

Upgrading Rollback-Agnostic Replay Attacks

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Agenda

- # Whoami #
- Introduction
 - Software Defined Radio (SDR)
 - Arsenal
 - Radio Frequency Analysis
 - Modulation
 - Rolling Codes
- Attacks
 - Rolljam
 - Rollback
 - Upgrade
 - Questions & Contact







Disclaimer



- All tests carried out have been under the permission and supervision of the legitimate owners
- Performing any of the above techniques is considered ILLEGAL if the necessary permission is not obtained
- All captured signals have been erased after the end of the investigation
- The tests comply with data protection law and the right to personal privacy







- Associate Security Consultant at IOActive
- Software engineering
- Love cars, evade and breaks things =)
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in

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Radio Frequency Introduction











Traditional Radio









Which SDR should I buy?

What do I want to do?

- Signal reception
- Emitting signals
- Reception of a certain band
- Professional use







USRP: \$1000





BladeRF: \$700

Ubertooth: \$130



Yard Stick One: \$150











JAMMING IS ILLEGAL









What is RKE?

- Remote Keyless Entry system
- Operate by radio frequencies
 - European, Asian, and British cars on 433.92 MHz
 - North American and Japanese cars on 315 MHz
- Lock/unlock doors, turn on the vehicle, etc.
- Chips with cyphers













- Process of modifying an information signal so that it can be transmitted over a communication channel
- The modulating signal contains the information to be transmitted, such as voice, music or data











Modulation (continued)

ASK









HITS .

How do rolling codes work exactly?











FIXED CODES	Car is Unlocked 🗗
	Generated Passcode List
Next Value: 168	169 170
	171 172

https://harryli0088.github.io/rolling-code/





HITS

Rolling Codes (continued)



	Car is Unlocked 🗗
FIXED CODES	Generated Passcode List
	168
	169
Next Value: 168	170
	171
	172

	Car is Unlocked 🗬
ROLLING CODES	Generated Passcode List
Next Value: <u>940726474085962200</u>	288638251346168640
	350431964959453600 884465203000531000

https://harryli0088.github.io/rolling-code/







Car is Unlocked 🗬

Generated Passcode List 940726474085962200 288638251346168640 397682136877814140 350431964959453600

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CHIP Codec: 4D70











- CHIP Codec: 4D70
 - ASK modulation



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Center:	0,0516	
Samples/Symbol:	200 🗘	
rror tolerance:	1 0	
Iodulation:	ASK 🜔 🎤	
Bits/Symbol:	1	
Autodetect	parameters 🗸	
		▲ 0 selected 0,00 ns -∞ dBm
		10101001100101010100011000110010101010



- CHIP Codec: 4D70
- ASK modulation
- Not bit codification



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RollJam Wireless Vehicle Entry Attack







Rolljam

ROLLJAM DEVICE



Samy Kamkar

0 @samykamkar













How Rolljam Works (continued)

ATTACK METHODOLOGY

- Jamming + listening signal 1
- 2. Jamming + listening signal 2
- 3. Stop the jamming device + send signal 1
- Signal 2 valid to use © 4.







Executing Rolljam

Jammer

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Sample rat RF gain IF gain Freq BB gain Bandwidth

> Relative Gain (dB)

Max

Executing Rolljam

Jammer



Hopping Program

Jammer Gen	- 0 ×							0			
		JUMP	Jam	ming	FM_TEST 1	frequency	at 4339	00000.0	with 20	MHz bandı	width
·		JUMP							with 10 M		idth
	<u> </u>	JUMP			FM_TEST 1		at 4339		with 20		width
		JUMP			FM_TEST2	frequency			with 10 M		idth
		JUMP			FM_TEST		at 4339		with 20		width
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		JUMP			FM_TEST2	frequency			with 10 M		idth
425.000 430.000 435.000 440.000 Frequency (MHz)		JUMP			FM_TEST		at 4339		with 20		width
Hold Reset Av	erage	JUMP			FM_TEST2		at 100	00000.0	with 10 M	Hz bandw	idth
Hold Reset 0	\$										
RF Frequencies FFT Size: 1024	~										

Window: Blackman-harris \lor



Executing Rolljam





Executing Rolljam (continued)









Rollback Time-Agnostic Re-Synchronization Replay Attack

CVE-2022-36945 CVE-2022-37305 CVE-2022-37418









- Presented at Blackhat USA 2022
 - Authors: Levente Csikor & Hoon Wei Lim
 - US-22-Csikor-RollBack-A-New-Time-Agnostic-Replay-Attack
- Official paper
 - Rollback Paper





















What is Rollback Exactly?



