


# NVMe: New Vulnerabilities Made easy






# Tal Lossos

Security Researcher  
@CyberArk Labs

OS Internals :)



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

(plz work)



01

# Open-Source VR

Methodologies & More



# Open Source Research



## Source code

Easier to understand  
than by reversing

## Debugging

Run it & debug on  
our machine!

## Static analysis

Write/Use tools for  
low-hanging-fruits

## Re-compiling

Adding debug  
snippets



# Open Source “disadvantages”

## Bug Bounty

Less (if at all)  
than closed source

## Overwhelming

So much code X.X



# STRATEGY



## STEP 1

Find code target




## STEP 3

Compile, Build & Execute




## STEP 2


Static Analysis



## STEP 4

Repeat (& consider  
fuzzing)







# Reverse Engineering

RE open-source??


# Reverse Engineering

```
memcpy(to, from, size);
```



# CVE-2022-29021

```
struct razer_report razer_chroma_extended_matrix_set_custom_frame2(  
    unsigned char row_index, unsigned char start_col, unsigned char stop_col, unsigned char *rgb_data, size_t packetLength)  
{  
    const size_t row_length = (size_t) (((stop_col + 1) - start_col) * 3); ←   
    const size_t data_length = (packetLength != 0) ? packetLength : row_length + 5;  
    struct razer_report report = get_razer_report(0x0F, 0x03, data_length);  
    // ...  
    memcpy(&report.arguments[5], rgb_data, row_length); ←   
    return report;  
}
```




```
get_razer_report(&report, 0xFu, 3u, data_length);
report.transaction_id.id = 63;
report.arguments[2] = row_index;
report.arguments[3] = l_start_col;
report.arguments[4] = l_stop_col;
if ( row_length >= 8 )
{
    *(_QWORD *)&report.arguments[5] = *l2_rgb_data;
    *(_QWORD *)(&report.data_size + row_length) = *(_QWORD *)((char *)l2_rgb_data + row_length - 8);
    qmemcpy(&report.arguments[10], (char *)l2_rgb_data + 5, 8 * ((row_length - 5) >> 3));
}
```



# FORTIFY\_SOURCE

```
get_razer_report(&report, 0xFu, 3u, data_length);
report.transaction_id.id = 63;
report.arguments[2] = row_index;
report.arguments[3] = l_start_col;
report.arguments[4] = l_stop_col;
if ( row_length > 0x4D )
    return razer_chroma_extended_matrix_set_custom_frame2_cold();
if ( row_length >= 8 )
{
    *&report.arguments[5] = *l2_rgb_data;
    *(&report.data_size + row_length) = *(l2_rgb_data + row_length - 8);
    qmemcpy(&report.arguments[10], l2_rgb_data + 5, 8 * ((row_length - 5) >> 3));
}
```







# “ Dumb ” Fuzzing?




# Linux kernel communication




# Linux kernel communication




# Linux kernel communication



# Linux kernel communication



# Linux kernel communication






# Example - CVE-2022-29021

```
1 files = list(Path(path).rglob('matrix*'))
2
3 def fuzzer(max_length: int = 100, char_start: int = 32, char_range: int = 32) -> str:
4     string_length = random.randrange(0, max_length + 1)
5     out = ""
6     for i in range(0, string_length):
7         out += chr(random.randrange(char_start, char_start + char_range))
8     return bytes(out, "utf-8")
9
10 while True:
11     f = random.choice(files)
12     i = fuzzer()
13     print(f'trying file - {f}, input - {i}')
14     with open(f, 'wb') as ff:
15         ff.write(i)
```

# 02

## SCA


Yes, Static code Analysis





“SCA commonly refers to the running of tools that attempt to highlight possible vulnerabilities within the source-code”

—OWASP



+++

# Available tools



## C/CPP

Clang  
cppcheck

## Python

Pylint  
Mypy

## JS




ESLint  
JSLint

CodeQL

# 03

## SCA vs Kernel


The Linux kernel, ofc.




