



Take a picture of your app code -
Android MRI interpreter

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Principal Researcher,
FSI (Financial Security Institute)

WHO AM I



- **SungHyoun Song** (@decashx)
- **Principal Researcher at FSI**(Financial Security Institute) of South Korea
 - Mobile security researcher
 - Penetration tester for the Korean financial industry
- **Speaker of** { ITU-T / BlackHat USA / BlackHat ASIA / Ekoparty / Nullcon / HITB / CanSecWest / SEC-T / PacSec / HITCON / beVX / BlackAlps }
- **Interested in Android OS and Linux Kernel**




Surgery in the 1600's



X-Rays






Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP)

- OS Integrity Check
- Code Obfuscation
- Device Binding
- Anti-Emulator
- Anti-Debugging
- Data Encryption
- Anti-Tampering
- Secure Communication
- Anti-Keylogger
- Anti-Hooking


MRI




Android MRI in 2023



Android MRI in 2023



Android MRI in 2023



boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)

0x1a: *invoke-direct {v0}, void java.lang.StringBuilder.<init>()*

vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1=0x00000000 vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@" vreg5=0x13347F30/string "570436"

boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)

0x1d: *const-string v1, ".X G,E(g\$Ym\nm"*

vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1=0x00000000 vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x13347F30/string "570436" vreg5=0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@"

boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)

0x1f: *invoke-static {v1}, java.lang.String mip.mia.data.model.verify.DataWrap.G(java.lang.Object)*

vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1= 0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@" vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x1334F718/string ".X G,E(g\$Ymm" vreg5=0x13347F30/string "

boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)

0x22: *move-result-object v1*

vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1=0x1334F718/string ".X G,E(g\$Ymm" vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@" vreg5=0x13347F30/string "

boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)

0x23: *const/4 v2, #+0*



vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1=0x1334F770/string "comparePin = " vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@" vreg5=0x13347F30/string "


boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)

0x24: *invoke-virtual {v0, v2, v1}, java.lang.StringBuilder java.lang.StringBuilder.insert(int,java.lang.String)*

vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1=0x1334F770/string "comparePin = " vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@" vreg5=0x13347F30/string "

Android MRI in 2023






```
boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)
0x1a: invoke-direct {v0}, void java.lang.StringBuilder.<init>()
vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1=0x00000000 vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/
com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@" vreg5=0x13347F30/string "570436"
```


```
boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)
0x1d: const-string v1, ".X G,E(g$Ym\nm"
vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1=0x00000000 vreg2=0x00000000 vreg3=0x133492A0/
com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x13347F30/string "570436" vreg5=0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@"
```

```
boolean com.ai.obf.am.G(android.content.Context,java.lang.String)
0x1f: invoke-static {v1}, java.lang.String mip.mia.data.model.verify.DataWrap.G(java.lang.Object)
vreg0=0x1334F6D8/java.lang.StringBuilder vreg1= 0x1334F6C0/string "1qw3e4r!@" vreg2=0x00000000
vreg3=0x133492A0/com.ai.obf.am vreg4=0x1334F718/string ".X G,E(g$Ymm" vreg5=0x13347F30/string "570436"
```





Design of Android MRI interpreter


File type of ART




Installation







App Start





YES



NO



Idle Time



MainFunc() →

SubFunc2() →

SubFunc2_3() →

SubFunc2_3_2()

Compiled Code

Byte Code

Compiled Code

Byte Code

```
void MainFunc( )  
{  
    SubFunc1();  
    SubFunc2();  
    SubFunc3();  
    SubFunc4();  
}
```

```
void SubFunc1( )  
{  
    .....  
}
```

```
void SubFunc2( )  
{  
    SubFunc2_1();  
    SubFunc2_2();  
    SubFunc2_3();  
    .....  
}
```

```
void SubFunc3( )  
{  
    .....  
}
```

```
void SubFunc2_1( )  
{  
    .....  
}
```

```
void SubFunc2_2( )  
{  
    .....  
}
```

```
void SubFunc2_3( )  
{  
    SubFunc2_3_1();  
    SubFunc2_3_2();  
    SubFunc2_3_3();  
    .....  
}
```

```
void SubFunc2_3_1( )  
{  
    .....  
}
```


```
void SubFunc2_3_2( )  
{  
    .....  
}
```

```
void SubFunc2_3_3( )  
{  
    .....  
}
```



