Virtually Secure

a journey from analysis to remote root 0day on an industry leading SSL-VPN appliance
Who am I?

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Independent security researcher from Israel

- Reverse engineering (mostly embedded systems)
- C/C++ And Python development
- Zerodays (Adobe Flash, PcAnywhere, EMC Networker, Windows Briefcase,…)
- No formal education
The research

• We were interested in exploiting an old vulnerability on an F5 product called FirePass.

• Overview (Taken from F5.com):

  The FirePass® SSL VPN appliance and Virtual Edition (VE) provide secure remote access to enterprise applications and data for users over any device or network. FirePass ensures easy access to applications by delivering outstanding performance, scalability, availability, policy management, and endpoint security. The result is unified security enforcement and access control that increases the agility and productivity of your workforce.
Virtual “Private” Networks
Note

F5 stated that a new SSL-VPN appliance is available and the FirePass SSL-VPN appliance is supported for legacy purposes.
Note

Combined net worth of 3 companies running this product is **177 billion dollars**
Advantages of using a virtual appliance vs a normal appliance

- Runs on x86/x64.
- Kernel debugging.
- Software encryption.
Disadvantages of using a virtual appliance vs a normal appliance

- Incorrect analysis.
- Different internal implementation.
- Maintenance issues.
- Can’t develop memory corruption exploits.
Downloading the vulnerable version

- Download ✓
- Boot ✓
- Activate ✗
0day research

- We can’t work with the vulnerable version.
- We can only try and find 0days now…
Attack surface (Black box)

- Open ports: http, https, ssh.
- Mostly HTTP based.
- This will be our main attack vector for now.
Getting a debug-shell

• Extract PHP files.
• Examine configuration.
• Other attack vectors?
The “debugStub” feature

- Remote kernel debugging.
- Use GDB to kernel debug.
- Unknown kernel version.
Mounting the drive in a different OS

• Boot partition.
• Hard drive encryption.
• Losetup, GPG, rootkey.gpg.
• Unable to mount the encrypted drives.
The boot partition

![File Browser]

- lost+found
- modules-2.4.31
- boot.0800
- boot.b
- chain.b
- config
- gpg
- initrd.gz
- insmod
- ld-linux.so.2
- libc.so.6
- losetup
- map
- os2_d.b
- rootkey.gpg
- System.map
- vmlinux-2.4.31

3 items selected (1.2 MB)
Interacting with the boot process

- Replaced `losetup` with a busybox shell.
- Booted and got a shell!
- Broke the decryption process.
The limited shell

```
mntbase: 1 MPT adapter found, 1 installed.
Fusion-MPT-SCSI Host Driver 2.05.18
scsi0: iocl0, LSI33C1030, FwRev=01032920h, Ports=1, MaxO=128, IRQ=17
blk: queue f7e93a18, I/O limit 4294967295Mb (mask 0xffffffffffffff)
   Vendor: UMHare, Model: UMHare Virtual S, Rev: 1.0
   Type: Direct-Access
   blk: queue f7e93a18, I/O limit 4294967295Mb (mask 0xffffffffffffff)
   Attached scsi disk sda at scsi0, channel 0, id 0, lun 0
SCSI device sda: 62914560 512-byte hdwr sectors (32212 MB)
Partition check:
   sda: sda1 sda2 sda3 sda4
pci hotplug: PCI Hot Plug PCI Core version: 0.5
NET4: Linux TCP/IP 1.0 for NET4.0
IP Protocols: ICMP, UDP, TCP, ICMP
IP: routing cache hash table of 6192 buckets, 64Kbytes
TCP: Hash tables configured (established 262144 bind 65536)
NET4: Linux domain sockets 1.0/SMF for Linux NET4.0
HAMDISK: Compressed image found at block 0
Freeing initrd memory: 1k freed
UFS: Mounted root (minix filesystem).
kjournald starting. Commit interval 5 seconds
EXT3-fs: mounted filesystem with ordered data mode.
loop: loaded (max 8 devices)
Encrypted file system, please supply correct password to continue
Running bash!

BusyBox v1.00 (2012-04-26-02:05+0000) Built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
ash: can't access tty; job control turned off
/ # ls -l
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 3 Mar 3 2010 bin -> lib
-rwxrwxrwx 4 root root 4096 Mar 2 17:37 dev
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 3 Mar 3 2010 lib64 -> lib
-rwxrwxrwx 2 root root 0 2644 Mar 2 17:37 proc
/ # exit
EXT3-fs: unable to read superblock
EXT3-fs: unable to read superblock
MINIX-fs: unable to read superblock
iso9660: read_super: bread failed. dev=07:05, iso_blknum=16, block=32
kernel panic: UFS: Unable to mount root fs on 07:05
```
Decrypting the file-system

