration.DeviceAccessInformation
Windows.Globalization.Spelling.Internal.Facility
Windows.Graphics.Capture.Server.CapturableItem
Windows.Graphics.Capture.Server.CaptureSession
Windows.Graphics.Internal.Printing.workflow.workflowSessionManager
Windows.Internal.CapabilityAccess.CapabilityAccess
Windows.Internal.CapabilityAccess.Management.CapabilityConsent
Windows.Internal.CapabilityAccess.Management.CapabilityConsentManager
Windows.Internal.CapabilityAccess.Management.CapabilityProvisioning
Windows.Internal.ComposableShell.ExtensionClassProvider
Windows.Internal.DeviceBroker
Windows.Internal.DeviceEnumerationHelper
```

# Package Name Checks

```
BOOL BrokerAuthenticateCOMCaller() {
    HANDLE token;
    CoImpersonateClient();
    OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_QUERY, &token);
    WCHAR family_name[255];
    ULONG family_name_length = 255;
    NTSTATUS status = RtlQueryPackageClaims(token,
        family_name, &family_name_length);
    if (NT_SUCCESS(status))
        return wcsicmp(package_name, L"MicrosoftEdge") == 0;
    return FALSE;
}
```

Reads from  
WIN://SYSAPPID



# Incorrect Capability or Missing Security Checks

```
HANDLE CheckedCreateFile(string path) {
    // Get client token.
    HANDLE token;
    CoImpersonateClient();
    OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), &token);

    HANDLE ret = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
    if (CapabilityCheck(token, L"internetClient")) {
        ret = CreateFile(path, ...);
    }

    return ret;
}
```

But opening a file.

Checking for  
internetClient capability

# HSTRING is a Counted String

```
UINT32 length;  
PCWSTR str = WindowsGetStringRawBuffer(hString,  
                                         &length);  
  
// Might not be equal.  
assert(wcslen(str) == length);
```



```
HRESULT WindowsStringHasEmbeddedNull(  
    HSTRING string,  
    BOOL *hasEmbeddedNull  
);
```

# TOCTOU in Marshaled Interfaces

```
HRESULT StartViewer(IFileObject file) {  
    if (file.GetPath().EndsWith(".exe"))  
        return E_ACCESS_DENIED;  
  
    ShellExecute(file.GetPath());  
}
```

Takes Generic  
interface

First call returns  
safe filename.

Second call returns  
unsafe filename.

```
class MyFileObject : IFileObject {  
    bool _returned = false;  
    string GetPath() {  
        if (_returned)  
            return "calc.exe";  
        _returned = true;  
        return "safe.txt";  
    }  
}
```


# Inject a DLL Into Running Process

```
c:\windows\system32\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell.exe
PS D:\> Get-NtProcessMitigations -Name 'MicrosoftEdge.exe' | select *Signed*

MicrosoftSignedOnly      : False
StoreSignedOnly          : True
SignedMitigationOptIn    : True
AuditMicrosoftSignedOnly : False
AuditStoreSignedOnly     : False

PS D:\> Get-NtProcessMitigations -Name 'Calculator.exe' | select *Signed*

MicrosoftSignedOnly      : False
StoreSignedOnly          : True
SignedMitigationOptIn    : False
AuditMicrosoftSignedOnly : False
AuditStoreSignedOnly     : False
```



Only Store signed  
DLLs can be loaded

# DEMO 4

# Conclusions

- All based on familiar COM programming paradigms
- The Windows Runtime has many interesting attack surfaces
  - Attack surface which might be accessible remotely
  - Plenty of Sandbox to User and User to System privilege escalation routes
- Tooling is not quite there, making an effort with OleViewDotNet

谢谢