- Rollback is **DIFFERENT** than Rolljam
- Don't need to **JAM** any signal
- Owner uses the vehicle/key fob as usual
 - Vehicle acts as intended, can receive the signals as usual
- Attack \rightarrow Re-synchronize the car with **used** codes
 - 2 to 3 codes for resync
- Original affected vehicles: Kia, Hyundai, Mazda, Nissan, and Toyota
 - ► New discoveries: censored (2013), censored (2019) and censored (2022)







How Rollback Works





Bag of 5 old codes





How Rollback Works





Replay the first 2 codes





How Rollback Works





Replay the first 2 codes

The vehicle is unlocked with the next code sent, the counters return to this state







Replay the first 2 codes

The vehicle is unlocked with the next code sent, the counters return to this state





How Rollback Works (continued)

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Send intercalated signals, in this case 2 and 4, to re-synchronise the vehicle





How Rollback Works (continued)



- Send intercalated signals, in this case 2 and 4, to re-synchronise
- Rollback on signal 5







How Rollback Works (continued)



- Send intercalated signals, in this case 2 and 4, to re-synchronise
- Rollback on signal 5

What is new new Rollback

Providing a fresh and profound alternative perspective









Is it possible to carry out a rollback attack on different days?



Is it possible to execute the attack with obsolete codes collected on different days?







Is it possible to carry out a rollback attack on different days?





- Is it possible to execute the attack with obsolete codes collected on different days?
- Perform Rollback on different days
- Perform Rollback on a run of 50 old codes







- We do not need jamming
- What is new here? Signals do not need to be sequential
 - In some cases they need to be strictly sequential
- Signals persit over time
- Loose, strict, and timeframes















HACKED



- Five days of grabbing
- Replay 1, 7, and $19 \rightarrow Open$





Replay 1, 7, and 14





• Replay 1, 7, and $14 \rightarrow$ Go Home







• Replay 1, 7, and $14 \rightarrow$ Go Home





Odd signal: 2





Odd signal: 2

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- Even + even = open
- Odd + even = go home





Rollback: Second New Scenario



TIMING TIME : D

STRICT SEQUENCE!



3 different signals











- 3 different signals
- Timeframe of 1.5 between signals











- 3 different signals
- Timeframe of 1.5 between signals











- 3 different signals
- Timeframe of 1.5 between signals













- 3 different signals
- Timeframe of 1.5 between signals
- Four days of signal capturing











TIMING TIME : D HACKED :) STRICT SEQUENCE!



- 3 different signals
- Timeframe of 1.5 between signals
- Four days of signal capturing
- Bag of 50 codes!





Trust the Process

- No methodology
- No a priori indications
- Not access to official documentation















Demo Time

STRICT + TIMEFRAME













HITS

Demo Time

LOOSE ATTACK











Findings

- Modern vehicles still affected
- Jamming is not necessary
- Design flaw in some manufacturers
 - Can be "fixed" by vehicle manufacturers with software/firmware updates
- More powerful than we thought
 - Repeatable with jumps of up to 50 old codes!
- Depends on code hoping, not days hoping















- Discard old codes used by vehicle manufacturers
- Mandatory physical resynchronisation of the RKEs
- Precautionary measures for most-based jamming attacks
- Establish anti-jamming technology by manufacturers (detect jamming of signals for example)



Q & A

- IOActive 💙
 - Alfredo Pironti
 - Jose Antonio Maldonado
- Hack In The Box
- Eduardo Arriols (@_Hykeos)
- Joel Serna (@JoelSernaMoreno)







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