

NETOAP

Implementation and evaluation of secure and scalable
anomaly-based network intrusion detection

\$ whoami

2019: Bachelor of Science @Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Security & Backend Engineer @bestbytes

Next up: Security and Network Engineering Master @University of Amsterdam

Interests:

- Network Security Monitoring & Anomaly Detection
- Machine Learning
- Programming (Golang, C / C++ / ObjC, Swift, Haskell, Python, Rust)
- Hardware & Software Security
- Reverse Engineering
- Penetration Testing

F.A.Q:

Are you moxies little brother? - Nope.

Are you a vegetarian or vegan? - Nope.

What's your favourite programming language? - Go.

Roadmap


- Introduction and problem formulation
- NETCAP overview
- Thesis experiments wrap up
- What's new

**Let's talk about a major problem
of the software industry.**

Memory Safety.

Memory safety issues remain dominant


We closely study the root cause trends of vulnerabilities & search for patterns



~70% of the vulnerabilities addressed through a security update each year continue to be memory safety issues

Source: Slides from Matt Miller @ BlueHat Israel 2019

Memory corruption is an issue on every platform.



Mitigations don't help.

**They increase the cost for attacks,
but do not address the root cause.**

**How does memory safety affect
network security monitoring?**

MITRE CVE results for Bro (Zeek) IDS

There are 7 CVE entries that match your search.

| Name | Description |
|----------------------------------|---|
| CVE-2018-17019 | In Bro through 2.5.5, there is a DoS in IRC protocol names command parsing in analyzer/protocol/irc/IRC.cc. |
| CVE-2018-16807 | In Bro through 2.5.5, there is a memory leak potentially leading to DoS in scripts/base/protocols/krb/main.bro in the Kerberos protocol parser. |
| CVE-2017-1000458 | Bro before Bro v2.5.2 is vulnerable to an out of bounds write in the ContentLine analyzer allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly other exploitation. |
| CVE-2015-1522 | analyzer/protocol/dnp3/DNP3.cc in Bro before 2.3.2 does not reject certain non-zero values of a packet length, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow or buffer over-read) via a crafted DNP3 packet. |
| CVE-2015-1521 | analyzer/protocol/dnp3/DNP3.cc in Bro before 2.3.2 does not properly handle zero values of a packet length, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow or buffer over-read if NDEBUG; otherwise assertion failure) via a crafted DNP3 packet. |
| CVE-2007-0186 | Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in F5 FirePass SSL VPN allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via (1) the xcho parameter to my.logon.php3; the (2) topblue, (3) midblue, (4) wtopblue, and certain other Custom color parameters in a per action to vdesk/admincon/index.php; the (5) h321, (6) h311, (7) h312, and certain other Front Door custom text color parameters in a per action to vdesk/admincon/index.php; the (8) ua parameter in a bro action to vdesk/admincon/index.php; the (9) app_param and (10) app_name parameters to webyfiers.php; (11) double eval functions; (12) JavaScript contained in an <FP_DO_NOT_TOUCH> element; and (13) the vhost parameter to my.activation.php. NOTE: it is possible that this candidate overlaps CVE-2006-3550. |
| CVE-2006-6256 | Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the file manager in admin/bro_main.php in AlternC 0.9.5 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a folder name. |

MITRE CVE results for Suricata IDS

Search Results

There are **17** CVE entries that match your search.