AOT/JIT (compiled code)

Interpreter (byte code)



adb shell oatdump --oat-file=/data/app/com.myandroid.app/oat/arm4/base.odex --output=/tmp/dump.txt

```
297: Lcom/appsflyer/internal/ac; (offset=0x0006ff38) (type_idx=1233) (Initialized) (OatClassSomeCompiled)
0: void com.appsflyer.internal.ac.<init>() (dex_method_idx=7531)
```

DEX CODE:

```
0x0000: 7010 f95b 0100 | invoke-direct {v1}, void java.lang.Object.<init>() // method@23545
0x0003: 1200          | const/4 v0, #+0
0x0004: 5c10 a314     | iput-boolean v0, v1, Z com.appsflyer.internal.ac. // field@5283
0x0006: 1210          | const/4 v0, #+1
0x0007: 5c10 a414     | iput-boolean v0, v1, Z com.appsflyer.internal.ac.' // field@5284
0x0009: 1200          | const/4 v0, #+0
0x000a: 5b10 a214     | iput-object v0, v1, Lcom/appsflyer/internal/ac$b; com.appsflyer.internal.ac.`
0x000c: 7300          | return-void-no-barrier
```

....

CODE: (code_offset=0x0041bcd0 size_offset=0x0041bcc size=20)...

```
0x0041bcd0: 52800020 mov w0, #0x1
0x0041bcd4: 3900303f strb wzr, [x1, #12]
0x0041bcd8: 39003420 strb w0, [x1, #13]
0x0041bcdc: b900083f str wzr, [x1, #8]
0x0041bce0: d65f03c0 ret
```

....

```
326: Lcom/appsflyer/internal/t$1; (offset=0x00070148) (type_idx=1265) (Initialized) (OatClassNoneCompiled)
0: void com.appsflyer.internal.t$1.<init>(com.appsflyer.internal.t) (dex_method_idx=7673)
```

DEX CODE:


```
0x0000: 5b01 2815     | iput-object v1, v0, Lcom/appsflyer/internal/t; com.appsflyer.internal.t$1.`
0x0002: 7010 f95b 0000 | invoke-direct {v0}, void java.lang.Object.<init>() // method@23545
0x0005: 7300          | return-void-no-barrier
```

....


CODE: (code_offset=0x003447a0 size_offset=0x0034479c size=24)...

NO CODE!

Trace dalvik instruction and register value (in Interpreter)




Trace dalvik instruction and register value (in Interpreter)






Shadow Frame




DEX INSTRUCTION LIST

(0x00, NOP, "nop", k10x, ...)
(0x01, MOVE, "move", k12x, ...)
(0x02, MOVE_FROM16, "move/from16", k22x, ...)
(0x03, MOVE_16, "move/16", k32x, ...)
(0x04, MOVE_WIDE, "move-wide", k12x, ...)
(0x05, MOVE_WIDE_FROM16, "move-wide/from16", k22x, ...)
(0x06, MOVE_WIDE_16, "move-wide/16", k32x, ...)
(0x07, MOVE_OBJECT, "move-object", k12x, ...)
(0x08, MOVE_OBJECT_FROM16, "move-object/from16", k22x, ...)
(0x09, MOVE_OBJECT_16, "move-object/16", k32x, ...)
(0x0A, MOVE_RESULT, "move-result", k11x, ...)
(0x0B, MOVE_RESULT_WIDE, "move-result-wide", k11x, ...)
(0x0C, MOVE_RESULT_OBJECT, "move-result-object", k11x, ...)
(0x0D, MOVE_EXCEPTION, "move-exception", k11x, ...)
(0x0E, RETURN_VOID, "return-void", k10x, ...)
(0x0F, RETURN, "return", k11x, ...)
(0x10, RETURN_WIDE, "return-wide", k11x, ...)
(0x11, RETURN_OBJECT, "return-object", k11x, ...)
(0x12, CONST_4, "const/4", k11n, ...)
(0x13, CONST_16, "const/16", k21s, ...)
(0x14, CONST, "const", k31i, ...)
(0x15, CONST_HIGH16, "const/high16", k21h, ...)
(0x16, CONST_WIDE_16, "const-wide/16", k21s, ...)