• During the normal boot process we noticed a command “/lib/losetup –e …”
• Decrypted the file-system.

Command "/lib/losetup –e AES128 -I 0 -K /lib/rootkey.gpg -G /lib /dev/loop5 /dev/sda3" returned error
Kernel panic: VFS: Unable to mount root fs on 01:01
Getting a debug shell

• Compiled a backdoor.
• Added it to “init.rd”.
• Rebooted and got a debug shell on our local appliance.
Attack Surface (White box)

- Distribution: Slackware 7.1 (June 22, 2000)
- OpenSSL: 0.9.7d (March 17, 2004)
- Apache: 1.3.33 (October 29, 2004)
- …
Attack Surface (White box)

- Vulnerable applications.
- Known vulnerabilities.
- Unknown architecture.
- Hard to write a reliable memory corruption exploit without a test box.
Attack Surface (White box)

- Unknown apache modules.
- SSH is modified.
- Downloaded the PHP scripts.
PHP Scripts

Y U NO USE NORMAL PHP?
Character distribution

- Normal PHP script
- my.logon.php3
PHP Scripts

• Character distribution is flat.
• No compression headers.
• Probably encrypted.
PHP Scripts

- Found several PHP code obfuscation and encryption solutions.
- Found one of them on the appliance ("IonCube").
- Found a talk by Stefan Esser that explained the situation.
Closed source PHP scripts

• This solution pre-compiles and encrypts the PHP code.
• A solution exist (Xdebug / VLD)
• Since this is an old version of “IonCube” it should work.
Xdebug / VLD

• Hard to compile.
• Dropped this angle for now; If everything fails we’ll go back and try it.
MySQL Log

```
ernal user mode and Signup by template mode|bol','on', 20130304033917)
  29 Query    insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logonn,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','No master group assigned, try fallback groups|red',''', 20130304033917)
  29 Query    insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logonn,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','No groups to authenticate|red',''', 20130304033917)
  29 Query    insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logonn,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','Use of Dynamic Group Mapping or Fallback Groups may be disabled|bol',''', 20130304033917)
  29 Query    insert into tblLogLogonDetails (logonID,logonn,ldescription,lvalue,ltime) values ('1362368357513417653deb2','myusername','Signup by template for |red','Not allowed', 20130304033917)
```
Setting up the environment

- Trying to install tools.
- Installed GCC, SSH, and others.
- Decided to have another look at the unknown apache modules
Custom apache modules

- Found a custom apache module that maps to a virtual directory
Analyzing the virtual directory

• Immediately launched a browser and tried to access the directory.
• Got a “Invalid parameters” error.
• Found the tunnel-handler.
• Launched a disassembler
The error string

Error: FirePass server could not handle the request Reason: Invalid parameters in url query
Playing with the parameters

• We already have mysql log enabled.
• While playing with the parameters we found an SQL injection vulnerability.
When we provide `hello` as the `sess` parameter we get:
When writing into outfile a common query looks like this:

Select logon, usergroup from tblLogSessions where lower(sid) = lower( 'hello' ) union select 'data', 'x' into outfile '/tmp/test' -- ')

hello' union select 'data', 'x' into outfile '/tmp/test' --
Trying to SQL inject

• When sending the query string “aaa%20”
  We get “aaa%20” at the actual query

• Turns out that url-encoded strings are not decoded :/
Trying to SQL inject

• When sending the query string “aaa%20aaa” We get “aaa 0x1.d42…” at the actual query.