| Name | Description |
|----------------------------------|--|
| CVE-2018-6794 | Suricata before 4.0.4 is prone to an HTTP detection bypass vulnerability in detect.c and stream-tcp.c. If a malicious server breaks a normal TCP flow and sends data before the 3-way handshake is complete, then the data sent by the malicious server will be accepted by web clients such as a web browser or Linux CLI utilities, but ignored by Suricata IDS signatures. This mostly affects IDS signatures for the HTTP protocol and TCP stream content; signatures for TCP packets will inspect such network traffic as usual. |
| CVE-2018-18956 | The ProcessMimeTypeEntity function in util-decode-mime.c in Suricata 4.x before 4.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segfault and daemon crash) via crafted input to the SMTP parser, as exploited in the wild in November 2018. |
| CVE-2018-14568 | Suricata before 4.0.5 stops TCP stream inspection upon a TCP RST from a server. This allows detection bypass because Windows TCP clients proceed with normal processing of TCP data that arrives shortly after an RST (i.e., they act as if the RST had not yet been received). |
| CVE-2018-10244 | Suricata version 4.0.4 incorrectly handles the parsing of an EtherNet/IP PDU. A malformed PDU can cause the parsing code to read beyond the allocated data because DecodeENIPDU in app-layer-enip-common.c has an integer overflow during a length check. |
| CVE-2018-10243 | htp_parse_authorization_digest in htp_parsers.c in LibHTTP 0.5.26 allows remote attackers to cause a heap-based buffer over-read via an authorization digest header. |
| CVE-2018-10242 | Suricata version 4.0.4 incorrectly handles the parsing of the SSH banner. A malformed SSH banner can cause the parsing code to read beyond the allocated data because SSHParseBanner in app-layer-ssh.c lacks a length check. |
| CVE-2018-1000167 | OISF suricata-update version 1.0.0a1 contains an Insecure Deserialization vulnerability in the insecure yaml.load-Function as used in the following files: config.py:136, config.py:142, sources.py:99 and sources.py:131. The "list-sources"-command is affected by this bug. that can result in Remote Code Execution(even as root if suricata-update is called by root). This attack appears to be exploitable via a specially crafted yaml-file at https://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/rules/index.yaml . This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.0.0b1. |
| CVE-2017-7177 | Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching. |
| CVE-2017-15377 | In Suricata before 4.x, it was possible to trigger lots of redundant checks on the content of crafted network traffic with a certain signature, because of DetectEngineContentInspection in detect-engine-content-inspection.c. The search engine doesn't stop when it should after no match is found; instead, it stops only upon reaching inspection-recursion-limit (3000 by default). |
| CVE-2016-10728 | An issue was discovered in Suricata before 3.1.2. If an ICMPv4 error packet is received as the first packet on a flow in the to_client direction, it confuses the rule grouping lookup logic. The toclient inspection will then continue with the wrong rule group. This can lead to missed detection. |
| CVE-2015-8954 | The MemcmpLowercase function in Suricata before 2.0.6 improperly excludes the first byte from comparisons, which might allow remote attackers to bypass intrusion-prevention functionality via a crafted HTTP request. |
| CVE-2015-0971 | The DER parser in Suricata before 2.0.8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via vectors related to SSL/TLS certificates. |
| CVE-2014-9769 | pcre_jit_compile.c in PCRE 8.35 does not properly use table jumps to optimize nested alternatives, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted string, as demonstrated by packets encountered by Suricata during use of a regular expression in an Emerging Threats Open ruleset. |

Several memory related fixes in latest Suricata release

April 30, 2019

by Inliniac

in news, release

Leave a comment

Suricata 4.1.4 released

We're pleased to announce **Suricata 4.1.4**. This release fixes a number of issues found in the 4.1 branch.

Get the release here:

<https://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/download/suricata-4.1.4.tar.gz>

Changes

- Bug #2870: pcap logging with lz4 coverity warning
- Bug #2883: ssh: heap buffer overflow
- Bug #2884: mpls: heapbuffer overflow in file decode-mpls.c
- Bug #2887: decode-ethernet: heapbuffer overflow in file decode-ethernet.c
- Bug #2888: 4.1.3 core in HCBDCreateSpace
- Bug #2894: smb 1 create andx request does not parse the filename correctly
- Bug #2902: rust/dhcp: panic in dhcp parser
- Bug #2903: mpls: cast of misaligned data leads to undefined behavior
- Bug #2904: rust/ftp: panic in ftp parser
- Bug #2943: rust/nfs: integer underflow
- This release includes Suricata-Update 1.0.5

