

# NETOAP

Implementation and evaluation of secure and scalable  
anomaly-based network intrusion detection

# \$ whoami

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## Interests:

- Network Security Monitoring & Anomaly Detection
- Machine Learning
- Programming (Golang, C / C++ / ObjC, Swift, Haskell, Python, Rust)
- Hardware & Software Security
- Reverse Engineering
- Penetration Testing

## F.A.Q:

Are you moxies little brother? - Nope.

Are you a vegetarian or vegan? - Nope.

What's your favourite programming language? - Go.

# Roadmap

- Introduction and problem formulation
- NETCAP overview
- Thesis experiments wrap up
- What's new


**Let's talk about a major problem  
of the software industry.**



# Memory Safety.

Memory safety issues remain dominant


We closely study the root cause trends of vulnerabilities & search for patterns



~70% of the vulnerabilities addressed through a security update each year continue to be memory safety issues

**Source: Slides from Matt Miller @ BlueHat Israel 2019**

# Memory corruption is an issue on every platform.



**Mitigations don't help.**

**They increase the cost for attacks,  
but do not address the root cause.**

**How does memory safety affect  
network security monitoring?**

# MITRE CVE results for Bro (Zeek) IDS

There are 7 CVE entries that match your search.

Name	Description
<a href="#">CVE-2018-17019</a>	In Bro through 2.5.5, there is a DoS in IRC protocol names command parsing in analyzer/protocol/irc/IRC.cc.
<a href="#">CVE-2018-16807</a>	In Bro through 2.5.5, there is a memory leak potentially leading to DoS in scripts/base/protocols/krb/main.bro in the Kerberos protocol parser.
<a href="#">CVE-2017-1000458</a>	Bro before Bro v2.5.2 is vulnerable to an out of bounds write in the ContentLine analyzer allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly other exploitation.
<a href="#">CVE-2015-1522</a>	analyzer/protocol/dnp3/DNP3.cc in Bro before 2.3.2 does not reject certain non-zero values of a packet length, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow or buffer over-read) via a crafted DNP3 packet.
<a href="#">CVE-2015-1521</a>	analyzer/protocol/dnp3/DNP3.cc in Bro before 2.3.2 does not properly handle zero values of a packet length, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow or buffer over-read if NDEBUG; otherwise assertion failure) via a crafted DNP3 packet.
<a href="#">CVE-2007-0186</a>	Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in F5 FirePass SSL VPN allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via (1) the xcho parameter to my.logon.php3; the (2) topblue, (3) midblue, (4) wtopblue, and certain other Custom color parameters in a per action to vdesk/admincon/index.php; the (5) h321, (6) h311, (7) h312, and certain other Front Door custom text color parameters in a per action to vdesk/admincon/index.php; the (8) ua parameter in a bro action to vdesk/admincon/index.php; the (9) app_param and (10) app_name parameters to webyfiers.php; (11) double eval functions; (12) JavaScript contained in an <FP_DO_NOT_TOUCH> element; and (13) the vhost parameter to my.activation.php. NOTE: it is possible that this candidate overlaps CVE-2006-3550.
<a href="#">CVE-2006-6256</a>	Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the file manager in admin/bro_main.php in AlternC 0.9.5 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a folder name.



# MITRE CVE results for Suricata IDS

## Search Results

There are **17** CVE entries that match your search.

