

Fresh Apples: Researching New Attack Interfaces on iOS and MacOS

Lilang Wu, Moony Li

Agenda

- About US
- Solution Overview
- Static Analysis for Kernel and KEXTs Attack Interfaces
 - KEXTs Interfaces Vector Automatic Generate
 - Kernel Interfaces Vector Automatic Generate
 - Kernel/KEXTs Interfaces Diff Analysis
- Dynamic Analysis for Kernel and UserMode Attack Interfaces
- Automatic Fuzzing solution
- 0Day vulnerabilities found

About us

- **Lilang Wu**

- 4 years security
- Mobile advance threat research
- MacOS/iOS Vulnerability/Malware
- @Lilang_Wu



- **Moony Li**

- 9 years security
- MacOS/Android/iOS vulnerability
hunt and exploit
- Sandbox/Emulator Development
- @Flyic






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Solution Overview


【1】 Identify attack interfaces by automatically reverse engineering

【2】 Dynamic analysis for kernel attack interface





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Attack Surfaces



Factory



Military Base




Big City

Think about Apple System

Key Components




New Attack Interfaces Generator






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KEXTs Interfaces Analysis Flow



Classes inheritance relationship

OSMetaClass::OSMetaClass

- manages run-time type information for Libkern and I/O Kit C++ classes
- rdi/x0: instance of register Meta class
- rsi/x1: Meta class name
- rdx/x2: instance of parent Meta class
- rcx/w3: size of register Meta class instance

```
__GLOBAL__sub_I_IOAccelMemory_cpp proc near
; DATA XREF: __mod_init_func:00000000000590E0↓o
    push    rbp
    mov     rbp, rsp
    lea    rdi, __ZN13IOAccelMemory10gMetaClassE ; IOAccelMemory::gMetaClass
    lea    rsi, aIoaccelmemory ; "IOAccelMemory"
    mov    rdx, cs: __ZN8OSObject10gMetaClassE_0 ; OSObject::gMetaClass
    mov    ecx, 0A0h ; '
    call   __ZN11OSMetaClassC2EPKcPKS_j ; OSMetaClass::OSMetaClass(char const*,OSMetaClass const*,uint)
    lea    rax, off_59550
    mov    cs: __ZN13IOAccelMemory10gMetaClassE, rax ; IOAccelMemory::gMetaClass
    pop    rbp
    retn
__GLOBAL__sub_I_IOAccelMemory_cpp endp
```

```
ADRP    X0, #unk_FFFFFFFF0077500C8@PAGE
ADD     X0, X0, #unk_FFFFFFFF0077500C8@PAGEOFF
ADRP    X1, #aIoethernetcont@PAGE ; "IOEthernetController"
ADD     X1, X1, #aIoethernetcont@PAGEOFF ; "IOEthernetController"
ADRP    X2, #unk_FFFFFFFF007750298@PAGE
ADD     X2, X2, #unk_FFFFFFFF007750298@PAGEOFF
MOV     W3, #0x118
BL      __ZN11OSMetaClassC2EPKcPKS_j_IONetworkingFamily_0_bridge
```


Class/Method names re-fine

Re-fine two method table

- instance method table
- meta method table

```

ClassName : IOmobileFramebuffer
SuperClass: IOService->IORegistryEntry->OSObject
SuperClass: 0xffffffff0765eb68
ClassSize : 0x8db0
0 : 0xffffffff0063af65cL sub_0xffffffff0063af65cL
1 : 0xffffffff0063ba7d0L sub_0xffffffff0063ba7d0L
2 : 0xffffffff00754b618L OSMetaClass::release(int)
3 : 0xffffffff00754b61cL OSMetaClass::getRetainCount()
4 : 0xffffffff00754b624L OSMetaClass::retain()
5 : 0xffffffff00754b628L OSMetaClass::release()
6 : 0xffffffff00754b62cL OSMetaClass::serialize(OSSerialize*)
7 : 0xffffffff00754b64cL OSMetaClass::getMetaClass()
8 : 0xffffffff00754b458L OSMetaClassBase::isEqualTo(OSMetaClassBase const*)
9 : 0xffffffff00754b658L OSMetaClass::taggedRetain(void const*)
10 : 0xffffffff00754b65cL OSMetaClass::taggedRelease(void const*)
11 : 0xffffffff00754b660L OSMetaClass::taggedRelease(void const*, int)
12 : 0xffffffff0063af6d4L sub_0xffffffff0063af6d4L
-vtable:0xffffffff006ed14e0L
:
:
IOmobileFramebuffer IOService if super_addr in BASE_CLASS: IORegistryEntry OSObject
0 : 0xffffffff0063af680L sub_0xffffffff0063af680L sub_0xffffffff007584da8L sub_0xffffffff00754d
1 : 0xffffffff0063af68cL sub_0xffffffff0063af68cL IOService::~IOService() IORegistryEntry::~IORegistryEntry() OSObject::~OSObject
2 : 0xffffffff00754d4c4L OSObject::release(int) OSObject::release(int) OSObject::release(int) OSObject::release(int)
3 : 0xffffffff00754d4d8L OSObject::getRetainCount() OSObject::getRetainCount() OSObject::getRetainCount() OSObject::getRetainCount()
4 : 0xffffffff00754d4e8L OSObject::retain() OSObject::retain() OSObject::retain() OSObject::retain()
5 : 0xffffffff00754d4f0L OSObject::release() OSObject::release() OSObject::release() OSObject::release()
6 : 0xffffffff00754d500L OSObject::serialize(OSSerialize*) OSObject::serialize(OSSerialize*) OSObject::serialize(OSSerialize*) OSObject::serialize(OSSerialize*)
7 : 0xffffffff0063af690L sub_0xffffffff0063af690L IOService::getMetaClass() IORegistryEntry::getMetaClass() OSObject::getMetaCl
8 : 0xffffffff00754d558L OSMetaClassBase::isEqualTo(OSMetaClassBase const*) OSMetaClassBase::isEqualTo(OSMetaClassBase const*) OSMetaClassBase::is
9 : 0xffffffff00754d568L OSObject::taggedRetain(void const*) OSObject::taggedRetain(void const*) OSObject::taggedRetain(void const*) OSObject::taggedRet
10 : 0xffffffff00754d590L OSObject::taggedRelease(void const*) OSObject::taggedRelease(void const*) OSObject::taggedRelease(void const*) OSObject::taggedRel
11 : 0xffffffff00754d598L OSObject::taggedRelease(void const*, int) OSObject::taggedRelease(void const*, int) OSObject::taggedRelease(void const*, int) OSObject::taggedRel
12 : 0xffffffff00754d770L OSObject::init() OSObject::init() OSObject::init() OSObject::init()
13 : 0xffffffff0063b0118L sub_0xffffffff0063b0118L IOService::~free() IORegistryEntry::~free() OSObject::~free()
    
```



Connection Type - User Clients

IOService::newUserClient function

- creates an IOUserClient-based connection for communication with a non-kernel client
- invokes this function by calling the IOServiceOpen


```
frame #11: 0xfffff80145f1871 kernel.development IOService::newUserClient(this=0xfffff8036144800, ow
ff8042c36840, type=6, properties=0x0000000000000000, handler=0xfffff921acdbce0) at IOService.cpp:5851
frame #12: 0xfffff80146542d0 kernel.development ;:is_io_service_open_extended(_service=0xfffff803614
type=6, ndr=<unavailable>, properties=<unavailable>, propertiesCnt=<unavailable>, result=0xfffff803ca
Client.cpp:3468 [opt]
frame #13: 0xfffff8013ff2662 kernel.development _Xio_service_open_extended(InHeadP=0xfffff803ca0e26
er.c:8003 [opt]
frame #14: 0xfffff8013ec450d kernel.development ipc_kobject_server(request=0xfffff803ca0e200, option
frame #15: 0xfffff8013e9124a kernel.development ipc_kmsg_send(kmsg=0xfffff803ca0e200, option=3, send
frame #16: 0xfffff8013eb024f kernel.development mach_msg_overwrite_trap(args=<unavailable>) at mach_r
frame #17: 0xfffff7f9749e1d7
frame #18: 0xfffff801402c7c3 kernel.development mach_call_munger(state=<unavailable>) at bsd_i386.c:
frame #19: 0xfffff8013e5b222 kernel.development hndl_mach_scall + 210
```

```
switch ( type )
{
case 0u:
    LODWORD(v19) = ((int (__fastcall *) (IOGraphicsAccelerator2 *))this->vtable->member326)(this);
    v5 = -536870210;
    if ( v19 )
    {
        v20 = (IOAccelDisplayPipeUserClient2 *)v19;
        v18 = 0LL;
        v21 = IOAccelSurface2::init(v19, 0LL, v7);
        goto LABEL_28;
    }
    break;
default:
    LODWORD(v22) = ((int (__fastcall *) (IOGraphicsAccelerator2 *, _QWORD))this->vtable->_ZN22IOGra
        this,
        type);
    v5 = -536870206;
    if ( v22 )
    {
        v23 = (IOUserClient *)v22;
        if ( (unsigned __int8)IOAccelContext2::init(v22, 0LL, v7) )
            goto LABEL_36;
        (*(void (__fastcall **)(IOUserClient *, _QWORD)))(*(void *)v23 + 40LL)(v23, 0LL);
        v5 = -536870210;
    }
    break;
case 2u:
    LODWORD(v24) = ((int (__fastcall *) (IOGraphicsAccelerator2 *))this->vtable->member327)(this);
```

User Client External Methods

IOUserClient::externalMethod

- Can be call by is_io_connect_method from user-space
- execute related external method according to selector



How Automation?