More memory issues not listed in the Suricata bug tracker

```
commit 316a411b6b40365ffff382967bec8bc22f18c192
```

```
Author: Philippe Antoine <contact@catenacyber.fr>
```

```
Date: Wed Mar 27 22:56:15 2019 +0100
```

```
ssl : SSLProbingParser overflow fix
```

```
Found by fuzzing
```

```
Fixes ssl detection evasion by packet splitting
```

```
commit 666bb1b6e48b47e9fafe161ac57deae8d0fd89f0
```

```
Author: Victor Julien <victor@inliniac.net>
```

```
Date: Mon Apr 15 14:52:38 2019 +0200
```

```
parse/ip: fix potential oob write in ipv4 validation
```

```
Found using AFL.
```

Mitigations in IDS solutions

Suricata: Rust for several parsers

340k Lines of C / 17k Lines of Rust

```
dreadbook:suricata alien$ git status
HEAD detached at suricata-4.1.4
nothing to commit, working tree clean
dreadbook:suricata alien$ cloc .
  1352 text files.
  1343 unique files.
   172 files ignored.

github.com/AlDanial/cloc v 1.80 T=2.86 s (415.3 files/s, 192981.0 lines/s)
-----
Language             files      blank      comment      code
-----
C                    520        65983       51941       341645
C/C++ Header         520        6337        15787       20393
Rust                   73         2045        2121       17642
Bourne Shell         15         1932        1406       12055
YAML                   4          198         204        3101
m4                     3          314         23         2712
Python                19         474         703        2265
make                  17          76         13         869
Perl                   9          103        114         868
Markdown              4           81          0         101
Lua                    1           11         10         27
CSS                    1           2           0         25
TOML                   1           0           1         1
-----
SUM:                  1187       77551      72318      401704
-----
```

Suricata 5 beta: Mandatory use of Rust

April 30, 2019

by Inliniac

in news, release

Leave a comment


Call for testing: announcing Suricata 5.0.0-beta1

We're happy to present the first beta in the upcoming Suricata 5.0 series. In 5.0 we're making a couple of large changes.

Rust

The most visible is that our Rust support is no longer optional. We're convinced that Rust is a perfect match for Suricata, and we plan to increase its footprint in our code base steadily. By making it mandatory we're able to remove parallel implementations and focus fully on making the Rust code better.

Bro / Zeek: BinPAC parser generator



Problems with BinPAC

Bro 2.5.3

Bro 2.5.4

Bro 2.5.5

Bro 2.5.5 primarily addresses security issues.

- Fix array bounds checking in BinPAC: for arrays that are fields within a record, the bounds check was based on a pointer to the start of the record rather than the start of the array field, potentially resulting in a buffer over-read.

Problem #2: Signatures

Signatures

Can only detect **known threats**

Size of signature databases is continuously growing

Existing malware can be **obfuscated** to evade signature detection

!Problem?



Let's do it in Go!

NETCAP

Decodes network packets and generates **audit records**

Uses the **gopacket library** (~80k LoC) for decoding packets

Concurrent design: **worker pool**, each audit record written to a separate file


Audit record generation as **compressed protocol buffers**

Why protocol buffers?


Type safe structured data - can represent complex nested structures

Platform neutral - generate type definitions for your favourite language

NETCAP in a nutshell



NETCAP worker




NETCAP buffered workers

**Packet Data Distribution
via Round Robin**

**Buffered Input Channel
for each worker**

**Configurable Number
of workers**



Available Audit Records?

Custom:

- + **Flow (unidirectional)**
- + **Connection (bidirectional)**
- + LinkFlow (disabled by default)
- + NetworkFlow (disabled by default)
- + TransportFlow (disabled by default)
- + **TLS (Client Hello Msg + Ja3)**
- + **HTTP**

Available Audit Records?