Name	Description
<a href="#">CVE-2018-6794</a>	Suricata before 4.0.4 is prone to an HTTP detection bypass vulnerability in detect.c and stream-tcp.c. If a malicious server breaks a normal TCP flow and sends data before the 3-way handshake is complete, then the data sent by the malicious server will be accepted by web clients such as a web browser or Linux CLI utilities, but ignored by Suricata IDS signatures. This mostly affects IDS signatures for the HTTP protocol and TCP stream content; signatures for TCP packets will inspect such network traffic as usual.
<a href="#">CVE-2018-18956</a>	The ProcessMimeEntity function in util-decode-mime.c in Suricata 4.x before 4.0.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segfault and daemon crash) via crafted input to the SMTP parser, as exploited in the wild in November 2018.
<a href="#">CVE-2018-14568</a>	Suricata before 4.0.5 stops TCP stream inspection upon a TCP RST from a server. This allows detection bypass because Windows TCP clients proceed with normal processing of TCP data that arrives shortly after an RST (i.e., they act as if the RST had not yet been received).
<a href="#">CVE-2018-10244</a>	Suricata version 4.0.4 incorrectly handles the parsing of an EtherNet/IP PDU. A malformed PDU can cause the parsing code to read beyond the allocated data because DecodeENIPDU in app-layer-enip-common.c has an integer overflow during a length check.
<a href="#">CVE-2018-10243</a>	htp_parse_authorization_digest in htp_parsers.c in LibHTTP 0.5.26 allows remote attackers to cause a heap-based buffer over-read via an authorization digest header.
<a href="#">CVE-2018-10242</a>	Suricata version 4.0.4 incorrectly handles the parsing of the SSH banner. A malformed SSH banner can cause the parsing code to read beyond the allocated data because SSHParseBanner in app-layer-ssh.c lacks a length check.
<a href="#">CVE-2018-1000167</a>	OISF suricata-update version 1.0.0a1 contains an Insecure Deserialization vulnerability in the insecure yaml.load-Function as used in the following files: config.py:136, config.py:142, sources.py:99 and sources.py:131. The "list-sources"-command is affected by this bug. that can result in Remote Code Execution(even as root if suricata-update is called by root). This attack appears to be exploitable via a specially crafted yaml-file at https://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/rules/index.yaml. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 1.0.0b1.
<a href="#">CVE-2017-7177</a>	Suricata before 3.2.1 has an IPv4 defragmentation evasion issue caused by lack of a check for the IP protocol during fragment matching.
<a href="#">CVE-2017-15377</a>	In Suricata before 4.x, it was possible to trigger lots of redundant checks on the content of crafted network traffic with a certain signature, because of DetectEngineContentInspection in detect-engine-content-inspection.c. The search engine doesn't stop when it should after no match is found; instead, it stops only upon reaching inspection-recursion-limit (3000 by default).
<a href="#">CVE-2016-10728</a>	An issue was discovered in Suricata before 3.1.2. If an ICMPv4 error packet is received as the first packet on a flow in the to_client direction, it confuses the rule grouping lookup logic. The toclient inspection will then continue with the wrong rule group. This can lead to missed detection.
<a href="#">CVE-2015-8954</a>	The MemcmpLowercase function in Suricata before 2.0.6 improperly excludes the first byte from comparisons, which might allow remote attackers to bypass intrusion-prevention functionality via a crafted HTTP request.
<a href="#">CVE-2015-0971</a>	The DER parser in Suricata before 2.0.8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via vectors related to SSL/TLS certificates.
<a href="#">CVE-2014-9769</a>	pcre_jit_compile.c in PCRE 8.35 does not properly use table jumps to optimize nested alternatives, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (stack memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted string, as demonstrated by packets encountered by Suricata during use of a regular expression in an Emerging Threats Open ruleset.

# Several memory related fixes in latest Suricata release

April 30, 2019

by Inliniac

in news, release

Leave a comment

## Suricata 4.1.4 released

We're pleased to announce **Suricata 4.1.4**. This release fixes a number of issues found in the 4.1 branch.

Get the release here:

<https://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/download/suricata-4.1.4.tar.gz>

## Changes

- Bug #2870: pcap logging with lz4 coverity warning
- Bug #2883: ssh: heap buffer overflow
- Bug #2884: mpls: heapbuffer overflow in file decode-mpls.c
- Bug #2887: decode-ethernet: heapbuffer overflow in file decode-ethernet.c
- Bug #2888: 4.1.3 core in HCBDCreateSpace
- Bug #2894: smb 1 create andx request does not parse the filename correctly
- Bug #2902: rust/dhcp: panic in dhcp parser
- Bug #2903: mpls: cast of misaligned data leads to undefined behavior
- Bug #2904: rust/ftp: panic in ftp parser
- Bug #2943: rust/nfs: integer underflow
- This release includes Suricata-Update 1.0.5