Shadow Frame




DEX INSTRUCTION FORMAT

```
( k10x, // op )
( k12x, // op vA vB )
( k11n, // op vA, #+B )
( k11x, // op vAA )
( k10t, // op +AA )
( k20t, // op +AAAA )
( k22x, // op vAA, vBBBB )
( k21t, // op vAA, +BBBB )
( k21s, // op vAA, #+BBBB )
( k21h, // op vAA, #+BBBB0000[00000000] )
( k21c, // op vAA, thing@BBBB )
( k23x, // op vAA, vBB, vCC )
( k22b, // op vAA, vBB, #+CC )
( k22t, // op vA, vB, +CCCC )
( k22s, // op vA, vB, #+CCCC )
( k22c, // op vA, vB, thing@CCCC )
( k32x, // op vAAAA, vBBBB )
( k30t, // op +AAAAAAAA )
( k31t, // op vAA, +BBBBBBBB )
( k31i, // op vAA, #+BBBBBBBB )
( k31c, // op vAA, thing@BBBBBBBB )
( k35c, // op {vC, vD, vE, vF, vG}, thing@BBBB )
( k3rc, // op {vCCCC .. v(CCCC+AA-1)}, meth@BBBB )
```

Interpreter



Shadow Frame



```
int java.lang.Math.min(int, int)
0x4 : move r1, r3
reg0(0x00000000), reg1(0x00000019), reg2(0x00000001),
reg3(0x00000000), reg4(0x00000019), reg5(0x00000001)
```



```
### This items sets the UID of the target app.
[TARGET_APP_UID]=[10169]

### This item sets the target methods
[INCLUDE]=[ com.amazonaws ]
###[INCLUDE]=[ com.amazonaws.auth.BasicAWSCredentials ]
###[INCLUDE]=[java.lang.String a.a.a.a.e.d.g.d(java.lang.String, ]

### This item sets the exclude methods
[EXCLUDE]=[ android.]

### default Android Class List
[EXCLUDE]=[ android.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ java.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ org.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ com.android.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ com.google.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ sun.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ dalvik.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ libcore.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ javax.]
[EXCLUDE]=[ androidx.]
```

`java.lang.String com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl.getName()`

0x0: *iget-object v0, v1, Landroid/util/TypedXmlPullParser; com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml\$ReadSectionImpl.mParser*

`vreg0=0x00000000 vreg1=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl`

`java.lang.String com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl.getName()`

0x2: *invoke-interface {v0}, java.lang.String android.util.TypedXmlPullParser.getName()*

`vreg0=0x13D16DF0/com.android.internal.util.BinaryXmlPullParser vreg1=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl`

`java.lang.String com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl.getName()`

0x5: *move-result-object v0*

`vreg0=0x13D16DF0/com.android.internal.util.BinaryXmlPullParser vreg1=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl`

`java.lang.String com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl.getName()`

0x6: *return-object v0*

`vreg0=0x1400BC38/java.lang.String "user-state" vreg1=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl`

`void com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings.readUserStates(com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSection)`

0x1c: *move-result-object v5*

`vreg0=0x14016978/java.lang.String "com.google.vr.apps.ornament" vreg1=0x13B16588/java.lang.Object
vreg2=0x140169A8/com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings$LegacyState
vreg3=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl vreg4=0x13B16538/java.lang.String "user-state" vreg5=0x00000000
vreg6=0x13B16578/com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings
vreg7=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl`

`void com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings.readUserStates(com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSection)`

0x1d: *invoke-virtual {v4, v5}, boolean java.lang.String.equals(java.lang.Object)*

`vreg0=0x14016978/java.lang.String "com.google.vr.apps.ornament" vreg1=0x13B16588/java.lang.Object
vreg2=0x140169A8/com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings$LegacyState
vreg3=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl vreg4=0x13B16538/java.lang.String "user-state"
vreg5=0x1400BC38/java.lang.String "user-state" vreg6=0x13B16578/com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings
vreg7=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl`

`void com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings.readUserStates(com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSection)`

