

# IPv666

## Address of the **Beast**

Chris Grayson  
@\_lavalamp

Marc Newlin  
@marcnewlin




**ALLOW ME TO**

**REINTRODUCE  
MYSELF**


**MY NAME IS**



**HO (OH)**



**H TO THE OH VEE**



MR. RASER | TUMBLR.  
**WHAT'CHU TALKIN' 'BOUT, WILLIS?**

IT'S THE FUTURE BAYBEEEEEE



*The Future Starts Now!*

# The Future is a Scary Place...

- IPv6 is growing increasingly prevalent
- It's great from a number of angles
- As far as security is concerned, IPv6 fails open in some interesting ways
- We're p sure there are organizations out there with their whole corporate network on the open Internet



# ...and IPv6 is No Exception



- Started learning about IPv6 security
- Things seemed like they might be bad
- Went to validate some hypotheses...
- Turns out IPv6 address discovery is a hard problem



# Where to From Here Cap'n?

- Background
- IPv6 Security Implications
- The Scanning Problem
- Honeypotting for PSLAAC
- Modeling for non-PSLAAC
- IPv666
- Conclusion






# A Bit o' Background

# What is IPv6?

HUH




- ...it's the future
- We ran out of IPv4 addresses (hence NAT, 10.\*, 192.168.\*, 172.16.\*)
- IPv4 == 32-bit addresses, IPv6 == 128-bit addresses ( $3.4028237e+38$ )
- Lots of engineering improvements

# How Common is IPv6?


## IPv6 Adoption

We are continuously measuring the availability of IPv6 connectivity among Google users. The graph shows the percentage of users that access Google over IPv6.



# IPv6 is a Great Engineering Feat!

- Better routing
- More efficient packet processing
- Multicast is the new broadcast
- Automatic configuration
- IT JUST WORKS!!




# A Tale of Gateways and Set Top Boxes



- DEFCON 25
- 26 CVEs
- All in consumer premise equipment (CPE)
- I.e: gateways and set top boxes
- IPv6 was a big part
- <https://github.com/BastilleResearch/CableTap>

# Send-to-TV / Remote Web UI

- Gateway web UI accepts remote requests from ISP infrastructure
- IPv6 address of target gateway provides remote web UI access via set-top box



# Remote Web Inspector

Comparable to FireFox and Chrome DevTools, accessible from over the internet





# IPv6 Security Implications

# No More NAT (Kinda)



- RFC 2663 - Network Address Translation
- Allocated 10.\*, 192.168.\*, 172.16.\* for private, repeated usage
- Intended to help with address space exhaustion
- Ended up being a slammin' security control



# SLAAC

- Originally, statically configure your IP addresses
- Then comes DHCP servers to automatically allocate IP addresses
- Need to have a DHCP server for most networks
- Nah bruh - check out Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
- ...and PSLAAC



# IPv6 is the Preferred Communications Protocol



- All modern operating systems prefer to talk over IPv6
- All modern networking equipment supports IPv6 by default
- If your machine can talk to a remote host over IPv6, it will do so over IPv6 in most cases

# Many-to-one Addresses to Interfaces

```
en0: flags=8863<UP,BROADCAST,SMART,RUNNING,SIMPLEX,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
    ether 01:5c:00:cc:bc:d7
    inet6 fe80::1c99:9f0d:1a2a:ad70%en0 prefixlen 64 secured scopeid 0x5
    inet 192.168.43.124 netmask 0xfffff00 broadcast 192.168.43.255
    inet6 2600:1011:b04a:ef59:c9f:afca:234a:7a71 prefixlen 64 autoconf secured
    inet6 2600:1011:b04a:ef59:8984:6c26:6583:52f3 prefixlen 64 autoconf temporary
    ndo options=201<LINKBROADCAST,DAD>
    media: autoselect
    status: active
```

- Ever configured a server to listen on an interface?
- You might be listening for more than you bargained for

# We Need ICMPv6



- In IPv4 address resolution protocol (ARP) is used to tie layer two addresses (MAC) to layer three addresses (IP)
- This is required for routing traffic - without it no talky
- Built into ICMPv6 is Neighbor Discovery Protocol
- Ergo blocking or disabling ICMP entirely means your networks don't work



# Multicast is the New Broadcast

Address(s) <input type="checkbox"/>	Description <input type="checkbox"/>
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:0	Reserved Multicast Address
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:C	SSDP
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:FB	mDNSv6
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:FC	ALL_MPL_FORWARDERS
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:FD	All CoAP Nodes
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:FE- FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:FF	Unassigned
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:100	VMTP Managers Group
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:101	Network Time Protocol (NTP)
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:102	SGL-Dogfight
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:103	Rwhod
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:104	VNP
FF0X:0:0:0:0:0:0:105	Artificial Horizons - Aster