# More memory issues not listed in the Suricata bug tracker

```
commit 316a411b6b40365ffff382967bec8bc22f18c192
```

```
Author: Philippe Antoine <contact@catenacyber.fr>
```

```
Date: Wed Mar 27 22:56:15 2019 +0100
```

```
ssl : SSLProbingParser overflow fix
```

```
Found by fuzzing
```

```
Fixes ssl detection evasion by packet splitting
```

```
commit 666bb1b6e48b47e9fafe161ac57deae8d0fd89f0
```

```
Author: Victor Julien <victor@inliniac.net>
```

```
Date: Mon Apr 15 14:52:38 2019 +0200
```

```
parse/ip: fix potential oob write in ipv4 validation
```

```
Found using AFL.
```



# **Mitigations in IDS solutions**

# Suricata: Rust for several parsers

340k Lines of C / 17k Lines of Rust

```
dreadbook:suricata alien$ git status
HEAD detached at suricata-4.1.4
nothing to commit, working tree clean
dreadbook:suricata alien$ cloc .
    1352 text files.
    1343 unique files.
    172 files ignored.

github.com/AlDanial/cloc v 1.80  T=2.86 s (415.3 files/s, 192981.0 lines/s)
-----
Language                      files      blank      comment      code
-----
C                               520        65983       51941       341645
C/C++ Header                   520        6332       15782       20393
Rust                            73         2045        2121       17642
Bourne Shell                    15         1932        1406       12055
YAML                             4          198         204        3101
m4                               3          314         23         2712
Python                          19         474         703        2265
make                            17          76         13         869
Perl                             9          103        114         868
Markdown                        4           81          0         101
Lua                              1           11         10          27
CSS                              1           2           0          25
TOML                             1           0           1           1
-----
SUM:                           1187       77551      72318     401704
-----
```

# Suricata 5 beta: Mandatory use of Rust

**April 30, 2019**

by **Inliniac**

in **news, release**

**Leave a comment**


## Call for testing: announcing Suricata 5.0.0-beta1

We're happy to present the first beta in the upcoming Suricata 5.0 series. In 5.0 we're making a couple of large changes.

### Rust

The most visible is that our Rust support is no longer optional. We're convinced that Rust is a perfect match for Suricata, and we plan to increase its footprint in our code base steadily. By making it mandatory we're able to remove parallel implementations and focus fully on making the Rust code better.

# Bro / Zeek: BinPAC parser generator



# Problems with BinPAC

**Bro 2.5.3**

---

**Bro 2.5.4**

---

**Bro 2.5.5**

---

Bro 2.5.5 primarily addresses security issues.

- Fix array bounds checking in BinPAC: for arrays that are fields within a record, the bounds check was based on a pointer to the start of the record rather than the start of the array field, potentially resulting in a buffer over-read.

# **Problem #2: Signatures**

# Signatures

Can only detect **known threats**

**Size** of signature databases is continuously growing

Existing malware can be **obfuscated** to evade signature detection

# !Problem?





**Let's do it in Go!**

# NETCAP

Decodes network packets and generates **audit records**

Uses the **gopacket library** (~80k LoC) for decoding packets

Concurrent design: **worker pool**, each audit record written to a separate file


Audit record generation as **compressed protocol buffers**

# Why protocol buffers?


**Type safe structured data** - can represent complex nested structures

**Platform neutral** - generate type definitions for your favourite language

# NETCAP in a nutshell



# NETCAP worker




# NETCAP buffered workers

**Packet Data Distribution  
via Round Robin**

**Buffered Input Channel  
for each worker**

**Configurable Number  
of workers**



# Available Audit Records?

## Custom:

- + **Flow (unidirectional)**
- + **Connection (bidirectional)**
- + LinkFlow (disabled by default)
- + NetworkFlow (disabled by default)
- + TransportFlow (disabled by default)
- + **TLS (Client Hello Msg + Ja3)**
- + **HTTP**

# Available Audit Records?

## Layers

- + **TCP**
- + **UDP**
- + **IPv4**
- + **IPv6**
- + **DHCPv4**
- + **DHCPv6**
- + **ICMPv4**
- + **ICMPv6**
- + ICMPv6Echo
- + ICMPv6NeighborSolicitation
- + ICMPv6RouterSolicitation
- + **DNS**
- + **ARP**
- + **Ethernet**
- + Dot1Q
- + Dot11
- + NTP
- + **SIP**
- + **IGMP**
- + LLC
- + IPv6HopByHop
- + SCTP
- + **SNAP**
- + LinkLayerDiscovery
- + ICMPv6NeighborAdvertisement
- + ICMPv6RouterAdvertisement
- + EthernetCTP
- + EthernetCTPReply
- + LinkLayerDiscoveryInfo