Layers

- + **TCP**
- + **UDP**
- + **IPv4**
- + **IPv6**
- + **DHCPv4**
- + **DHCPv6**
- + **ICMPv4**
- + **ICMPv6**
- + ICMPv6Echo
- + ICMPv6NeighborSolicitation
- + ICMPv6RouterSolicitation
- + **DNS**
- + **ARP**
- + **Ethernet**
- + Dot1Q
- + Dot11


- + NTP
- + **SIP**
- + **IGMP**
- + LLC
- + IPv6HopByHop
- + SCTP
- + **SNAP**
- + LinkLayerDiscovery
- + ICMPv6NeighborAdvertisement
- + ICMPv6RouterAdvertisement
- + EthernetCTP
- + EthernetCTPReply
- + LinkLayerDiscoveryInfo

v0.3.9


- + **OSPF**
- + BFD
- + GRE
- + FDDI
- + VRRPv2
- + EAP
- + **CiscoDiscovery**
- + NortelDiscovery
- + **IPSec**
- + Geneve
- + VXLAN
- + **USB**
- + LCM
- + MPLS
- + **ModbusTCP**

NETCAP audit records

Single Audit Record



Audit Record File




e.g:
TCP.ncap.gz (compressed)
TCP.ncap (uncompressed)


| Flow / Connection |
|--------------------------------------|
| Timestamp First Seen (seconds.micro) |
| Link Layer Protocol |
| Network Layer Protocol |
| Transport Layer Protocol |
| Application Layer Protocol |
| Source Mac Address |
| Destination Mac Address |
| SrcIP |
| SrcPort |
| DstIP |
| DstPort |
| Size in bytes |
| Number of Packets |
| Timestamp Last Seen (seconds.micro) |
| Duration (nanoseconds) |

| Example |
|-------------------|
| 1499257434.003136 |
| Ethernet |
| IPv4 |
| TCP |
| HTTP |
| 00:0c:28:9f:16:1e |
| 00:0c:28:c9:60:ce |
| 173.15.11.103 |
| 1873 |
| 95.100.238.75 |
| 80 |
| 922 |
| 6 |
| 1499257551.553088 |
| 117549952000 |


Format on disk: Length delimited audit records



NETCAP data pipe




NETCAP filtering & csv export



```
$ netcapture -r TCP.ncap.gz -select Timestamp,SrcPort,DstPort,SeqNum,Window,ACK,SYN,RST > TCP.csv
```

NETCAP labeling


Phase 1:
Data generation
with net.capture



Phase 2:
Label extraction
with suricata



Phase 3:
Mapping alerts
with net.capture




parsed alerts will be mapped onto the collected data concurrently for each audit record type

important: granularity

final data in CSV format with mapped alerts for each record

NETCAP Sensors




Use Cases?

Monitor honeypots

Forensic Analysis

Research! :) - GPLv3 license

Classification of malicious behaviour with NETCAP and a Deep Neural Network with Tensorflow



The screenshot shows the website for the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity. The header includes the UNB logo (University of New Brunswick) and navigation links for 'Give to UNB', 'Apply', and a search icon. Below the header, the text 'Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity' is displayed. A navigation bar contains links for 'Home', 'About', 'Research', 'Members', and 'Datasets'. On the left side, there is a 'Datasets' menu with links to various datasets: IDS 2012, IDS 2017 (highlighted), NSL-KDD, VPN-nonVPN, Botnet, Android Validation, Android Botnet, Tor-nonTor, Dos Dataset, Android-Adware, Android-Malware2017, and CSE-CIC-IDS2018. The main content area is titled 'Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset (CICIDS2017)'. The text describes the importance of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) and notes that existing datasets are often outdated and unreliable. It states that the CICIDS2017 dataset contains benign and up-to-date common attacks, resembling true real-world data (PCAPs). It also mentions the use of CICFlowMeter for network traffic analysis and the generation of realistic background traffic using a B-Profile system.