- Broadcasting is cool, but in many cases it's wasteful
- What if you could specify a distance for propagation and the type of devices to receive the data?
- You're talkin' about multicast brotha

# In Summary

- IPv6 works out of the box without any configuration
- All your devices and networking equipment prefers it
- There's no such thing as private address space (for the most part)
- Your existing firewall rules don't apply
- You can't easily prevent ping scans
- Single packets can be relayed to lots and lots of hosts

Let's Go Hunting

# The Problem of Scale

- IPv4
  - 32 bit addresses
  - $2^{32}$  possible addresses
  - 4,294,967,296 addresses
- IPv6
  - 128 bit
  - $2^{128}$  possible addresses



340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,768,211,456 addresses

# PSLAAC Makes Things Harder

request for comments: 4941  
Obsoletes: [3041](#)  
Category: Standards Track


IBM Corporation  
R. Draves  
Microsoft Research  
S. Krishnan  
Ericsson Research  
September 2007

## Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6


### Status of This Memo

This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Figure 3-2 Basic IPv6 Address Format



Example:



- Addresses have host and network bits
- Network is site prefix and subnet ID
- Host is interface ID
- PSLAAC means interface ID is pseudorandom
- Even “small” networks (/96) have 32 bits of randomness

# Breaking Down the Problem

- Modeling for cryptographic entropy is no bueno
- Two independent problems instead
  - Identifying PSLAAC hosts
  - Identifying non-PSLAAC hosts



# Honeypotting for PSLAAC




# Why Honeypotting?




- Search space too massive
- Instead of finding them, have them find us
- Took multiple approaches
  - DNS Server
  - SMTP Server
  - Web Server
- Popads!

# Honey DNS Server

- Set up Bind server
- Glue records point to IPv6
- Zones delegated to IPv4 then IPv6
- Post links all over social media
- Popads!




# A Quick Note on PopAds




# Honey Web Server

IPv6 Kitten


Cats Cats Cats



shark shark shark





can you taste it



- Set up best site ever at <http://ipv6.exposed/>
- Available over IPv6, some other shenanigans for forcing IPv6
- WebRTC for IP address enumeration
- Post all over social media
- Popads!

# Honey Web Server (cont'd)



# Honey SMTP Server

- Set up SMTP server
- Have our DNS honeypot point to it
- Sign up for ALL THE THINGS
- Use MailBait to sign up for spam
- Mega womp womp



# Sweet(?) Honey Results

- 92,609 unique IP addresses over ~10 months
- Cost \$500+
- Lost focus, but still suboptimal





# Modeling for Non-PSLAAC


# Structure in IPv6 Addresses

2001:1284:f01c:2c0a:8238:bcff:fed3:4e03  
2001:1498:1::32:48  
2001:16b8:101:3175:a96:d7ff:fe7e:c4aa  
2001:16b8:6100:0:3631:c4ff:fe14:3d72  
2001:1890:1f8:46::1:6  
2001:1bc8:1004::2:0:99  
2001:260:450:7b::4  
2001:41d0:2:275b::182  
2001:41d0:2:3d77::  
2001:4998:44:6027::2005  
2001:4b78:2::f06b  
2001:558:370:ba::1  
2001:579:6f03:600:c0b3:b230:5c3:df35  
2001:610:1a0:30::2  
2001:638:708:30da:ea11:32ff:fe70:8ae6  
2001:8d8:921:c500::70:18e1  
2001:980:6972::1  
2001:bc8:2800:36dd:87f9:1ef0:8a7a:c21f  
2001:e42:102:1819:160:16:234:111  
2001:ee0:4041:37a5:8acf:98ff:fee7:fec  
2001:ee0:4140::1230:2502:7004  
2001:ee0:4501:5062:1894:5a03:9cc3:216f  
2001:ee0:5500:8b5a:585d:c41a:7a09:f73a  
2003:0:2e02:1050::1  
2003:5a:4049::1  
2400:6180:100:d0::34:8001