# Memory Corruption Bugs




**Buffer  
Overflow /  
Underflow**



**Null PTR  
Dereference**



**Integer  
Overflow /  
Underflow**



**Uninitialized  
variables**

<> **Code** Pull requests 86 Actions Security Insights

main ▾

**cppcheck** / **readme.md**



**firewave** **readme.md**: removed defunct (and unnecessary) GitHub Actions badge [sk... 



18 contributors



+6

248 lines (180 sloc) | 8.42 KB

# Cppcheck




OSS-Fuzz	Coverity Scan Build Status	License
		

## About the name

The original name of this program was "C++check", but it was later changed to "Cppcheck".

Despite the name, Cppcheck is designed for both C and C++.

# cppcheck




# cppcheck

```
./cppcheck source/XXX.c --xml 2>check.xml
```

```
htmlreport/cppcheck-htmlreport -  
file=check.xml -report-dir=check_report
```

```
firefox check_report/index.html
```



# Cppcheck report


[error](#) [warning](#) [portability](#) [performance](#)

## Defect summary

Toggle all

### Show #      Defect ID


- 1549 integerOverflow
- 1390 unknownMacro
- 1356 uninitializedvar
- 59 syntaxError
- 54 nullPointer
- 50 nullPointerArithmetic



[..../linux/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c](#)

[201](#) nullPointer

[476](#) warning Possible null pointer dereference: ctrl->ctrl\_key






```
ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_ctrl_secret + 10,
                                         host->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
    ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
    ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL; <--- Assignment 'ctrl->ctrl_key=NULL', assigned value is 0
}
pr_debug("%s: using ctrl hash %s key %*ph\n", __func__,
         ctrl->ctrl_key->hash > 0 ? <--- Null pointer dereference
         nvme_auth_hmac_name(ctrl->ctrl_key->hash) : "none",
         (int)ctrl->ctrl_key->len, ctrl->ctrl_key->key);
```



# 04


## Hunting for Bugs

(using SCA)



# SCA failed attempt

```
struct razer_report razer_chroma_extended_matrix_set_custom_frame2(  
    unsigned char row_index, unsigned char start_col, unsigned char stop_col, unsigned char *rgb_data, size_t packetLength)  
{  
    const size_t row_length = (size_t) (((stop_col + 1) - start_col) * 3); ←   
    const size_t data_length = (packetLength != 0) ? packetLength : row_length + 5;  
    struct razer_report report = get_razer_report(0x0F, 0x03, data_length);  
    // ...  
    memcpy(&report.arguments[5], rgb_data, row_length); ←   
    return report;  
}
```



# NVidia open-source drivers

The screenshot shows a GitHub repository page for the "NVIDIA / open-gpu-kernel-modules" repository. The repository is public, as indicated by the "Public" badge. The main navigation tabs are "Code", "Issues 99", "Pull requests 29", "Discussions", "Actions", "Security", and "Insights". The "Code" tab is selected, highlighted with a red underline. Below the tabs, there's a dropdown menu showing "main" and a link to "open-gpu-kernel-modules / README.md". The repository has 535.43.02 contributors, with one user named "aritger" shown. There are 2 contributors listed, each with a small green NVIDIA logo icon. The repository contains 857 lines (791 sloc) and is 51.4 KB in size. A large banner at the bottom of the page reads "NVIDIA Linux Open GPU Kernel Module Source" in white text on a black background. Below the banner, a smaller text states: "This is the source release of the NVIDIA Linux open GPU kernel modules, version 535.43.02."

# Nvidia vulnerabilities


```
void NV_API_CALL nv_acpi_methods_uninit(void)
{
    struct ACPI_device *device = NULL;

#ifndef NV_ACPI_BUS_GET_DEVICE_PRESENT
    acpi_bus_get_device(nvif_parent_gpu_handle, &device);

    nv_uninstall_notifier(device->driver_data, nv_acpi_event);
#endif

    device->driver_data = NULL;
    nvif_parent_gpu_handle = NULL;

    return;
}
```



```
int acpi_bus_get_device(acpi_handle handle, struct acpi_device **device)
{
    return acpi_get_device_data(handle, device, NULL);
}
```

```
static int acpi_get_device_data(acpi_handle handle, struct acpi_device **device,
                                void (*callback)(void *))
{
    acpi_status status;

    if (!device)
        return -EINVAL;

    *device = NULL;

    status = acpi_get_data_full(handle, acpi_scan_drop_device,
                               (void **)device, callback);
    if (ACPI_FAILURE(status) || !*device) {
        ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO, "No context for object [%p]\n",
                          handle));
        return -ENODEV;
    }
    return 0;
}
```



# Linux kernel



## Linus Torvalds Comments On The NTFS Linux Driver Situation

Written by [Michael Larabel](#) in [Linux Storage](#) on 28 April 2022 at 07:11 AM EDT. [47 Comments](#)



As written about earlier this week, [concerns have been raised over the "new" NTFS Linux driver](#) that it's effectively unmaintained already less than one year after being mainlined. Linus Torvalds has since commented on the matter and opens up the door for other developers to maintain it.