0x20: *move-result v4*

`vreg0=0x14016978/java.lang.String "com.google.vr.apps.ornament" vreg1=0x13B16588/java.lang.Object
vreg2=0x140169A8/com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings$LegacyState
vreg3=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl vreg4=0x13B16538/java.lang.String "user-state"
vreg5=0x1400BC38/java.lang.String "user-state" vreg6=0x13B16578/com.android.server.pm.verify.domain.DomainVerificationLegacySettings
vreg7=0x1400B920/com.android.server.pm.SettingsXml$ReadSectionImpl`





Interpreter





```
int java.lang.Math.min(int, int) // method info
0x4 : move r0, r3 // pc and instruction
reg0(0x00000000), reg1(0x00000019), reg2(0x00000001), reg3(0xffec30008), reg4(0x003000ff), ... // register
```



Action	Dalvik Instruction List
Create	const-string, const-string-jumbo
Move	move-object, move-object_from16, move-object-16, move-result-object, return-object
Copy	aget-object, aput-object, iget-object, iput-object, sget-object, sput-object
Call	invoke-virtual, invoke-virtual-range, invoke-super, invoke-super-range, invoke-direct, invoke-direct-range, invoke-interface, invoke-interface-range, invoke-static, invoke-static-range

```
reg3(0xffec30008)
⇒ CHECK TYPE : byte[], char[], java.string.String, java.lang.charsequence, ...
⇒ CHECK TARGET : reg3(0xffec30008) == "1q2w3e4r!"
```








RASP (Runtime Application Self-Protection)

RASP is a security technology that uses runtime instrumentation to detect and block computer attacks by taking advantage of information from inside the running software.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Runtime_application_self-protection



OS Integrity Check
Code Obfuscation
Device Binding
Anti-Emulator
Anti-Debugging
Data Encryption
Anti-Tampering
Secure Communication
Anti-Keylogger
Anti-Hooking



Root Detections

/system/xbin/su
/system/bin/.ext/su
/odm/bin/su ...

Hooking Framework Detections


frida-agent-64.so
libxposed_art.so
frida-agent-32.so ...

VS Emulator Checks

init.nox.rc
com.google.android.launcher.layouts.genymotion
com.bluestacks ...

Custom ROM Checks

/system/build.prop
ro.build.tags, test-keys
ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state ...



EvolutionX

Pixel UI, Android 13, Customization and more.
We are Evolution X!



Bliss Roms



ArrowOS

AOSiP



Havoc-OS



Corvus OS



LINEAGE



crDroid



paranoidandroid




pixelexperience



SYBERIA



PROJECT SAKURA
Feels like spring.







MSMXTENDED
CUSTOM ROM REDEFINED










<https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/boot-flow>

```
static int cmdline_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
    seq_printf(m, "%s\n", saved_command_line);
    return 0;
}
```

```
static int cmdline_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
    seq_printf(m, "%s\n", "rcupdate.rcu_expedited=1 rootwait ro init=/init androidboot.bootdevice=1d84000.ufshc androidboot.ba
seband=sdm androidboot.keymaster=1 msm_drm.dsi_display0=dsi_s6e3ha8_cmd_display::timing0 androidboot.force_normal_boot=1 and
roidboot.serialno=8B9Y0VSZ3 androidboot.slot_suffix=_a androidboot.slot_retry_count=2 androidboot.slot_successful=no android
boot.hardware.platform=sdm845 androidboot.hardware=crosshatch androidboot.revision=MP1.0 androidboot.bootloader=b1c1-0.4-761
7406 androidboot.hardware.sku=G013C androidboot.hardware.radio.subtype=0 androidboot.hardware.dsds=0 androidboot.secure_boot
=PRODUCTION androidboot.cdt_hwid=0x05012800 androidboot.hardware.majorid=0x01 androidboot.dtb_idx=0 androidboot.dtbo_idx=13
androidboot.bootreason=reboot androidboot.hardware.ldr=4GB,Samsung,LPDDR4X androidboot.ldr_info=Samsung androidboot.ldr_size
=4GB androidboot.hardware.ufs=128GB,Micron androidboot.cid=00000000 androidboot.boottime=0BLE:88,1BLL:141,1BLE:1042,2BLL:121
,2BLE:498,SW:10028,KL:0,KD:72,ODT:106,AVB:245,AFTL:0 androidboot.ramdump=disabled androidboot.blockchain=disabled usbcfg.suz
yq=disabled androidboot.theme=1 androidboot.hardware.pcbcfg=G650-01995-06 androidboot.hardware.devicfg=G950-00762-03 androidb
oot.vbmeta.device=PARTUUID=b7fc981c-7b25-4f78-848a-e5015e7b3cf5 androidboot.vbmeta.avb_version=1.1 androidboot.vbmeta.device
_state=locked androidboot.vbmeta.hash_alg=sha256 androidboot.vbmeta.size=4224 androidboot.vbmeta.digest=68cd5529bb07077fee41
e72d9e4bf35e89cb61be1488e08f37681a94e87f2c26 androidboot.veritymode=enforcing androidboot.verifiedbootstate=green androidboo
t.aftlstate=8 printk.devkmsg=on msm_rtb.filter=0x237 ehci-hcd.park=3 service_locator.enable=1 cgroup.memory=nokmem lpm_level
s.sleep_disabled=1 usbcore.autosuspend=7 loop.max_part=7 androidboot.boot_devices=soc/1d84000.ufshc androidboot.super_partit
ion=system buildvariant=user console=null");
    //seq_printf(m, "%s\n", saved_command_line);
    return 0;
}
```