2400:8500:1302:803:133:130:127:180  
2400:b800:1:1::18  
2400:cb00:2048:1::6810:7166  
2400:cb00:2048:1::6818:d3a  
2404:6800:4007:801::2003  
2406:da00:ff00::1715:7892  
2406:e00:120:391c:0:30:ab4:4f40  
2407:500::2:5a9:b7bf  
2600:0:2:1239:144:232:2:85  
2600:3c00::f03c:91ff:feae:ee1c  
2600:3c00::f03c:91ff:fedf:426  
2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fe79:e1a4  
2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fea1:4761  
2600:3c03::f03c:91ff:fea2:42c7  
2603:3006:103c:b000::17f6  
2604:2d80:4030:0:91c2:c016:2329:7219  
2605:de00:1:1:4a:32:0:23  
2606:b400:8808:f000::a022:fa6d  
2620:11:0:c2b4:749a:46bf:291:38cf  
2620:8d:0:7f47::d827:7f47  
2800:370:2:418a:b8d3:ddc8:13a8:8768  
2800:370:2:972d:dd4a:a203:9d92:3353  
2800:370:44:256d:5950:afb3:7627:10f4  
2800:370:55:3c60:404a:d212:49dd:4477  
2800:370:55:b9c6:70b1:9c61:69e:2b02  
2800:370:61:11dc:e57f:1804:a456:eddc

2800:370:84:0:d0bd:6968:d1ae:d26f  
2800:370:84:bba1:857c:f02d:cd6c:cd51  
2800:370:a:ae43:79b9:348b:3c0:8c7b  
2800:4f0:1:ecd5:dd66:8006:1203:be04  
2800:4f0:62:850c:92d:85a1:3431:a7b8  
2803:c300::2  
2804:14d:1a87:0:7815:7414:e01:dd02  
2804:14d:8e8c:1000:b42f:9577:7fbb:778b  
2804:292c:1::5  
2804:a8:2:c8::12a  
2806:102e:9:5055:272:63ff:fe83:e620  
2806:108e:c:2e3:7279:90ff:fe9c:2a07  
2a00:d0c0:200:0:b9:1a:9c36:20c  
2a01:488:42:1000:50ed:8479:33:339a  
2a01:488:42:1000:50ed:84f5:1c:ff1f  
2a01:5a60:3::92  
2a01:7c8:d002:1c::1  
2a01:a8:dc0:330:1::1c5d  
2a02:2028:80c:e900::1  
2a02:26f0:df:202:e3cc:80db:ebaa:3e93  
2a02:6b8:0:161b:ec4:7aff:fe18:c48  
2a02:6b8:b000:63a:96de:80ff:fe81:1258  
2a02:6b8:b000:6509:215:b2ff:fea9:66fa  
2a02:8108:0:12:587b:b48e:e629:436b  
2a02:8108:8000:21:2864:5009:d4d2:36f0  
2a02:810d:8000:29:e8b0:6937:7ddd:e597

# MACHINE LEARNING BAYBEEEE



- Model is a compact representation of data set
- Projection through model creates new data set with error %
- Errors are representative of structure in IPv6 addresses
- Hopefully find new addresses

# lol jk

- All attempts resulted in over-fitting
- Projected addresses were the same as our input addresses
- We're not ML experts sooooo....



# The Entropy/IP Paper






Figure 1: Entropy/IP's user interface displaying an analysis of a Japanese telco prefix with 24K active client IPs. Entropy by nybble plotted in (a). In (b), we select the 00000... value (60%) for segment J by mouse click, resulting in updated probabilities in (c) (e.g., 100%).

- <http://www.entropy-ip.com/>
- Really interesting paper from Akamai
- Maps entropy of different segments of IPv6 addresses
- Big takeaways:
  - Not THAT much entropy in non-PSLAAC IPs
  - Simpler modeling might work better

# Dumbing Things Down (Modeling)

2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:cf59:662b



Break down into 32 nybbles

0x2, 0x8, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x4, 0xf, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x8, 0x0, 0xf, 0x6, ...



Count occurrences by position and nybble

counts[0][0x2]++  
counts[1][0x8]++  
counts[2][0x0]++  
counts[3][0x0]++  
counts[4][0x0]++  
counts[5][0x4]++  
counts[6][0xf]++  
...



# Dumbing Things Down (Prediction)

0x2  
Position 0

probabilities[0][0x2] {

p(0x0)	=>	0.05
p(0x1)	=>	0.05
p(0x2)	=>	0.01
p(0x3)	=>	0.09
p(0x4)	=>	0.00
p(0x5)	=>	0.15
p(0x6)	=>	0.05
p(0x7)	=>	0.09
p(0x8)	=>	0.00
p(0x9)	=>	0.06
p(0xa)	=>	0.15
p(0xb)	=>	0.09
p(0xc)	=>	0.06
p(0xd)	=>	0.10
p(0xe)	=>	0.03
p(0xf)	=>	0.02



0xa  
Position 1

# Looks Promising... TOO PROMISING

- Generated 10mm addresses
- After scanning, over 50k responded to ICMP probes
- WOW WE TOTES SOLVED THE PROBLEM!!! ZOMG CELEBRATION TIME!!!!