# NTFS3 Vulnerability



```
1. int attr_punch_hole(struct ntfs_inode *ni, u64 vbo, u64 bytes, u32 *frame_size)
2. {
3.     struct ATTRIB *attr = NULL, *attr_b;
4.
5.     ...
6.
7.     attr_b = ni_find_attr(ni, NULL, &le_b, ATTR_DATA, NULL, 0, NULL, &mi_b);
8.     if (!attr_b)
9.         return -ENOENT;
10.
11.    if (!attr_b->non_res) {
12.        u32 data_size = le32_to_cpu(attr->res.data_size);
```

# NTFS3 Vulnerability




```
1. int attr_punch_hole(struct ntfs_inode *ni, u64 vbo, u64 bytes, u32 *frame_size)
2. {
3.     struct ATTRIB *attr = NULL, *attr_b;
4.
5.     ...
6.
7.     attr_b = ni_find_attr(ni, NULL, &le_b, ATTR_DATA, NULL, 0, NULL, &mi_b);
8.     if (!attr_b)
9.         return -ENOENT;
10.
11.    if (!attr_b->non_res) {
12.        u32 data_size = le32_to_cpu(attr->res.data_size);
```



# The Linux Kernel and the Cursed Driver

Alon Zahavi | 2/7/23



Share This!



# 05

# NVMe

101 & exploitation





News from the source

## Content

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[Unread comments](#)

---

[LWN FAQ](#)


[Write for us](#)

User:  Password:  [Log in](#) | [Subscribe](#) | [Register](#)

# nvme: In-band authentication support

**From:** Hannes Reinecke <hare-AT-suse.de>  
**To:** Sagi Grimberg <sagi-AT-grimberg.me>  
**Subject:** [PATCHv8 00/12] nvme: In-band authentication support  
**Date:** Thu, 02 Dec 2021 16:23:46 +0100  
**Message-ID:** <20211202152358.60116-1-hare@suse.de>  
**Cc:** Christoph Hellwig <hch-AT-lst.de>, Keith Busch <keith.busch-AT-wdc.com>, linux-nvme-AT-lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto-AT-vger.kernel.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare-AT-suse.de>


**Archive-link:** [Article](#)



[..../linux/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c](#)

[201](#) nullPointer

[476](#) warning Possible null pointer dereference: ctrl->ctrl\_key



```
ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_ctrl_secret + 10,
                                         host->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
    ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
    ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
}
pr_debug("%s: using ctrl hash %s key %*ph\n", __func__,
         ctrl->ctrl_key->hash > 0 ?
         nvme_auth_hmac_name(ctrl->ctrl_key->hash) : "none",
         (int)ctrl->ctrl_key->len, ctrl->ctrl_key->key);
```



```
ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_ctrl_secret + 10,
                                         host->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
    ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
    ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
}
pr_debug("%s: using ctrl hash %s key %*ph\n", __func__,
         ctrl->ctrl_key->hash > 0 ?
         nvme_auth_hmac_name(ctrl->ctrl_key->hash) : "none",
         (int)ctrl->ctrl_key->len, ctrl->ctrl_key->key);
```






# NVMe 101





# NVMe




Adobe Stock | #404765713

## NVMe

Nonvolatile Memory Express protocol,  
a transport protocol for accessing  
nonvolatile storage media over PCIe.



# NVMe-oF



Adobe Stock | #539346721



## NVMe-oF

Extension of NVMe which enables NVMe-based communication over connections other than PCIe, like FC or Ethernet (over fabric).





# NVMe-TC




TCP

Adobe Stock | #472666315

## NVMe-TCP

Definition of NVMe-oF for TCP  
specifically.