acpi	cut	getprop	kill	monkey	rmmmod	taskset
am	dalvikvm	grep	killall	more	rmnetcli	tc
app_process	dalvikvm32	groups	ld.mc	mount	run-as	tee
app_process32	dalvikvm64	gzip	linker	mountpoint	runcon	telecom
app_process64	date	head	linker64	mtpd	schedtest	time
applypatch	dd	healthd	linker_asan	mv	screencap	timeout
appops	debuggerd	hid	linker_asan64	nanotool	screenrecord	tombstoned
appwidget	dex2oat	hostname	lmkd	ndc	sdcard	toolbox
arping	dex2oatd	hw	ln	netd	secdiscard	top
art	dexdiag	hwclock	load_policy	netstat	sed	touch
atrace	dexdump	hw servicemanager	locksettings	newfs_msdos	sendevent	toybox
audioserver	dexdump2	id	log	nice	sensorservice	tr
base64	dexlayout	idmap	logcat	nl	sensortest	tracepath
basename	dexlist	ifconfig	logcatd	nohup	seq	tracepath6
bcc	dexoptanalyzer	ime	logd	oatdump	service	traceroute6
blkid	dexoptanalyzerd	imgdiag	logname	oatdumpd	servicemanager	true
blockdev	df	imgdiag32	logpersist.cat	od	setenforce	truncate
bmgr	dirname	imgdiag64	logpersist.start	paste	setprop	tty
bootanimation	dmesg	imgdiagd	logpersist.stop	patch	setsid	tune2fs
bootstat	dnsmasq	imgdiagd32	logwrapper	patchoat	settings	tzdatacheck
bu	dos2unix	imgdiagd64	losetup	patchoatd	sgdisk	uiautomator
bugreport	dpm	incident	ls	perfprofd	sh	ulimit
bugreportz	drmserver	incidentd	lshal	pgrep	shasum	umount
bunzip2	du	init.bullhead.power.sh	lsmod	pidof	sha224sum	uname
bzcat	dumpstate	init.bullhead.qseecomd.sh	lsof	ping	sha256sum	uncrypt
bzip2	dumpsys	init.bullhead.sh	lsusb	ping6	sha384sum	uniq
cal	e2fsck	init.qcom.devstart.sh	make_ext4fs	pskill	sha512sum	unix2dos
cameraserver	echo	init.qcom.devwait.sh	make_f2fs	pm	sleep	uptime
cat	egrep	inotifyd	md5sum	pmap	sm	usleep
chcon	env	input	mdnsd	pppd	sort	uudecode
chgrp	expand	insmod	media	printenv	split	uuencode
chmod	expr	installd	mediaextractor	printf	ss	vdc
chown	fallocate	ionice	mediametrics	profman	start	vmstat
chroot	false	iorenice	mediaserver	profmand	stat	vold
chrt	fgrep	iotop	memory_replay32	ps	stop	vr
cksum	file	ip	memory_replay64	pwd	storaged	wc
clatd	find	ip6tables	memtest	racoon	strings	webview_zygote32
clear	flock	ip6tables-restore	microcom	readlink	surfaceflinger	webview_zygote64
cmd	free	ip6tables-save		realpath	svc	which

DEMO




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
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END

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