# Enter Aliased (ie: Jerk) Networks



- Network ranges where every IP address responds to ICMP pings
- Why?? Because they're jerks
- Not great for scanning
- Even worse for statistical modeling

# Identifying Aliased Networks (Initial)

2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:cf59:662b



Wrap in /96 network

2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:cf59:662b/96



Generate eight addresses in network

2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:fed3:4e03  
2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:eb83:9376  
2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:8924:f2f6  
2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:7949:7d8e

2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:5676:f7bb  
2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:a286:ad59  
2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:bb7d:6d0a  
2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:8e3e:4fd4



ICMP scan



If 50% of addresses respond, net is aliased

2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:cf59:662b/96

# Identifying Aliased Networks (Network Size)

2800:4f0:80:f662:880b:6c2f:cf59:662b



Map to bits

0010100000000000:0000010011110000:0000000010000000:1111011001100010:1000100000001011:0110110000101111:1100111101011001:0110011000101011

Unknown

Aliased



Flip right half of unknown bits

0010100000000000:0000010011110000:0000000010000000:0000100110011101:011101111110100:1001001111010000:1100111101011001:0110011000101011



ICMP scan

...



IPv666

# Was Ist Das?


`ipv666` is a set of tools that enables the discovery of IPv6 addresses both in the global IPv6 address space and in more narrow IPv6 network ranges. These tools are designed to work out of the box with minimal knowledge of their workings.

If you're interested in how these tools work please refer to [this blog post](#).

The tools included in this codebase are as follows:

- `666scan` - Locates live hosts over IPv6 using statistical modeling and ICMP ping scans
- `666alias` - Tests a single IPv6 network range to see if the network range is aliased
- `666blgen` - Adds the contents of a file containing IPv6 network ranges to the aliased network blacklist
- `666clean` - Cleans the contents of a file containing IPv6 addresses based on an aliased network blacklist

# The Scanning Loop



# 666scan

Usage of ./build/666scan:

-config string

Local file path to the configuration file to use. (default "config.json")

-force

Whether or not to force accept all prompts (useful for daemonized scanning).

-input string

An input file containing IPv6 addresses to initiate scanning from.

-input-type string

The type of file pointed to by the 'input' argument (bin or txt). (default "txt")

-network string

The target IPv6 network range to scan in. If empty, defaults to 2000::/4

-output string

The path to the file where discovered addresses should be written.

-output-type string

The type of output to write to the output file (txt or bin). (default "txt")



# 666alias

Usage of ./build/666alias:

-config string

Local file path to the configuration file to use. (default "config.json")

-net string

An IPv6 CIDR range to test as an aliased network.

# 666blgen

Usage of ./build/666blgen:

-config string

Local file path to the configuration file to use. (default "config.json")

-input string

An input file containing IPv6 network ranges to build a blacklist from.

# 666clean

Usage of ./build/666clean:

-blacklist string

The local file path to the blacklist to use. If not specified, defaults to the most recent blacklist in the configured blacklist directory.

-config string

Local file path to the configuration file to use. (default "config.json")

-input string

An input file containing IPv6 addresses to clean via a blacklist.

-out string

The file path where the cleaned results should be written to.

# Proof in the Pudding?

- Global address space, 20mbps, eight days
  - 58,388 unique addresses found
  - ~80% of them not in public datasets
- Targeted address space (ISP, /48), 20mbps, 30 minutes
  - 4,901 addresses
  - ...mostly consumer premise equipment
  - ...with web login portals
  - OGD THE FLASHBACKS



# Linky Links

- IPv666 Blog Post  
<https://l.avalamp/?p=285>
- IPv666 GitHub Repository  
<https://github.com/lavalamp-ipv666>



Conclusion

# Recap



- Background
- IPv6 Security Implications
- The Scanning Problem
- Honeypotting for PSLAAC
- Modeling for non-PSLAAC
- IPv666
- Conclusion

# Moar Links

- Entropy/IP  
<http://www.entropy-ip.com/>
- 6gen  
<https://zakird.com/papers/imc17-6gen.pdf>
- Clustering of IPv6 address structure  
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1806.01633.pdf>
- IPv6 hitlist  
<https://ipv6hitlist.github.io/>





**Q&A**

# THANKS!

<3

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