# NVMeXXX



**NVMe** - Protocol / Specification

**NVMe-oF** - Extension of NVMe to allow  
non-PCIe communication

**NVMe-TCP** - an implementation of NVMe-oF  
for TCP






# NVMe-where?



# Amazon EBS and NVMe on Linux instances

[PDF](#) | [RSS](#)

EBS volumes are exposed as NVMe block devices on instances built on the [Nitro System](#). The device names are `/dev/nvme0n1`, `/dev/nvme1n1`, and so on. The device names that you specify in a block device mapping are renamed using NVMe device names (`/dev/nvme[0-26]n1`). The block device driver can assign NVMe device names in a different order than you specified for the volumes in the block device mapping.




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**Announcing the new Ebsv5 VM sizes offering 2X remote storage performance with NVMe-Public Preview**



# Amazon EBS and NVMe on Linux instances

[PDF](#) | [RSS](#)


EBS volumes are exposed as NVMe block devices on instances built on the [Nitro System](#). The device names are `/dev/nvme0n1`, `/dev/nvme1n1`, and so on. The device names that you specify in a block device mapping are renamed using NVMe device names (`/dev/nvme[0-26]n1`). The block device driver can assign NVMe device names in a different order than you specified for the volumes in the block device mapping.

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## NetApp NVMe solutions: Customer-focused technology leadership

Need help addressing your most stringent SLOs and business challenges? Look no further than our end-to-end NVMe-FC SAN solutions. They deliver the highest throughput and fastest response times yet for your enterprise workloads. And with new NVMe/TCP over traditional ethernet networks, the benefits keep rolling in.



# Amazon EBS and NVMe on Linux instances

[PDF](#) | [RSS](#)

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## Linux Driver Information

The Linux NVMe™ driver is open source and included as part of the Linux Kernel, which can be found here <https://github.com/torvalds/linux/tree/master/drivers/nvme>

NVMe architecture works out of the box in every major operating system, including all mainstream Linux distributions. Please check on specific feature support with the distros, e.g. Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Ubuntu. NVMe technology has been supported since kernel 3.3, and at the time had been backported to 2.6. Intel released some history of the Linux NVMe drivers stack in 2015 here:



# Exploitation



# NULL PTR dereference

```
int nvmet_setup_auth(struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl)

ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_ctrl_secret + 10,
                                         host->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash);


if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
    ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
    ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
}
pr_debug("%s: using ctrl hash %s key %*ph\n", __func__,
         ctrl->ctrl_key->hash > 0 ?
         nvme_auth_hmac_name(ctrl->ctrl_key->hash) : "none",
         (int)ctrl->ctrl_key->len, ctrl->ctrl_key->key);
```



# Invalid key


```
key_len = base64_decode(secret, allocated_len, key->key);
if (key_len < 0) {
    pr_debug("base64 key decoding error %d\n",
             key_len);
    ret = key_len;
    goto out_free_secret;
}

if (key_len != 36 && key_len != 52 &&
    key_len != 68) {
    pr_err("Invalid key len %d\n", key_len);
    ret = -EINVAL;
    goto out_free_secret;
}
```



# Exploiting NULL ptr dereference

- `mmap_min_addr` - min allowed address to map
- **SMEP/SMAP** - disable exec/access to userspace from kernel
- `panic_on_oops`



# Project Zero


News and updates from the Project Zero team at Google

Thursday, January 19, 2023

Exploiting null-dereferences in the Linux kernel

Posted by Seth Jenkins, Project Zero






# NVMe Exploitation





# NVMe-TCP reference in commit notes

Hi all,

recent updates to the NVMe spec have added definitions for in-band authentication, and seeing that it provides some real benefit especially for NVMe-TCP here's an attempt to implement it.





```
ctrl->ctrl_key = nvme_auth_extract_key(host->dhchap_ctrl_secret + 10,
                                         host->dhchap_ctrl_key_hash);
if (IS_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key)) {
    ret = PTR_ERR(ctrl->ctrl_key);
    ctrl->ctrl_key = NULL;
}
pr_debug("%s: using ctrl hash %s key %*ph\n", __func__,
         ctrl->ctrl_key->hash > 0 ?
         nvme_auth_hmac_name(ctrl->ctrl_key->hash) : "none",
         (int)ctrl->ctrl_key->len, ctrl->ctrl_key->key);
```



# Call stack

nvmet\_setup\_auth(...)