CONNECTION TYPE - USER CLIENTS

- Find the <connection type – user client> tuple, like

```
enum {
    // connection types for IOServiceOpen
    kIOFBServerConnectType      = 0,
    kIOFBSharedConnectType     = 1,
    kIOFBDiagnoseConnectType   = 2,
};
```

{

IOFramebufferUserClient
IOFramebufferSharedUserClient
IOFramebufferDiagnosticUserClient

USER CLIENT EXTERNAL METHODS

- Find or construct a external methods dispatch table, like


connection type	selector	scalarInputCount	structureInputSize	scalarOutputCount	structureOutputSize	
7	0	0	0	1	0xffffffff	IOAccelMemoryInfoUserClient:s_
	1	0	0xffffffff	0	0x70	IOAccelMemoryInfoUserClient:s_
	2	0	0	0	0	IOAccelMemoryInfoUserClient:s_
connection type	selector	scalarInputCount	structureInputSize	scalarOutputCount	structureOutputSize	
9	0	0	0	0	0	IOAccelCommandQueue::s_set_n
	1	0	0xffffffff	0	0	IOAccelCommandQueue::s_subm
	2	0	0xc	0	0	IOAccelCommandQueue::s_set_p
	3	0	0	0	0	IOAccelCommandQueue::s_get_c
	4	0	0	8	0	IOAccelCommandQueue::s_set_q
5	0	0	0x408	0	0	IOAccelCommandQueue::s_set_g

Connection Type - User Clients

Automation Methodology

- Locate the newUserClient function address in the driver
- Analyze the ASM instructions to enumerate the connection types
- Analyze the ASM instructions to get the corresponding user client for each connection type

```
do {  
    if (type == kIOHIDParamConnectType) {  
        if (eventsOpen) {  
            newConnect = new IOHIDParamUserClient;  
        } else {  
            err = kIOReturnNotOpen;  
            break;  
        }  
    }  
    else if ( type == kIOHIDServerConnectType) {  
        newConnect = new IOHIDUserClient;  
    }  
    else if ( type == kIOHIDStackShotConnectType ) {  
        newConnect = new IOHIDStackShotUserClient;  
    }  
    else if ( type == kIOHIDEventSystemConnectType ) {  
        newConnect = new IOHIDEventSystemUserClient;  
    }  
    else {  
        err = kIOReturnUnsupported;  
    }  
}
```



User Client External Methods – Graceful

```
IOReturn IOFramebufferDiagnosticUserClient::
externalMethod(uint32_t selector, IOExternalMethodArguments *args,
               IOExternalMethodDispatch *dispatch, OSObject *target,
               void *reference)
{
    static const IOExternalMethodDispatch methodTemplate[] =
    {
        // Private
        /*[0]*/ { (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOFramebuffer::extDiagnose,
                2, 0, 0, sizeof(IOGDiasnose) },
        /*[1]*/ { (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOFramebuffer::extReservedB,
                0, 0, 0, 0 },
        /*[2]*/ { (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOFramebuffer::extReservedC,
                0, 0, 0, 0 },
        /*[3]*/ { (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOFramebuffer::extReservedD,
                0, 0, 0, 0 },
        /*[4]*/ { (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOFramebuffer::extReservedE,
                4, 0, 0, kIOUCVariableStructureSize },
    };

    //=====
    // IOHIDEventServiceUserClient::sMethods
    //=====
    const IOExternalMethodDispatch IOHIDEventServiceUserClient::sMethods[kIOHIDEventServiceUserClientNumCommands] = {
        { // kIOHIDEventServiceUserClientOpen
          (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOHIDEventServiceUserClient::_open,
          1, 0,
          0, 0
        },
        { // kIOHIDEventServiceUserClientClose
          (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOHIDEventServiceUserClient::_close,
          1, 0,
          0, 0
        },
        { // kIOHIDEventServiceUserClientCopyEvent
          (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOHIDEventServiceUserClient::_copyEvent,
          2, -1,
          0, -1
        },
        { // kIOHIDEventServiceUserClientSetElementValue
          (IOExternalMethodAction) &IOHIDEventServiceUserClient::_setElementValue,
          3, 0,
          0, 0
        },
    };
};
```

Defined as Global or Local Constant
Array

■ externalMethod

OR

■ getTargetAndMethodForIndex

■ getAsyncTargetAndMethodForIndex



User Client External Methods – Graceful

Automation Methodology

- Locate the starting address for each constant array in the symbol table
- Parse the contents according to the IOExternalMethodDispatch or IOExternalMethod structure from starting address

```
struct IOExternalMethod {
    IOService *    object;
    IOMethod      func;
    IOOptionBits  flags;
    IOByteCount   count0;
    IOByteCount   count1;
};
```


```
struct IOExternalAsyncMethod {
    IOService *    object;
    IOAsyncMethod  func;
    IOOptionBits  flags;
    IOByteCount   count0;
    IOByteCount   count1;
};
```

```
struct IOExternalMethodDispatch
{
    IOExternalMethodAction function;
    uint32_t                checkScalarInputCount;
    uint32_t                checkStructureInputSize;
    uint32_t                checkScalarOutputCount;
    uint32_t                checkStructureOutputSize;
};
```

User Client External Methods - Ugly

```
cmp     esi, 6           ; switch 7 cases
ja      loc_21054        ; jumptable 00000000000020CDD default case
mov     eax, esi
lea     rcx, off_2109C
movsxd rax, dword ptr [rcx+rax*4]
add     rax, rcx
jmp     rax              ; switch jump

;
align 4
off_2109C dd offset loc_20CDF - 2109Ch
; DATA XREF: IOBluetoothDeviceUserClient:
dd offset loc_20D1A - 2109Ch ; jump table for switch statement
dd offset loc_20D4B - 2109Ch
dd offset loc_21054 - 2109Ch
dd offset loc_20D9A - 2109Ch
dd offset loc_20DE9 - 2109Ch
dd offset loc_20E38 - 2109Ch
```



Automation Methodology

- Locate the address of override externalMethod/getTarget.../getAsyn cTarget... Function
- Analyze the ASM instructions to get selector and external methods

The slide features a decorative background of curved lines in the top-left and bottom-right corners. A large red speech bubble is positioned on the left side, containing the title text. The main content is a bulleted list on the right side.

Automation Implementation

- Locate the Address of Key Const Array and Parse their Content
 - For global const external method dispatch
 - For local const external method dispatch
- Analyze the ASM Instructions
 - For newUserClient method
 - For externalMethod/getTar.../getAsynTar... method

Parse the External Method Dispatch Array

Global/Local Const Array

- Parse "Symbol Table" section
- Search Constant Array name, shown as "String Table Index"
 - ✓ Start with "__ZZN" or "__ZN"
- Locate the address, shown as "value"

String Table Index	__ZN23IOFramebufferUserClient14externalMethodEjP25IOExternalMethodArgumentsP24IOExternalMethodDispatchP8OSObjectPvE14methodTemplate	
Type		
0E	N_SECT	
Section Index	7 (__DATA,__const)	
Description		
Value	205360 (\$+41072)	
000627A0 0000C05F	String Table Index	__ZN18IOHIDLibUserClient8sMethodsE
000627A4 0F	Type	
	0E	N_SECT
	01	N_EXT
000627A5 08	Section Index	8 (__DATA,__const)
000627A6 0000	Description	
000627A8 0000000000042F10	Value	274192 (\$+11216)

Analyze the ASM Instructions

Methods Compare

Angr/Miasm

Support binary to ASM
Support ASM CG/CFG
Support Emulating using JIT

Need to Map Multi code into SE VM
Construct conditions to support all paths



Start From Scratch



Can only Simulate part of Instruction Operation
Can only care about certain registers' data flow

Need to construct a next analysis engine
Need disassembling, CG/CFG
Need to vm address operation

...


Analyze the ASM Instructions

What we want?



Analyze the ASM Instructions

■ Combination Method



Automation Practice

Custom KEXT Analysis Engine

- Init a MachO structure handler
- Parse key sections and segments
- Vm addr and file addr operation
- Vm memory operation based on vm and file addr

Custom KEXT Analysis Engine

▼ C MachOHeader(object)

- Ⓜ __init__(self, fh, offset, size)
- Ⓜ get_driver_list(self)
- Ⓜ parser_driver_dict(self, bundle)
- Ⓜ macho_get_vmaddr(self, segname, sectname)
- Ⓜ macho_get_fileaddr(self, segname, sectname)
- Ⓜ macho_get_size(self, segname, sectname)
- Ⓜ macho_get_loadcmds(self)
- Ⓜ memcpy(self, start_fileaddr, size)
- Ⓜ get_mem_from_vmaddr(self, anchor_f, anchor_vm, src_vm)
- Ⓜ get_memStr_from_vmaddr(self, anchor_f, anchor_vm, src_vm)
- Ⓜ get_memStr_from_f(self, file_off)
- Ⓜ get_f_from_vm(self, anchor_f, anchor_vm, src_vm)
- Ⓜ get_vm_from_f(self, anchor_f, anchor_vm, src_f)
- Ⓜ get_prelinkf_from_vm(self, src_vm)
- Ⓜ get_prelinkvm_from_f(self, anchor_vm, anchor_f, src_f)
- Ⓜ MH_MAGIC
- Ⓜ endian
- Ⓜ fh
- Ⓜ kernel_header
- Ⓜ mach_header
- Ⓜ offset
- Ⓜ prelink_offset
- Ⓜ size
- Ⓜ sizediff

▼ C KernelMachO(object)