• We got a format string vulnerability at the same argument! (Disassembly confirmed)
The format string

• Just to be sure, let’s send the query string “%08x--%08x--%08x…”

• That’s nice but we already have a logical vulnerability; I want a universal exploit!
Trying to SQL inject

• Turns out that the apache module doesn’t escape the url-encoded query string.
• Can’t write characters such as space
• How can we write a valid query?
Trying to SQL inject

• Block comments?
• A query like “Or/**/1=1/**/”)” worked!
• What about the rest of the query?
• -- doesn’t seem to work without a trailing space

```
hello’/**/union/**/select/**/‘data’,/**/‘x’/**/into/**/outfile/**/‘/tmp/test’ --
```
Trying to SQL inject

- Documentation confirmed “--” has to have a trailing space
- Format string you say? Spaces you say? What about %20d?
- Got our valid terminator!

```sql
hello'/**/union/**/select/**/‘data’,'/**/‘x’/**/into/**/outfile/**/‘/tmp/test’ --%20d
```
Writing into outfile

- Composed our union select into outfile; Failed.
- But everything looks fine.
Wtf?

- Tried running the query myself; Failed.
- Tried a trivial union select; Failed.
Mysql 3.23

- No union selects.
- No nested queries.
- Can’t do a join because we’re at the while condition.
- Can write into outfile, but since there’s no union we do not control the data that gets written.

```sql
hello '/**/or/**( '1' = '1' )/**/into/**/outfile/**/' /tmp/test' /
**/--%20d
```
The table we write into outfile

- `tblLogSessions`; Contains session info.
- Updated when we login successfully.
- Can’t poison it because we can’t login.
Really getting mad

- Read documentation.
- Read some source code.
- Asked anyone I know.
- And then!
Got it

SELECT order_id, product_name, qty
FROM orders
INTO OUTFILE '/tmp/orders.csv'
FIELDS TERMINATED BY ','
ENCLOSED BY "";
LINES TERMINATED BY '\n'

Arbitrary data!!
Writing into outfile!

- Can write arbitrary data into the file.
Pwned!
Minor down-side

• This attack will only work if a user or an administrator has ever logged in to the server
• I’m guessing it’s not much to ask in a production environment (Initial server configuration applies as a login)
Got root?

- Rootkit the appliance.
- Sniff traffic. (tcpdump is available)
- Man-in-the-middle VPN clients
- Extract certificates
- Create our own user and join the network
Attacking VPN Clients

• Replace existing PHP scripts (can’t edit them..)
• If ActiveX installation fails we get a “please download and install this client” message.
• New client anyone?
F5 – Vulnerability response win

• From all my vulnerability disclosures F5 impressed me the most.
• Their response was quick and professional.
• The patch came soon after.
• F5 wants to work with all researchers. Contact them at security-reporting@F5.com.
Summery

• We wanted to own the appliance.
• Got no useful results from blackbox.
• Decrypted the file-system and installed a backdoor to turn the assessment into whitebox.
• Found out the environment is *old*
• Found out the PHP scripts are encrypted but can be decrypted.
• Found the right combination of vulnerabilities and owned the appliance
Live Demo
Thanks to the EFF

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Greets and Thanks

• Mati aharoni (Aka muts) – Configuring linux and highlighting some critical points
• Oran avraham – Ninja, helping me out with linux stuff and solving huge problems in seconds
• Igor Rayak, Shai Priel, UY, Yuval Ofir, m0she, Gil Dabah, Assaf Nativ
Questions?