    └→ nvmet\_execute\_admin\_connect(...)

        └→ nvmet\_parse\_connect\_command(...)

            └→ nvmet\_req\_init(...)

+++

```
bool nvmet_req_init(struct nvmet_req *req, struct nvmet_cq *cq,
                     struct nvmet_sq *sq, const struct nvmet_fabrics_ops *ops)
{
    u8 flags = req->cmd->common.flags;
    u16 status;

    req->cq = cq;
    req->sq = sq;
    req->ops = ops;
    req->sg = NULL;
    req->metadata_sg = NULL;
    req->sg_cnt = 0;
```

## Referenced in 6 files:

[drivers/nvme/target/core.c](#), line 980

[drivers/nvme/target/fc.c](#), line 2549

[drivers/nvme/target/loop.c](#)

└ line 151

└ line 184

[drivers/nvme/target/rdma.c](#), line 988

[drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c](#), line 999

[drivers/nvme/target/trace.h](#), line 61

# NVMe-oF:

# NVMe-TCP

```
static int nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue)
{
    struct nvme_tcp_hdr *hdr = &queue->pdu.cmd.hdr;
    int len;
    struct kvec iov;
    struct msghdr msg = { .msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT };

recv:
    iov.iov_base = (void *)&queue->pdu + queue->offset;
    iov.iov_len = queue->left;
    len = kernel_recvmsg(queue->sock, &msg, &iov, 1,
                         iov.iov_len, msg.msg_flags);
```





# NVMe

## Environment setup





# **setup --help**

- NVMe / NVMe-TCP






# **setup --help**

- NVMe / NVMe-TCP – Google (EASY)





## setup --help

- NVMe / NVMe-TCP – Google (EASY)
- Authentication





## setup --help

- NVMe / NVMe-TCP – Google (**EASY**)
- Authentication – Kernel Sources (**HARD**)





## setup --help

- NVMe / NVMe-TCP – Google (**EASY**)
- Authentication – Kernel Sources (**HARD**)
- blktest framework : ) (**EASY**)



master

blktests / README.md

Go to file

...



kawasaki CONTIRIBUTING, README: transfer maintainer role  ✓

Latest commit 3ab437e on May 25, 2022  History

4 contributors




55 lines (39 sloc) | 1.74 KB

## blktests


 CI  passing

blktests is a test framework for the Linux kernel block layer and storage stack. It is inspired by the [xfstests](#) filesystem testing framework. It was originally written by Omar Sandoval and [announced in 2017](#).



```
_create_nvmet_host() {
    local nvmet_subsystem="$1"
    local nvmet_hostnqn="$2"
    local nvmet_hostkey="$3"
    local nvmet_ctrlkey="$4"
    local cfs_path="${NVMET_CFS}/subsystems/${nvmet_subsystem}"
    local host_path="${NVMET_CFS}/hosts/${nvmet_hostnqn}"



    mkdir "${host_path}"
    echo 0 > "${cfs_path}/attr_allow_any_host"
    ln -s "${host_path}" "${cfs_path}/allowed_hosts/${nvmet_hostnqn}"
    if [[ "${nvmet_hostkey}" ]]; then
        echo "${nvmet_hostkey}" > "${host_path}/dhchap_key"
    fi
    if [[ "${nvmet_ctrlkey}" ]]; then
        echo "${nvmet_ctrlkey}" > "${host_path}/dhchap_ctrl_key"
    fi
}
```



# 06

## Demo

Or 2









# 06


## Demo N.2

From Remote DoS to  
Pre-Auth Remote DoS



# Authorization

[30749.638602] nvme nvme0: Connect for subsystem testnqn is not allowed, hostnqn: AAAA




# Authorization

[30749.638602] nvme nvme0: Connect for subsystem testnqn is not allowed, hostnqn: AAAA





# TIMELINE



## Fix

Reported the vulnerabilities which were patched



## CVE

CVE-2023-0122  
CVE-2022-4842  
& more..



## Blogpost






# Wrap-up

- Open source research might be a bit overwhelming
  - focus is the key
- If no documentation available, search for tests
- SCA is still a powerful tool for low-hanging-fruits!





# THANKS !



@TalLossos