- Ⓜ __init__(self, filename=None, base_addr=0xffffffff00700400)
- Ⓜ load(self, fh)
- Ⓜ load_fat(self, fh)
- Ⓜ load_header(self, fh, offset, size)
- Ⓜ get_section_addrs(self)
- Ⓜ get_other_addrs(self)
- Ⓜ get_driver_list(self)
- Ⓜ extract_kext(self, bundleID=None, dir=None)
- Ⓜ __construct_kext(self, bundle, offset, prelink_offset, dir)
- Ⓜ __dump_kext_data(self, fd, fh_offset, data_size, fd_offset)
- Ⓜ parser_driver_dict(self, bundle)
- Ⓜ base_addr
- Ⓜ driver_list_notprelink
- Ⓜ driver_list_prelink
- Ⓜ fat
- Ⓜ filename
- Ⓜ headers

▼ C OSMetaClass(object)

- Ⓜ __init__(self)
- Ⓜ IOExternalAsyncMethod
- Ⓜ IOExternalMethod
- Ⓜ IOExternalMethodDispatch
- Ⓜ can_ser_open
- Ⓜ can_ser_open_type
- Ⓜ class_name
- Ⓜ class_self_addr
- Ⓜ class_size
- Ⓜ class_super_addr
- Ⓜ class_super_list
- Ⓜ class_super_name
- Ⓜ extends_list
- Ⓜ externalMethod_f
- Ⓜ externalMethod_vm
- Ⓜ getAsyncTargetAndMethodForIndex_f
- Ⓜ getAsyncTargetAndMethodForIndex_vm
- Ⓜ getTargetAndMethodForIndex_f
- Ⓜ getTargetAndMethodForIndex_vm
- Ⓜ getTargetAndTrapForIndex_f
- Ⓜ getTargetAndTrapForIndex_vm
- Ⓜ havePublishedResource
- Ⓜ instance_list
- Ⓜ is_ioeam
- Ⓜ is_ioem
- Ⓜ is_ioemd
- Ⓜ metaclass_list
- Ⓜ metaclass_vt_f
- Ⓜ metaclass_vt_vm
- Ⓜ newUserClient_f

Automation Practice

CG/CFG BASED ON MIASM

- Init a disassembling engine, like capstone
- Init Miasm machine
- Generate CFG local information


<https://github.com/cea-sec/miasm>

Generate CFG local information

AppleHDAEngine::newUserClient

```
loc_2C1F1:                                ; CODE XREF: AppleHDAEngine::newUserClient+0x1F1
mov     r12d, 0E00002C2h
cmp     r14d, 3
jz      short loc_2C235
cmp     r14d, 2
jz      loc_2C2B4
test    r14d, r14d
jnz     loc_2C354
mov     rax, cs:off_920E0
xor     ecx, ecx
mov     rdi, r13
mov     rsi, r15
mov     rdx, [rbp-40h]
mov     r8, [rbp-30h]
call   qword ptr [rax+788h]
mov     r12d, eax
jmp     loc_2C354
```

```
loc_2C235:                                ; CODE XREF: AppleHDAEngine::newUserClient+0x235
lea     rax, __ZN24AppleHDAEngineUserClient9...
mov     rdi, [rax]
mov     rax, [rdi]
call   qword ptr [rax+88h]
```




Analyze key paths based on CFG

■ Key Paths based on Key registers

- RCX register in “newUserClient” function
- RSI register in “externalMethod” function
- Tracking data flow between registers, as shown below, RCX move to R14D register

AppleHDAEngine::newUserClient



A red speech bubble graphic with a white outline, containing the text 'Automation Practice'.

Automation Practice

CUSTOM INSTRUCTIONS EMULATOR

- Analysis key functions based on CFG
- Emulate key instructions operation
- Output User Client or external method information

Emulate key instructions operation

■ ARM Emulator

- adrp/adr, add, mov/movz, orr, ldr, bl...

■ X86_64 Emulator

- lea, mov, call, cmp, jz, je...

```
if not cmp(mnemonic, "str"):
    reg_num = insn.op_count(CS_OP_REG)
    if reg_num == 1:
        continue
    f_reg = get_first_reg(insn)
    if f_reg == arm64_const.ARM64_REG_XZR or f_reg == arm64_const.ARM64_REG_D0 or \
        f_reg == arm64_const.ARM64_REG_WZR:
        continue
    s_reg = get_second_reg(insn)

    if s_reg:
        s_reg_v = get_actual_value_by_regN(s_reg)
        if not (s_reg_v and s_reg_v == meta_class.class_self_addr):
            continue
    else:
        continue

    f_reg_v_vm = get_actual_value_by_regN(f_reg)
    if iskext:
        f_reg_v_f = k_header.get_prelinkf_from_vm(f_reg_v_vm)
    else:
        f_reg_v_f = k_header.get_f_from_vm(each_mif_f, each_mif_vm, f_reg_v_vm)

    parse_const_func(k_header, meta_class, f_reg_v_vm,
                    f_reg_v_f, iskext)
```

```
if not cmp(mnemonic, "bl"):
    if insn.op_count(CS_OP_IMM):
        bl_addr_vm = get_single_IMM(insn)
        meta_class = OSMetaClass()
        if bl_addr_vm == OSMetaClass_OSMetaClass_VMaddr:
            #meta_class = OSMetaClass()

            meta_class.class_self_addr = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X0)
            meta_class.class_name_addr = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X1)
            meta_class.class_super_addr = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X2)
            meta_class.class_size = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X3)

            if meta_class.class_name_addr:
                meta_class.class_name = k_header.get_memStr_from_vmaddr(each_mif_f, each_mif_vm, meta_class.class_name_addr)
                if not cmp(meta_class.class_name, "IOUserClient"):
                    IOUserClient_VMaddr = meta_class.class_self_addr
                if not cmp(meta_class.class_name, "IOService"):
                    IOService_VMaddr = meta_class.class_self_addr
            else:
                meta_class.class_name = "unknow classname"
            each_meta_class = meta_class

        bl_addr_vm = int(bl_addr_vm, 16)
        bl_addr_f = k_header.get_f_from_vm(each_mif_f, each_mif_vm, bl_addr_vm)
        bl_indirect_addr = get_jump_addr(k_header, cs_handler, bl_addr_vm, bl_addr_f)

        if hex(bl_indirect_addr).strip("L") == OSMetaClass_OSMetaClass_VMaddr:

            meta_class.class_self_addr = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X0)
            meta_class.class_name_addr = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X1)
            meta_class.class_super_addr = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X2)
            meta_class.class_size = get_actual_value_by_regN(arm64_const.ARM64_REG_X3)

            if meta_class.class_name_addr:
                meta_class.class_name = k_header.get_memStr_from_vmaddr(each_mif_f, each_mif_vm,
                                                                           meta_class.class_name_addr)
                if not cmp(meta_class.class_name, "IOUserClient"):
                    IOUserClient_VMaddr = meta_class.class_self_addr
                if not cmp(meta_class.class_name, "IOService"):
                    IOService_VMaddr = meta_class.class_self_addr
            else:
                meta_class.class_name = "unknow classname"
```


Emulate register operation

```
def get_single_IMM(insn):
    seg_num = insn.op_count(CS_OP_IMM)
    if seg_num > 1:
        print "Extract: too much imm reg!"
    if seg_num != 1:
        print "Extract: no imm reg found!"
    return to_x(insn.op_find(CS_OP_IMM, 1).value.imm)

def get_mem_op_offset(insn):
    mem_num = insn.op_count(CS_OP_MEM)
    if mem_num >= 1:
        offset = insn.op_find(CS_OP_MEM, 1).mem.disp
        return offset

def get_mem_op_reg(insn):
    mem_num = insn.op_count(CS_OP_MEM)
    if mem_num >= 1:
        offset = insn.op_find(CS_OP_MEM, 1).mem.base
        return offset

def get_first_reg(insn):
    return insn.op_find(CS_OP_REG, 1).value.reg

def get_second_reg(insn):
    return insn.op_find(CS_OP_REG, 2).value.reg
```

```
from capstone import x86_const

class x_reg_manager(object):

    def __init__(self):
        self.x = [1]*234
        for i in range(234):
            self.x[i] = 0

    def get_actual_value_by_regN(self, reg):
        #global x0
        return self.x[reg]

    def set_actual_value_by_regN(self, reg, reg_val):
        self.x[reg] = reg_val
```

Output User Client or external method information

AppleHDAEngine::newUserClient

```
-----  
index  CanOpen  TOpenType  ServiceName  extends  
4      True    0          AppleHDAEngineOutput  IOAudioEngine::gMetaClass-->AppleHDAEngine-->AppleHDAEngineOutput  
86     True    0          AppleHDAEngine        IOAudioEngine::gMetaClass-->AppleHDAEngine  
-----  
ServiceName  OpenType  UserClient  
AppleHDAEngine  0x3      AppleHDAEngineUserClient::metaClass  
AppleHDAEngine  0x2      DspFuncUserClient::Create(IOAudioEngine*, task*)
```

AppleHDAEngineUserClient::externalMethod

```
-----  
selector  cSIC      cSIS      cSOC      cSOS      func_name  
0          2         0         0         4095     AppleHDAEngineUserClient::getState  
1          2         4095     0         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::setState  
2          0         0         0         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::resetDSPToPropertyList  
3          1         0         1         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::isPortPresent  
4          0         0         6         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::getHardwareVolume  
5          1         0         0         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::setHardwareVolume  
6          0         0         16        0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::getActiveSpatialChannels  
7          0         0         3         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::getAudioSnoopEnabled  
8          3         0         0         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::setAudioSnoopEnabled  
9          2         0         0         0        AppleHDAEngineUserClient::setSpatialChannelMute
```