CICIDS2017 Dataset:

Up to date, 5 days of traffic

Well documented

~50GB **original PCAPs**

Monday: Normal Traffic

Tuesday: Brute Force

Wednesday: DoS

Thursday: Web Attacks

Friday: Botnet Traffic

Experiment takeaways

Encoding strategies are vital for performance

High detection accuracy (95-99.9%) can be achieved with a **handful of extracted features** (Flow / Connection Durations, Payload Size and Entropy)

Different approaches to labelling can be used to **increase value for analysts**

High accuracy for **protocol specific approach**

What's new

Protobuf Serialisation Performance

with `golang` code generator:

```
$ go test -bench=. -v ./types
=== RUN TestMarshal
--- PASS: TestMarshal (0.00s)
goos: darwin
goarch: amd64
pkg: github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types
BenchmarkMarshal-12      10000000      184 ns/op      64 B/op      1 allocs/op
BenchmarkUnmarshal-12   10000000      160 ns/op      40 B/op      2 allocs/op
PASS
ok   github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types 3.830s
```

with `gogo` code generator:

```
$ go test -bench=. -v ./types
=== RUN TestMarshal
--- PASS: TestMarshal (0.00s)
goos: darwin
goarch: amd64
pkg: github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types
BenchmarkMarshal-12      20000000      89.1 ns/op     64 B/op      1 allocs/op
BenchmarkUnmarshal-12   20000000      110 ns/op     40 B/op      2 allocs/op
PASS
ok   github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types 4.215s
```

Payload Capture

Payload capture

It is now possible to capture payload data for the following protocols: TCP, UDP, ModbusTCP, USB

This can be enabled with the **-payload** flag:

```
net.capture -r traffic.pcap -payload
```

Also available for live capture:

```
net.capture -iface en0 -payload
```

USB Decoding

USB decoding

USB live capture is now possible, currently the following Audit Records exist: USB and USBRequestBlockSetup.

To capture USB traffic live on macOS, install wireshark and bring up the USB interface:

```
sudo ifconfig XHC20 up
```

Now attach netcap and set baselayer to USB:

```
net.capture -iface XHC20 -base usb
```

To read offline USB traffic from a PCAP file use:

```
net.capture -r usb.pcap -base usb
```

Configurable CSV Output

Configurable separators for CSV structures

The separator characters for structs in CSV output mode are now configurable via commandline flags.

Default is '(' for opening, '-' as separator for values and ')' for closing.

```
type Message struct {  
    string Text  
    bool  Secret  
    int   MagicNumber  
}
```

would appear in CSV like:

```
(Text-Secret-MagicNumber)
```

with the concrete field values:

```
(Hi-true-42)
```

Restructured Interface

Commandline Tools

The commandline tools have been restructured and the framework now consists of:

- **net.capture** (capture audit records live or from dumpfiles)
- **net.dump** (dump with audit records in various formats)
- **net.label** (tool for creating labeled CSV datasets from netcap data)
- **net.collect** (collection server for distributed collection)
- **net.agent** (sensor agent for distributed collection)
- **net.proxy** (http reverse proxy for capturing traffic from web services)
- **net.util** (utility tool for validating audit records and converting timestamps)
- **net.export** (exporter for prometheus metrics)

Golang Library Improvements:

netcap.Writer

The netcap library now exposes a data structure for writing audit records to disk.

Check out the GoDocs: <https://godoc.org/github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap>

```
type Writer
```

```
func NewWriter(name string, buffer, compress, csv bool, out string, writeChan bool) *Writer
```

```
func (w *Writer) Close() (name string, size int64)
```

```
func (w *Writer) GetChan() <-chan []byte
```

```
func (w *Writer) Write(msg proto.Message) error
```

```
func (w *Writer) WriteCSV(msg proto.Message) (int, error)
```

```
func (w *Writer) WriteCSVHeader(msg proto.Message) (int, error)
```

```
func (w *Writer) WriteHeader(t types.Type, source string, version string, includesPayloads bool) error
```

```
func (w *Writer) WriteProto(msg proto.Message) error
```

Configurable gopacket.DecodeOptions

Gopackets DecodeOptions are now configurable via commandline, three options exist:

- lazy (gopacket.Lazy)
- default (gopacket.Default)
- nocopy (gopacket.NoCopy)

By default, netcap uses the the lazy decoding option.