Process finished with exit code 0



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Kernel Interfaces


Implementation files in XNU source code

```
BUILD
├── OBJ
│   ├── DEBUG_X86_64
│   │   ├── bsd
│   │   │   ├── DEBUG
│   │   │   │   └── init_sysent.c
│   │   └── EXPORT_HDRS
│   │       ├── bsd
│   │       └── sys
│   │           ├── syscall.h
│   │           ├── sysproto.h
│   │           └── system.h
└── osfmk
    ├── device
    │   └── device.defs //mig
    ├── kern
    │   └── syscall_sw.c //traps
    └── mach
        └── mach_traps.h //traps
```




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Kernel Diff Methodology



Kernel Diff Analysis Practice (1/2)

Updated Function "getvolattrlist ()" in vfs_attrlist.c

- Diff kernel source code files and find the difference functions
- Meld: A open source visual diff and merge tool
- CVE-2018-4243 Patch

```
/*  
 * Allocate a target buffer for attribute results.  
 * Note that since we won't ever copy out more than the caller requested,  
 * we never need to allocate more than they offer.  
 */  
ab.allocated = ulmin(bufferSize, fixedsize + varsize);  
if (ab.allocated > ATTR_MAX_BUFFER) {  
    error = ENOMEM;  
    VFS_DEBUG(ctx, vp, "ATTRLIST - ERROR: buffer size too large (%d limit %d)", ab.allocated, ATTR_MAX_BUFFER);  
    goto out;  
}  
MALLOC(ab.base, char *, ab.allocated, M_TEMP, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);  
if (ab.base == NULL) {  
    error = ENOMEM;  
    VFS_DEBUG(ctx, vp, "ATTRLIST - ERROR: could not allocate %d for copy buffer", ab.allocated);  
    goto out;  
}  
/*  
 * Pack results into the destination buffer.  
 */
```

```
if (return_valid &&  
    (ab.allocated < (ssize_t)(sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(attribute_set_t))) &&  
    !(options & FSOPT_REPORT_FULLSIZE)) {  
    uint32_t num_bytes_valid = sizeof(uint32_t);  
    /*  
     * Not enough to return anything and we don't have to report  
     * how much space is needed. Get out now.  
     * N.B. - We have only been called after having verified that  
     * attributeBuffer is at least sizeof(uint32_t);  
     */  
    if (UIO_SEG_IS_USER_SPACE(segflg)) {  
        error = copyout(&num_bytes_valid,  
            CAST_USER_ADDR_T(attributeBuffer), num_bytes_valid);  
    } else {  
        bcopy(&num_bytes_valid, (void *)attributeBuffer,  
            (size_t)num_bytes_valid);  
    }  
    goto out;  
}  
MALLOC(ab.base, char *, ab.allocated, M_TEMP, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
```

```
def _diff_files(self, refresh=False):  
    yield _("[%s] Computing differences") % self.label_text  
    texts = self.buffer_filtered[:self.num_panes]  
    self.linediffer.ignore_blanks = self.props.ignore_blank_lines  
    step = self.linediffer.set_sequences_iter(texts)  
    while next(step) is None:  
        yield 1  
  
if not refresh:  
    for buf in self.textbuffer:  
        buf.place_cursor(buf.get_start_iter())  
  
chunk, prev, next_ = self.linediffer.locate_chunk(1, 0)  
target_chunk = chunk if chunk is not None else next_  
self.scheduler.add_task(  
    lambda: self.go_to_chunk(target_chunk, centered=True), True)
```

<https://github.com/GNOME/meld>

Kernel Diff Analysis Practice (2/2)

getvolattrlist () for example

■ P-diff: A tool Implemented by IDA pro script

- ✓ Construct CG for getvolattrlist function
- ✓ List and report calling sequence that entry function in attack vector
- ✓ CodeRefsTo(ea, flow) and [CodeRefsFrom](#)(ea, flow)

```
[P-Diff calling sequence 0]: _getvolattrlist() <- _getattrlist_internal() <- _getattrlistat_internal() <- _getattrlistat()  
[P-Diff calling sequence 1]: _getvolattrlist() <- _getattrlist_internal() <- _fgetattrlist()  
[P-Diff calling sequence 2]: _getvolattrlist() <- _getattrlist_internal() <- _readdirattr() <- _getattrlistbulk()  
[P-Diff calling sequence 3]: _getvolattrlist() <- _getattrlist_internal() <- _getattrlistat_internal() <- _getattrlist()
```

```
220 AUE_GETATTRLIST ALL { int getattrlist(const char *path, struct  
attrlist *alist, void *attributeBuffer, size_t bufferSize, u_long  
options) NO_SYSCALL_STUB; }  
461 AUE_GETATTRLISTBULK ALL { int getattrlistbulk(int dirfd, struct  
attrlist *alist, void *attributeBuffer, size_t bufferSize, uint64_t  
options); }  
228 AUE_FGETATTRLIST ALL { int fgetattrlist(int fd, struct  
attrlist *alist, void *attributeBuffer, size_t bufferSize, u_long  
options); }  
476 AUE_GETATTRLISTAT ALL { int getattrlistat(int fd, const char  
*path, struct attrlist *alist, void *attributeBuffer, size_t  
bufferSize, u_long options); }
```


KEXTs Diff Analysis

Difference with Kernel and KEXTs

- KEXTs are closed source
- Using IDA pro script with plugin "Bindiff"

P-Diff: entry functions

```
AppleHDAEngine::createVolumeAndMuteControlsForActivePathSet()
AppleHDAEngine::handlePowerStateChange()
AppleHDAEngine::resetDSPTOPlist()
AppleHDAEngineInput::init(IOService, AppleHDACodec, OSDictionary, OSArray)
AppleHDAEngineInput::initAudioStream()
AppleHDAEngineInput::performFormatChange(IOAudioStream, _IOAudioStreamFormat, _IOAudioSampleRate)
AppleHDAEngineInput::protectedChangePathSet(IOAudioControl)
AppleHDAEngineOutput::init(IOService, AppleHDACodec, OSDictionary, OSArray)
AppleHDAEngineOutput::protectedChangePathSet(IOAudioControl)
AppleHDAEngineUserClient::getHardwareVolume()
AppleHDAEngineUserClient::getStateAction(UserClientData)
AppleHDAEngineUserClient::setHardwareVolume()
AppleHDAEngineUserClient::setStateAction(UserClientData)
```

0.67	0.69	GI----	000000000000527C	AppleHDATDM_CS42L83::getSampleRateRegisterValue(...)	0000000000004A9A	AppleHDATDM_CS42L83::getSampleRateRegisterValue(...)
0.62	0.99	G-----	0000000000005F070	AppleBusController::init(AppleHDADriver *, OSDictionary...	0000000000005E6D8	AppleBusController::init(AppleHDADriver *, OSDictionary...
0.59	0.83	GI-----	00000000000069EA6	AppleHDATDM_CS42L81::setSampleRateForDeviceChan...	0000000000006948A	AppleHDATDM_CS42L81::setSampleRateForDeviceChan...
0.57	0.72	GI--EL-	0000000000005A682	AppleHDATDMampTAS5764L::faultHandler(void)	00000000000059D30	AppleHDATDMampTAS5764L::faultHandler(void)
0.56	0.75	GI-JE--	0000000000003705C	AppleHDAPath::isWidgetAmplifierGainAdjustable(uint)	00000000000036860	AppleHDAPath::isWidgetAmplifierGainAdjustable(uint)
0.53	0.73	-I--E--	00000000000078038	AppleHDATDMampTAS5758L::AppleHDATDMampTAS5...	000000000000594A0	AppleHDATDMampTAS5764L::AppleHDATDMampTAS5...
0.52	0.62	GI--EL-	0000000000004B74C	AppleHDATDMampTAS5764L::AppleHDATDMampTAS5...	0000000000004A57A	AppleHDATDMampTAS5764L::AppleHDATDMampTAS5...

Similarity


Disadvantages about KEXTs static analysis

- KEXTs are closed source, many method strings are stripped
- Function call usually use *(object_ptr + offset) type
 - ✓ difficult to construct CFG, which bring noise for KEXTs vector analysis
 - ✓ difficult to construct CG, which bring noise for KEXTs diff analysis

```
v20 = (*(int (__fastcall **)(IORegistryEntry *, __int64, AMDRadeonX4000_AMDaccelResource *, _QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD))(*(_QWORD *)this_ptr + 0xB70LL))(
    this_ptr,
    v2,
    accelResource_offset8,
    0LL,
    *((_QWORD *)this_ptr + 594),
    0LL); // AMDRadeonX4000_AMDSIGLContext::bindResource(IOAcceleratorCommandStreamInfo &,IOAcceleratorResource2 *,bool,IOAcceleratorChannel2 *
```




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- 

Comparison of dynamic trace

	User Trace	Kernel Trace	Embedded in OS	Any privilege?	Support script?	Performance	Platform
Frida	Yes	No	No	Root or Repack	Yes	Middle	iOS/Osx
Dtrace	No	Yes	Yes	Root	Yes	High	Osx
Ildb	Yes	Yes	Yes	Root	Yes	Low	iOS/Osx
Kernel hook	---	Yes	No	Root	No	Middle	Osx

Frida Hook in User Mode




xpc_connection_send_message API context

(e.g.)

```
{
  "time": "2017-09-18T10:38:32.807Z",
  "txnType": "moony?",
  "lib": "libxpc.dylib",
  "method": "xpc_connection_send_message",
  "artifact": [
    {
      "name": "connection",
      "value": "0x1658d090",
      "argSeq": 0
    },
    {
      "name": "connectioninfo",
      "value": "\\tconnection=0x1658d090\\tconnectionName=\\tconnectionPid=2312\\tconnectionProcName=Preferences",
      "argSeq": 0
    },
    {
      "name": "retval", "value": 374477440, "argSeq": -1
    }
  ]
}
```

Hunt more dynamic relation if you like (e.g. profile install)

/private/var/mobile/Library/ConfigurationProfiles/profile-4ecba0b5def636872b1da380625035b4adfb4c5f4f38788cf1774579fe90dd3c.stub



Profiled \leftrightarrow misagent

xpc_connection_get_name_by_address: com.apple.misagent

[2916:289299 (profiled)]: libxpc.dylib!xpc_connection_send_message_with_reply_sync : connection=0x1575c100


connectionName=com.apple.misagent connectionPid=3115 connectionProcName=misagent

[2916:205566 (profiled)]: libsystem_kernel.dylib!__read_nocancel call stack:

0x26032dc8 Foundation!_NSReadFromFileDescriptorWithProgress,

0x26032c11 Foundation!_NSReadBytesFromFileWithExtendedAttributes,

Dtrace introduction



Source: Solaris Dynamic Tracing Guide

Dtrace providers list

The typical interface for fuzzing:
system call,
IOKit,
mach msg,
network,
Disk,
XPC
...

```
sh-3.2# dtrace -l |more
ID PROVIDER MODULE FUNCTION NAME
1 dtrace BEGIN
2 dtrace END
3 dtrace ERROR
4 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_lock adaptive-acquire
5 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_lock adaptive-spin
6 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_lock adaptive-block
7 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_try_lock adaptive-acquire
8 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_try_spin_lock adaptive-acquire
9 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_unlock adaptive-release
10 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_ext_lock adaptive-acquire
11 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_ext_lock adaptive-spin
12 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_ext_lock adaptive-block
13 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_ext_unlock adaptive-release
14 lockstat mach_kernel lck_mtx_lock_spin adaptive-acquire
15 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_lock_shared rw-acquire
16 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_lock_shared rw-block
17 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_lock_shared rw-spin
18 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_lock_exclusive rw-acquire
19 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_lock_exclusive rw-block
20 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_lock_exclusive rw-spin
21 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_done rw-release
22 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_try_lock_shared rw-acquire
23 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_try_lock_exclusive rw-acquire
24 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_shared_to_exclusive rw-upgrade
25 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_shared_to_exclusive rw-spin
26 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_shared_to_exclusive rw-block
27 lockstat mach_kernel lck_rw_exclusive_to_shared rw-downgrade
28 lockstat mach_kernel lck_spin_lock spin-acquire
29 lockstat mach_kernel lck_spin_lock spin-spin
30 lockstat mach_kernel lck_spin_unlock spin-release
31 profile profile-97
32 profile profile-199
33 profile profile-499
34 profile profile-997
35 profile profile-1999
```

Dtrace script (e.g. file probe)

```
dtrace:::BEGIN
{
    printf("Tracing... Hit Ctrl-C to end.\n");
}

/* save time at start */
io:::wait-start
{
    self->start = timestamp;
}


/* process event */
io:::wait-done
/self->start/
{
    /*
     * wait-done is used as we are measuring wait times. It also
     * is triggered when the correct thread is on the CPU, obviating
     * the need to link process details to the start event.
     */
    this->elapsed = timestamp - self->start;
    @files[pid, execname, args[2]->fi_pathname] = sum(this->elapsed);
    self->start = 0;
}

/* print report */
dtrace:::END
{
    normalize(@files, 1000);
    printf("%6s %-12s %8s %s\n", "PID", "CMD", "TIME", "FILE");
    printa("%6d %-12.12s %8d %s\n", @files);
}
}
```




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Enhanced kernel fuzz

- I. 3D online games (OpenGL, Unreal game engine..)
- II. Peripheral devices operation (e.g. wifi, bluetooth)
- III. IOKit services matching and other operation
- IV. Font render
- V. Other scenario you collected




[2] Catch first crash spot and analysis

KASAN in iOS/OSX Kernel

```
make SDKROOT=macosx ARCH_CONFIGS=X86_64  
KERNEL_CONFIGS="KASAN "
```

```
/System/Library/Kernels/kernel*
```



```
673 a2 = 8LL;  
674 v69 = __asan_report_store_n(v66, 8LL, v14, v67, v63);  
675 LABEL_135:  
676 if ( (char)((v104 & 7) + 3) < v69 )  
677 {  
678 LABEL_60:  
679 v3 = *(unsigned int*)(v8 + 44);  
680 v70 = *( _BYTE*)(a3 - 2305845139517472768LL);  
681 if ( v70 )  
682 goto LABEL_137;  
683 goto LABEL_61;  
684 }  
685 v70 = __asan_report_load4(v104);  
686 LABEL_137:  
687 if ( (char)((v102 & 7) + 3) < v70 )  
688 {  
689 LABEL_61:  
690 v3 = ((_DWORD)v3 + 3) & 0xFFFFFFFFFC;  
691 a2 = v110;  
692 __asan_memcpy(v102, (unsigned int)(8 * *( _DWORD *)v102), v8 + v3 + 52, v110);  
693 v72 = *( _BYTE*)(v107 - 2305845139517472768LL);  
694 if ( v72 )  
695 goto LABEL_139;  
696 goto LABEL_62;  
697 }  
698 v72 = __asan_report_load4(v102);  
699 LABEL_139:  
700 if ( (char)((v102 & 7) + 3) < v72 )  
701 {  
702 LABEL_62:  
703 v73 = v3;  
704 a2 = v105 + v3 - 4096;  
705 v74 = *(unsigned int *)v102;
```

00484288 _Xio_connect_method:688 (FFFFFFFF8000684288)

Future plan

■ Syzkaller-like Fuzzing in Kernel Mode

There would be existing many environment preparation or initialization(e.g. Open correct service , initialize the target devices and send the correct mach message id) before one special kernel API (e.g. IOConnectionCallMethod) could work properly in kernel.


So why do not we intercept the kernel API at the proper time under proper state and fuzz it like AFL in kernel mode directly?

■ Porting KASAN/KMSAN for close-source driver

Modifying the memory API to asan_* API in import table in driver module, or patch the code with memory management in driver to support kernel sanitizer could be as further research.



Agenda

- **About US**
 - **Solution Overview**
 - **Static Analysis for Kernel and KEXTs Attack Interface**
 - **KEXTs Interfaces Vector Automatic Generate**
 - **Kernel Interfaces Vector Automatic Generate**
 - **Kernel/KEXTs Interfaces Diff Analysis**
 - **Dynamic Analysis for Kernel and UserMode Attack Interface**
 - **Automatic Fuzzing solution**
 - **0Day vulnerabilities found**
- 

CVE-2018-4462

Integer overflow vulnerability in AMDFramebuffer driver

```
((lldb) bt
* thread #1, stop reason = signal SIGSTOP
* frame #0: 0xffffffff7f8d91e324 AMDFramebuffer`AMDFramebuffer::getPixelInformationFromTiming(AtiDetailedTimingInformation const&, IOPixelFormatInformation*, int, int) + 388
frame #1: 0xffffffff7f8d91e180 AMDFramebuffer`AMDFramebuffer::getPixelInformation(int, int, IOPixelFormatInformation*) + 112
frame #2: 0xffffffff7f8d91e0a5 AMDFramebuffer`AMDFramebuffer::getPixelInformation(int, int, int, IOPixelFormatInformation*) + 101
frame #3: 0xffffffff7f8b42223d IOGraphicsFamily`IOFramebuffer::extGetPixelInformation(target=0xffffffff869e59f000, reference=<unavailable>, args=<unavailable>) at IOFramebuffer.cpp:388 [opt]
frame #4: 0xffffffff800aa4c478 kernel.development`IOUserClient::externalMethod(this=<unavailable>, selector=<unavailable>, args=0xffffffffa756c8b988, dispatch=0xffffffff7f8b42223d) at IOUserClient.cpp:5335 [opt]
frame #5: 0xffffffff7f8b437d0b IOGraphicsFamily`IOFramebufferUserClient::externalMethod(this=0xffffffff80b8810800, selector=1, args=0xffffffffa756c8b988, dispatch=<unavailable>) at IOFramebufferUserClient.cpp:380 [opt]
frame #6: 0xffffffff800aa553cf kernel.development`:is_io_connect_method(connection=0xffffffff80b8810800, selector=1, scalar_input=<unavailable>, scalar_inputCnt=<unavailable>, ool_input=0, ool_input_size=0, inband_output="", inband_outputCnt=0xffffffff80ac2e2e0c, scalar_output=0xffffffffa756c8bc0, scalar_outputCnt=0xffffffffa756c8bcac, ool_output=0, ool_output_size=0) at pasive_kernel_fuzz`trampoline_is_io_connect_method(connection=0xffffffff80b8810800, selector=1, scalar_input=0xffffffff80b881e10, scalar_inputCnt=0, inband_output="", inband_outputCnt=0xffffffff80ac2e2e0c, scalar_output=0xffffffffa756c8bc0, scalar_outputCnt=0xffffffffa756c8bcac, ool_output=0, ool_output_size=0) at device_server.c:8379 [opt]
frame #7: 0xffffffff7f8e6c854b pasive_kernel_fuzz`trampoline_is_io_connect_method(connection=0xffffffff80b8810800, selector=1, scalar_input=0xffffffff80b881e10, scalar_inputCnt=0, inband_output="", inband_outputCnt=0xffffffff80ac2e2e0c, scalar_output=0xffffffffa756c8bc0, scalar_outputCnt=0xffffffffa756c8bcac, ool_output=0, ool_output_size=0) at device_server.c:8379 [opt]
frame #8: 0xffffffff800a3f2bd4 kernel.development`_Xio_connect_method(InHeadP=<unavailable>, OutHeadP=0xffffffff80ac2e2de0) at ipc_kobject.c:359 [opt]
frame #9: 0xffffffff800a2c450d kernel.development`ipc_kobject_server(request=0xffffffff80b881d70, option=<unavailable>) at ipc_kobject.c:359 [opt]
frame #10: 0xffffffff800a29124a kernel.development`ipc_kmsg_send(kmsg=0xffffffff80b881d70, option=3, send_timeout=0) at ipc_kmsg.c:1822 [opt]
frame #11: 0xffffffff800a2b024f kernel.development`mach_msg_overwrite_trap(args=<unavailable>) at mach_msg.c:546 [opt]
frame #12: 0xffffffff7f8e6d81d7 pasive_kernel_fuzz`trampoline_mach_msg_overwrite_trap(args=0xffffffffa756c8bf08) at mach_msg_overwrite_trap_trampoline.c:131
frame #13: 0xffffffff800a42cb09 kernel.development`mach_call_munger64(state=0xffffffff80ac13de20) at bsd_i386.c:573 [opt]
frame #14: 0xffffffff800a25b466 kernel.development`hndl_mach_scall64 + 22
```