Protobuf type definitions in each release

Precompiled type definitions for:

- + Go
- + C++
- + Java
- + Rust
- + CSharp
- + JS
- + Python
- + Swift

Python Support


Retrieving the audit records as pandas dataframe:

```
1  #!/usr/bin/python
2
3  import pynetcap as nc
4
5  reader = nc.NCReader('pcaps/HTTP.ncap.gz')
6
7  reader.read(dataframe=True)
8  print("[INFO] completed reading the audit record file:", reader.filepath)
9  print("DATAFRAME:")
10 print(reader.df)
```



A proxy for web services

NETCAP http proxy



Enhanced HTTP audit records

Using the http tracing functionality from the go standard library, several interesting time deltas have been added to the HTTP audit record type.


```
// Time Deltas (Nanoseconds)  
// currently only available when using the HTTP proxy with tracing enabled.  
int64 DoneAfter          = 20;  
int64 DNSDoneAfter      = 21;  
int64 FirstByteAfter    = 22;  
int64 TLSDoneAfter      = 23;
```

Prometheus Metrics

- **NETCAP related metrics (Protocols, Decoding errors etc)**
- **Go runtime related metrics (Number of goroutines, memory usage etc)**
- **Audit record related metrics (Field values and custom metrics)**

Prometheus metrics


NETCAP metrics



Overview Dashboard




HTTP Dashboard



TCP Dashboard



Alpine Linux Docker Image



The screenshot shows the Docker Hub interface for the repository `dreadl0ck/netcap`. The header includes the Docker Hub logo, a search bar with the text "Search for great content (e.g., mysql)", and navigation links for "Explore", "Repositories", "Organizations", and "Get Help". The user profile "dreadl0ck" is visible in the top right.

The repository details section shows a blue cube icon, the name "dreadl0ck/netcap" with a star icon, and the text "By dreadl0ck • Updated 13 days ago". Below this, it says "Netcap docker containers" and "Container". A "Manage Repository" button is located in the top right of this section. The pull count is shown as "Pulls 2".

There are two tabs: "Overview" (selected) and "Tags".

The main content area is divided into two columns. The left column contains the description: "An alpine linux container with the netcap network security monitoring framework preinstalled." and the homepage link: "Homepage: <https://netcap.io>".

The right column contains a "Docker Pull Command" section with a dark box containing the command `docker pull dreadl0ck/netcap` and a copy icon. Below that is the "Owner" section, which shows a user icon and the name "dreadl0ck".

Website

13:47 Wed 8. May

netcap.io

78%



NETCAP

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Documentation

docs.netcap.io



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
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Source Code Stats



01101001 01110011 00100000 01110111 01100001 01110100 01100011 01101000
01101001 01101110 01100111 00100000 01111001 01101111 01110101 00101110

The *Netcap* (NETwork CAPture) framework efficiently converts a stream of network packets into highly accessible type-safe structured data that represent specific protocols or custom abstractions. These audit records can be stored on disk or exchanged over the network, and are well suited as a data source for machine learning algorithms. Since parsing of untrusted input can be dangerous and network data is potentially malicious, implementation was performed in a programming language that provides a garbage collected memory safe runtime.

It was developed for a series of experiments in my bachelor thesis: *Implementation and evaluation of secure and scalable anomaly-based network intrusion detection*. Currently, the thesis serves as documentation until the wiki is ready, it is included at the root of this repository (file: mied18.pdf). Slides from my presentation at the Leibniz Supercomputing Centre of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities are available on researchgate.

Future Development

- **YARA** support for labelling
- **benchmarks** & performance optimizations
- **Deep Packet Inspection Module** that looks for certain patterns in the payload to identify the application layer
- implement **IPv6 stream reassembly**
- implement an **interface for application layer decoders that require stream reassembly**

Questions?

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