CVE-2018-4462 – Root Cause

frame #0: 0xfffff7f8d91e324 AMDFramebuffer`AMDFramebuffer::getPixelInformationFromTiming(AtiDetailedTimingInformation const&, IOPixelInformation*, int, int) + 388

AMDFramebuffer`AMDFramebuffer::getPixelInformationFromTiming:

```
-> 0xfffff7f8d91e324 <+388>: movq (%rcx,%rdi,8), %rcx
    0xfffff7f8d91e328 <+392>: movq %rsi, %rdi
    0xfffff7f8d91e32b <+395>: movq %rcx, %rsi
    0xfffff7f8d91e32e <+398>: callq 0xfffff7f8ccbefe0 ; Utilities::str_copy(char*, char const*, unsigned long)
```

(lldb) register read rcx

rcx = 0xfffff7f8d926030 AMDFramebuffer::getPixelInformationFromTiming(AtiDetailedTimingInformation const&, IOPixelInformation*, int, int)::PIXEL_ENCODINGS

(lldb) register read rdi

rdi = 0xffffffff2000001

```
unsigned int v10; // [sp+D8h] [bp-28h]@1
int v11; // [sp+0Ch] [bp-24h]@1
void *v12; // [sp+E0h] [bp-20h]@1
void *v13; // [sp+E8h] [bp-18h]@1
__int64 v14; // [sp+F0h] [bp-10h]@1
unsigned int v15; // [sp+FCh] [bp-4h]@2
```

```
v14 = a1;
v13 = a2;
v12 = a3;
v11 = a4;
v10 = a5;
v8 = 0;
bzero(a3, 0xAcuLL);
if ( (signed int)v10 <= 2 )
{
```

check

```
text:0000000000021318
text:000000000002131C
text:0000000000021320
text:0000000000021324
text:0000000000021328
text:000000000002132B
text:000000000002132E
text:0000000000021333
text:0000000000021339
text:000000000002133C
text:0000000000021343
```

USE

```
mov rsi, [rbp+var_20]
add rsi, 58h
movsxd rdi, [rbp+var_28]
mov rcx, [rcx+rdi*8]; unsigned int64
mov rdi, rsi; this
mov rsi, rcx; char *
call __ZN9Utilities8str_copyEpcPKcn Utilities::str_copy(char *,char const*,ulong)
mov r8d, 40h; @
mov edx, r8d
mov rcx, 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
lea rsi, _ZL15COMPONENT_MASKS; COMPONENT_MASKS
```

move the value(0xf2000001) of rbp+var_28 to rdi, and extends it to 64 bits. then becomes 0xffffffff2000001

rdi*8 becomes so big , crash point

may be leak info if craft the value of rdi

however, if we craft the rdi value, the rdi*8 can be control by user

OOB read in AMDRadeonX4000 Extension

OOB Read Vulnerability Found in AMDRadeonX4000_AMDAccelResource Initialize Process

```
-----
* thread #1, stop reason = signal SIGSTOP
* frame #0: 0xffffffff7fa00965d3 AMDRadeonX4000`AMDRadeonX4000_AMDAccelResource::initialize(IOAccelNewResourceArgs*, unsigned long long) + 1525
  frame #1: 0xffffffff7f9fea346b IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelSharedUserClient2::new_resource(IOAccelNewResourceArgs*, IOAccelNewResourceReturnData*, unsigned long long, unsigned int*) + 1893
  frame #2: 0xffffffff7f9fea4a41 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelSharedUserClient2::s_new_resource(IOAccelSharedUserClient2*, void*, IOExternalMethodArguments*) + 151
  frame #3: 0xffffffff801d625ab8 kernel.development`IOUserClient::externalMethod(this=<unavailable>, selector=<unavailable>, args=0xffffffff83dd4b3b58, dispatch=0xffffffff7f9fee8260, target=0xffffffff80854fd780, reference=0x0000000000000000) at IOUserClient.cpp:5358 [opt]
  frame #4: 0xffffffff7f9fea4d98 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelSharedUserClient2::externalMethod(unsigned int, IOExternalMethodArguments*, IOExternalMethodDispatch*, OSObject*, void*) + 120
  frame #5: 0xffffffff801d62eb7f kernel.development`:is_io_connect_method(connection=0xffffffff80854fd780, selector=0, scalar_input=<unavailable>, scalar_inputCnt=<unavailable>, inband_input=<unavailable>, inband_inputCnt=2424, ool_input=0, ool_input_size=0, inband_output="", inband_outputCnt=0xffffffff806ba03e0c, scalar_output=0xffffffff83dd4b3ce0, scalar_outputCnt=0xffffffff83dd4b3cdc, ool_output=0, ool_output_size=0xffffffff8085919d5c) at IOUserClient.cpp:3994 [opt]
  frame #6: 0xffffffff801cfbbce4 kernel.development`_Xio_connect_method(InHeadP=<unavailable>, OutHeadP=0xffffffff806ba03de0) at device_server.c:8379 [opt]
  frame #7: 0xffffffff801ce8d27d kernel.development`ipc_kobject_server(request=0xffffffff8085919000, option=<unavailable>) at ipc_kobject.c:359 [opt]
  frame #8: 0xffffffff801ce59465 kernel.development`ipc_kmsg_send(kmsg=0xffffffff8085919000, option=3, send_timeout=0) at ipc_kmsg.c:1832 [opt]
  frame #9: 0xffffffff801ce78a75 kernel.development`mach_msg_overwrite_trap(args=<unavailable>) at mach_msg.c:549 [opt]
  frame #10: 0xffffffff801cff6323 kernel.development`mach_call_munger64(state=0xffffffff806ca9c480) at bsd_i386.c:573 [opt]
  frame #11: 0xffffffff801ce23486 kernel.development`hndl_mach_scall64 + 22
```

OOB read – Root Cause

```
__text:000000000000E58E loc_E58E:                ; CODE XREF: AMDRadeonX4000_AMDAccelResource::initialize(IOAccelNewResourceArgs *,ulong long)+58Dj
__text:000000000000E58E      mov     ecx, [r15+0F8h]
__text:000000000000E595      test   rcx, rcx
__text:000000000000E598      jz     short loc_E603
__text:000000000000E59A      shl   rcx, 3
__text:000000000000E59E      lea   rdi, [rcx+rcx*2]
__text:000000000000E5A2      call  _IOMalloc
__text:000000000000E5A7      mov   [r12+178h], rax  --- rax== buffer address which create by IOMalloc          ----- (a)
__text:000000000000E5AF      test  rax, rax
__text:000000000000E5B2      jz   short loc_E62A
__text:000000000000E5B4      or   byte ptr [r12+186h], 8
__text:000000000000E5BD      mov   ecx, [r15+0F8h]  -----r15==structureInput,  ecx=((uint32_t*) structureInput+62)  -----(b)
__text:000000000000E5C4      mov   [r12+180h], ecx
__text:000000000000E5CC      test  rcx, rcx        ----- test rcx, if zero, break          -----(c)
__text:000000000000E5CF      jz   short loc_E639
__text:000000000000E5D1      xor   edx, edx        ----- index          -----(d)
__text:000000000000E5D3      loc_E5D3:                ; CODE XREF: AMDRadeonX4000_AMDAccelResource::initialize(IOAccelNewResourceArgs *,ulong long)+621j
__text:000000000000E5D3      mov   rsi, [r15+rdx+98h]  ---- mov structureInput+rdx+0x98 to rsi
__text:000000000000E5DB      mov   [rax+rdx], rsi     ----mov rsi to rax+rdx, rax== buffer address which create by IOMalloc  -----(g)
__text:000000000000E5DF      mov   rsi, [r15+rdx+0A0h]
__text:000000000000E5E7      mov   [rax+rdx+8], rsi
__text:000000000000E5EC      mov   esi, [r15+rdx+0A8h]
__text:000000000000E5F4      mov   [rax+rdx+10h], esi
__text:000000000000E5F8      add   rdx, 18h         -----(e)
__text:000000000000E5FC      dec   rcx              ----decrease rcx value          -----(f)
__text:000000000000E5FF      jnz  short loc_E5D3
```

OverFlow in IOUSBFamily Extension

OverFlow bug due to No Boundary Check

```
kernel.development was compiled with optimization stripping any source code; for details, see the file 'kernel.development' in the root of the source tree.
* thread #1, stop reason = signal SIGSTOP
* frame #0: 0xffffffff8004779a1a kernel.development`panic_trap_to_debugger [inlined] current_cpu_datap at cpu_data.h:400 [opt]
  frame #1: 0xffffffff8004779a1a kernel.development`panic_trap_to_debugger [inlined] current_processor at cpu.c:220 [opt]
  frame #2: 0xffffffff8004779a1a kernel.development`panic_trap_to_debugger [inlined] DebuggerTrapWithState(db_op=DBOP_PANIC, db_message=<unavailable>, db_
ry/Caches/com.apple.xbs/Binaries/xnu/install/TempContent/Objects/EXPORT_HDRS/osfmk/mach/vm_param.h:362", db_panic_args=0xffffffffa77d6a38c0, db_panic_option
r=18446743524035789738) at debug.c:463 [opt]
  frame #3: 0xffffffff80047799ea kernel.development`panic_trap_to_debugger(panic_format_str=@"overflow detected"@/BuildRoot/Library/Caches/com.apple.xbs
HDRS/osfmk/mach/vm_param.h:362", panic_args=0xffffffffa77d6a38c0, reason=0, ctx=0x0000000000000000, panic_options_mask=0, panic_caller=18446743524035789738)
  frame #4: 0xffffffff80047797ec kernel.development`panic(str=<unavailable>) at debug.c:611 [opt]
  frame #5: 0xffffffff8004e403aa kernel.development`IOBufferMemoryDescriptor::initWithPhysicalMask(task*, unsigned int, unsigned long long, unsigned long
<unavailable>) at vm_param.h:362 [opt]
  frame #6: 0xffffffff8004e4037f kernel.development`IOBufferMemoryDescriptor::initWithPhysicalMask(this=0xffffffff80ac850300, inTask=<unavailable>, options=
<unavailable>, physicalMask=<unavailable>) at IOBufferMemoryDescriptor.cpp:164 [opt]
  frame #7: 0xffffffff8004e4149a kernel.development`IOBufferMemoryDescriptor::inTaskWithPhysicalMask(inTask=0xffffffff80a1614d88, options=65538, capacity=18
7520) at IOBufferMemoryDescriptor.cpp:354 [opt]
  frame #8: 0xffffffff7f8569efac IOUSBFamily`IOUSBInterfaceUserClient::LowLatencyPrepareBuffer(this=0xffffffff80a1714000, bufferData=0xffffffffa77d6a3ab0, add
ent.cpp:2358 [opt]
  frame #9: 0xffffffff8004e3b5e8 kernel.development`IOCommandGate::runAction(this=0xffffffff80a40e4690, inAction=(IOUSBFamily`IOUSBInterfaceUserClient::LowL
void*, void*) at IOUSBInterfaceUserClient.cpp:2265), arg0=0xffffffffa77d6a3ab0, arg1=0xffffffffa77d6a3d10, arg2=0x0000000000000000, arg3=0x0000000000000000)(
id*, void*, void*) at IOCommandGate.cpp:217 [opt]
  frame #10: 0xffffffff7f8569a5f7 IOUSBFamily`IOUSBInterfaceUserClient::_LowLatencyPrepareBuffer(target=0xffffffff80a1714000, reference=<unavailable>, argum
ent.cpp:2256 [opt]
  frame #11: 0xffffffff8004e622e8 kernel.development`IOUserClient::externalMethod(this=<unavailable>, selector=<unavailable>, args=0xffffffffa77d6a3b80, dis
00, reference=0x0000000000000000) at IOUserClient.cpp:5335 [opt]
  frame #12: 0xffffffff8004e6b057 kernel.development`::is_io_connect_method(connection=0xffffffff80a1714000, selector=17, scalar_input=<unavailable>, scalar
e, inband_inputCnt=0, ool_input=<unavailable>, ool_input_size=<unavailable>, inband_output=<unavailable>, inband_outputCnt=<unavailable>, scalar_output=<
_output=<unavailable>, ool_output_size=<unavailable>) at IOUserClient.cpp:3971 [opt]
  frame #13: 0xffffffff8004888354 kernel.development`_Xio_connect_method(InHeadP=<unavailable>, OutHeadP=0xffffffff80a85095e0) at device_server.c:8379 [opt]
  frame #14: 0xffffffff800477fdd7 kernel.development`ipc_kobject_server(request=0xffffffff80ac89ec00, option=<unavailable>) at ipc_kobject.c:351 [opt]
  frame #15: 0xffffffff8004752ddd kernel.development`ipc_kmsg_send(kmsg=0xffffffff80ac89ec00, option=3, send_timeout=0) at ipc_kmsg.c:1867 [opt]
  frame #16: 0xffffffff800476dbcb kernel.development`mach_msg_overwrite_trap(args=<unavailable>) at mach_msg.c:570 [opt]
```

Overflow – Root Cause

frame #7: 0xffffffff8004a4149a kernel.development`IOBufferMemoryDescriptor::inTaskWithPhysicalMask(inTask=0xffffffff80a10ebd88, options=65538, **capacity=18446744073709551615**, physicalMask=18446744073709547520) at IOBufferMemoryDescriptor.cpp:354 [opt]

18446744073709551615 = 0xffffffffffffffff

```
(lldb) f 8
IOUSBFamily was compiled with optimization - stepping may behave oddly; variables may not be available.
frame #8: 0xffffffff7f8529efac IOUSBFamily`IOUSBInterfaceUserClient::LowLatencyPrepareBuffer(this=0xffffffff80a5dbd800,
bufferData=0xffffffffa750b2bab0, addrOut=0xffffffffa750b2ba00) at IOUSBInterfaceUserClient.cpp:2358 [opt]
(lldb) fr v
(IOUSBInterfaceUserClientV3 *) this = 0xffffffff80a5dbd800
(LowLatencyUserBufferInfoV3 *) bufferData = 0xffffffffa750b2bab0
(uint64_t *) addrOut = 0xffffffffa750b2ba00
(bool) preparedIOMD = false
(uint64_t) dataBuffer = 0
(IOReturn) ret = <variable not available>

(IOUSBDevice *) device = <variable not available>

(IOOptionBits) optionBits = 0
(mach_vm_address_t) physicalMask = <variable not available>

(IOBufferMemoryDescriptor *) dataBufferDescriptor = <register rax is not available>
...
...
(lldb) memory read --size 8 --format x --count 12 0xffffffffa750b2bab0
0xffffffffa750b2bab0: 0x0e38340d99444cc1 0x0000000000000049
0xffffffffa750b2bac0: 0xffffffffffffffff 0x0000000000000000
0xffffffffa750b2bad0: 0x0000000000000008 0xffffffff8004cc0590
0xffffffffa750b2bae0: 0x0000000000000000 0xffffffffa750b2bbac
0xffffffffa750b2baf0: 0xffffffff8004cc08f0 0xffffffff7f852ede68
0xffffffffa750b2bb00: 0xffffffffa750b2bb80 0x0000000000000000
(lldb)
```

NULL PAGE Reference in IntelAccelerator

NULL PAGE Reference bug found in IntelAccelerator

```
120.102-21401e10 (x86_64) was loaded.
(lldb) bt
* thread #1, stop reason = signal SIGSTOP
* frame #0: 0xffffffff8013da405b kernel.development`memcpy + 11
  frame #1: 0xffffffff7f964b18c7 AppleIntelLHD5000Graphics`IntelAccelerator::newGTT(unsigned int**, bool, IGAccelTask&) + 173
  frame #2: 0xffffffff7f964a330 AppleIntelLHD5000Graphics`IntelPPGTT::init(IntelAccelerator&, bool, IGAccelTask&) + 24
  frame #3: 0xffffffff7f964a2c88 AppleIntelLHD5000Graphics`IGAccelTask::prepare(IntelAccelerator&) + 38
  frame #4: 0xffffffff7f964b17c7 AppleIntelLHD5000Graphics`IntelAccelerator::createUserGPUtask() + 219
  frame #5: 0xffffffff7f95083cca IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelShared2::init(IOGraphicsAccelerator2*, task*) + 58
  frame #6: 0xffffffff7f9509848d IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOGraphicsAccelerator2::createShared(task*) + 51
  frame #7: 0xffffffff7f95087051 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelSharedUserClient2::sharedStart() + 43
  frame #8: 0xffffffff7f964933a6 AppleIntelLHD5000Graphics`IGAccelSharedUserClient::sharedStart() + 22
  frame #9: 0xffffffff7f95085254 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelSharedUserClient2::start(IOService*) + 156
  frame #10: 0xffffffff7f95097db0 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOGraphicsAccelerator2::newUserClient(task*, void*, unsigned int, IOUserClient**) + 1088
  frame #11: 0xffffffff80145f1871 kernel.development`IOService::newUserClient(this=0xffffffff8036144800, owningTask=0xffffffff8042c36840, securityID=0xffffffff8042c36840, type=6, properties=0x0000000000000000, handler=0xffffffff921acdce0) at IOService.cpp:5851 [opt]
  frame #12: 0xffffffff80146542d0 kernel.development`::is_io_service_open_extended(_service=0xffffffff8036144800, owningTask=0xffffffff8042c36840, connection=0xffffffff921acdbd30) at IOUserClient.cpp:3468 [opt]
  frame #13: 0xffffffff8013ff2662 kernel.development`_Xio_service_open_extended(InHeadP=0xffffffff803ca0e260, OutHeadP=0xffffffff803ca0e07c) at device_server.c:8003 [opt]
  frame #14: 0xffffffff8013ec450d kernel.development`ipc_kobject_server(request=0xffffffff803ca0e200, option=<unavailable>) at ipc_kobject.c:359 [opt]
  frame #15: 0xffffffff8013e9124a kernel.development`ipc_kmsg_send(kmsg=0xffffffff803ca0e200, option=3, send_timeout=0) at ipc_kmsg.c:1822 [opt]
  frame #16: 0xffffffff8013eb024f kernel.development`mach_msg_overwrite_trap(args=<unavailable>) at mach_msg.c:546 [opt]
  frame #17: 0xffffffff7f9749e1d7
  frame #18: 0xffffffff801402c7c3 kernel.development`mach_call_munger(state=<unavailable>) at BSD_i386.c:481 [opt]
  frame #19: 0xffffffff8013e5b222 kernel.development`hndl_mach_scall + 210
(lldb) dis
kernel.development`memcpy:
0xffffffff8013da4050 <+0>: movq    %rdi, %rax
0xffffffff8013da4053 <+3>: movq    %rdx, %rcx
0xffffffff8013da4056 <+6>: shrq    $0x3, %rcx
0xffffffff8013da405a <+10>: cld
-> 0xffffffff8013da405b <+11>: rep    movsq    (%rsi), %es:(%rdi)
0xffffffff8013da405e <+14>: movq    %rdx, %rcx
0xffffffff8013da4061 <+17>: andq    $0x7, %rcx
0xffffffff8013da4065 <+21>: rep    movsb    (%rsi), %es:(%rdi)
0xffffffff8013da4067 <+23>: retq
0xffffffff8013da4068 <+24>: nopl   (%rax,%rax)
(lldb) register read $rdi
rdi = 0x0000000000000000
```

NULL PAGE Reference – Root Cause

Pseudo Code snippet of IntelAccelerator::newGTT function

v8 is not always returns normal address. may be null

```
v8 = (unsigned int *)IOAccelSysMemory::lockForCPUAccess(
    *(IOAccelSysMemory **)(v6 + 24),
    *(task **)kernel_task_0,
    1u);

*a2 = v8;
if ( v5 )
{
    v9 = this->member547;
    if ( v9 )
    {
        v10 = this->member546;
        v11 = 0LL;
        do
        {
            *(unsigned int *)((char *)v8 + (unsigned int)v11) = *(_DWORD *)(v10 + v11);
            v11 = (unsigned int)(v11 + 4);
        }
        while ( v9 > v11 );
    }
}
else
    use v8 as dst addr
{
    memcpy(v8, *(const void **)(this->member44 + 616), LODWORD(this->member551) >> 10);
    IntelAccelerator::releaseGARTMemory(this, LODWORD(this->member552), LODWORD(this->member553), v4);
    IntelAccelerator::releaseGARTMemory(this, LODWORD(this->member554), LODWORD(this->member555), v4);
}
```

---(a)

```
-----
if ( *(task **)kernel_task_0 == a2 )
{
    v12 = this->member45;
    if ( !v12 )
    {
        v12 = IOMemoryDescriptor::createMappingInTask((IOMemoryDesi
v5->member45 = v12;
        if ( !v12 )
        {
            v11 = 0LL;
            _os_log_internal(
                &dwrd_0,
                _os_log_default_0,
                17LL,
                IOAccelSysMemory::lockForCPUAccess(task *, unsigned int
                mach_vm_address_t IOAccelSysMemory::lockForCPUAccess(!
            return v11;
        }
    }
}
```

---(b)

Divide Zero in AMDRadeonX4000 Extension

Divide Zero BUG found in IOAccelCommandQueue class

(lldb) bt

* thread #1, stop reason = signal SIGSTOP

```
frame #0: 0xffffffff7f88b04941 AMDRadeonX4000`BltMgr::HwlOptimizeBufferBltRects(BltInfo*, unsigned int) + 879
frame #1: 0xffffffff7f88b1c474 AMDRadeonX4000`SiBltMgr::Adjust3dBltInfo(BltInfo*) + 662
frame #2: 0xffffffff7f88b1bfe2 AMDRadeonX4000`SiBltMgr::Execute3dBlt(BltInfo*) + 76
frame #3: 0xffffffff7f88b04241 AMDRadeonX4000`BltMgr::Memset(BltDevice*, _UBM_MEMSETINFO*) + 753
frame #4: 0xffffffff7f88a75506 AMDRadeonX4000`AMDRadeonX4000`AMDAtomicBltMgr::Memset(_UBM_MEMSETINFO*, _UBM_E_RETURNCODE*) + 28
frame #5: 0xffffffff7f88a73d29 AMDRadeonX4000`AMDRadeonX4000`AMDAtomicBltManager::doMemset(_UBM_MEMSETINFO*, ABM_OPTIONS const*) + 263
frame #6: 0xffffffff7f88a56478 AMDRadeonX4000`AMDRadeonX4000`AMDAccelResource::initFillRegions() + 390
frame #7: 0xffffffff7f88a5c9ac AMDRadeonX4000`AMDRadeonX4000`AMDAccelResource::prepare() + 108
frame #8: 0xffffffff7f889b7c3e IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelSegmentResourceList::prepare() + 48
frame #9: 0xffffffff7f889cbe94 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelCommandQueue::coalesceSegment(IOAccelCommandQueueSegment*, unsigned int*, IOAccelSegmentResourceList*, IOAccelKernelCommand const*, IOAccelKernelCommand const*) + 78
frame #10: 0xffffffff7f889cc1ce IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelCommandQueue::processCommandBuffer(unsigned int, unsigned int) + 666
frame #11: 0xffffffff7f889cd188 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelCommandQueue::process_command_buffer(unsigned int, unsigned int) + 924
frame #12: 0xffffffff7f889cb4c0 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelCommandQueue::submit_command_buffer(unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned long long, unsigned long long) + 252
frame #13: 0xffffffff7f889cb2b9 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelCommandQueue::submit_command_buffers(IOAccelCommandQueueSubmitArgs const*) + 827
frame #14: 0xffffffff7f889ca2f4 IOAcceleratorFamily2`IOAccelCommandQueue::s_submit_command_buffers(IOAccelCommandQueue*, void*, IOExternalMethodArguments*) + 250
frame #15: 0xffffffff8006224978 kernel.development`IOUserClient::externalMethod(this=<unavailable>, selector=<unavailable>, args=0xffffffff7f889fac68, dispatch=0xffffffff7f889fac68, target=<unavailable>, reference=<unavailable>) at IOUserClient.cpp:5689 [opt]
* frame #16: 0xffffffff800622da02 kernel.development`::is_io_connect_method(connection=<unavailable>, selector=1, scalar_input=<unavailable>, scalar_inputCnt=<unavailable>, inband_input=<unavailable>, inband_inputCnt=32, ool_input=0, ool_input_size=0, inband_output="", inband_outputCnt=0xffffffff80b137560c, scalar_output=0xffffffff7f889d3bce0, scalar_outputCnt=0xffffffff7f889d3bce0, ool_output=0, ool_output_size=0xffffffff80b1ee3138) at IOUserClient.cpp:4304 [opt]
frame #17: 0xffffffff8005bbc386 kernel.development`_Xio_connect_method(InHeadP=<unavailable>, OutHeadP=0xffffffff7f889d3bce0) at device_server.c:8379 [opt]
frame #18: 0xffffffff8005a948fd kernel.development`ipc_kobject_server(request=0xffffffff80b1ee3050, option=3) at ipc_kobject.c:361 [opt]
frame #19: 0xffffffff8005a6088e kernel.development`ipc_kmsg_send(kmsg=0xffffffff80b1ee3050, option=3, send_timeout=0) at ipc_kmsg.c:1868 [opt]
frame #20: 0xffffffff8005a800e3 kernel.development`mach_msg_overwrite_trap(args=<unavailable>) at mach_msg.c:553 [opt]
frame #21: 0xffffffff8005bf702b kernel.development`mach_call_munger64(state=0xffffffff80acb77100) at BSD_i386.c:580 [opt]
frame #22: 0xffffffff8005a2a476 kernel.development`hndl_mach_scall64 + 22
```


Divide Zero – Root Cause

ASM Code snippet of AMDRadeonX4000`BltMgr::HwlOptimizeBufferBltRects Function

```
-----  
__text:0000000000BB75B      div    esi  
__text:0000000000BB75D      mov    r14d, 0  
__text:0000000000BB763      mov    r12d, 0      -----init r12d with 0      --(a)  
__text:0000000000BB769      test   edx, edx  
.....  
-----omitted code ----  
.....  
__text:0000000000BB93C  loc_BB93C:          ; CODE XREF:  
BltMgr::HwlOptimizeBufferBltRects(BltInfo *,uint)+3E1j  
__text:0000000000BB93C      xor    edx, edx  
__text:0000000000BB93E      mov    eax, r13d  
__text:0000000000BB941      div    r12d      -----r12d is not always nonzero      ---(b)  
__text:0000000000BB944      cmp    eax, r14d  
__text:0000000000BB947      jbe   short loc_BB95B  
__text:0000000000BB949      mov    dword ptr [rsi+rbx-0Ch], 0  
__text:0000000000BB951      mov    [rsi+rbx-4], r12d  
__text:0000000000BB956      mov    eax, r14d  
__text:0000000000BB959      jmp   short loc_BB97C
```

<https://github.com/dongyangwu/p-joker>

new version will release later