## v0.3.9

- + **OSPF**
- + BFD
- + GRE
- + FDDI
- + VRRPv2
- + EAP
- + **CiscoDiscovery**
- + NortelDiscovery
- + **IPSec**
- + Geneve
- + VXLAN
- + **USB**
- + LCM
- + MPLS
- + **ModbusTCP**




# NETCAP audit records

## Single Audit Record



## Audit Record File




e.g:  
**TCP.ncap.gz (compressed)**  
**TCP.ncap (uncompressed)**


Flow / Connection
Timestamp First Seen (seconds.micro)
Link Layer Protocol
Network Layer Protocol
Transport Layer Protocol
Application Layer Protocol
Source Mac Address
Destination Mac Address
SrcIP
SrcPort
DstIP
DstPort
Size in bytes
Number of Packets
Timestamp Last Seen (seconds.micro)
Duration (nanoseconds)

Example
1499257434.003136
Ethernet
IPv4
TCP
HTTP
00:0c:28:9f:16:1e
00:0c:28:c9:60:ce
173.15.11.103
1873
95.100.238.75
80
922
6
1499257551.553088
117549952000


# Format on disk: Length delimited audit records



# NETCAP data pipe




# NETCAP filtering & csv export




```
$ netcapture -r TCP.ncap.gz -select Timestamp,SrcPort,DstPort,SeqNum,Window,ACK,SYN,RST > TCP.csv
```

# NETCAP labeling



# NETCAP Sensors



# Use Cases?


Monitor honeypots

Forensic Analysis

**Research!** :) - GPLv3 license



# Classification of malicious behaviour with NETCAP and a Deep Neural Network with Tensorflow



The screenshot shows the website of the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CICIDS). The header includes the UNB logo and navigation links: Home, About, Research, Members, and Datasets. The main content area is titled "Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset (CICIDS2017)". It describes the importance of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) and mentions that the dataset is the most up-to-date common attacks, which resembles true real-world data (PCAPs). It also includes the results of the network traffic analysis using CICFlowMeter with labeled flows based on the time stamp, source and destination IPs, source and destination ports, protocols and attack (CSV files). The dataset is generated using a proposed B-Profile system (Sharafaldin, et al. 2016) to profile the abstract behaviour of human interactions and generates a naturalistic benign background traffic. For this dataset we built the abstract behaviour of 25 users based on the HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols.

**Datasets**

- IDS 2012 >
- IDS 2017 >**
- NSL-KDD >
- VPN-nonVPN >
- Botnet >
- Android Validation >
- Android Botnet >
- Tor-nonTor >
- Dos Dataset >
- Android-Adware >
- Android-Malware2017 >
- CSE-CIC-IDS2018 >

## Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset (CICIDS2017)

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs) are the most important defense tools against the sophisticated and ever-growing network attacks. Due to the lack of reliable test and validation datasets, anomaly-based intrusion detection approaches are suffering from consistent and accurate performance evolutions.

Our evaluations of the existing eleven datasets since 1998 show that most are out of date and unreliable. Some of these datasets suffer from the lack of traffic diversity and volumes, some do not cover the variety of known attacks, while others anonymize packet payload data, which cannot reflect the current trends. Some are also lacking feature set and metadata.

CICIDS2017 dataset contains benign and the most up-to-date common attacks, which resembles the true real-world data (PCAPs). It also includes the results of the network traffic analysis using CICFlowMeter with labeled flows based on the time stamp, source and destination IPs, source and destination ports, protocols and attack (CSV files).

Generating realistic background traffic was our top priority in building this dataset. We have used our proposed B-Profile system (Sharafaldin, et al. 2016) to profile the abstract behaviour of human interactions and generates a naturalistic benign background traffic. For this dataset we built the abstract behaviour of 25 users based on the HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols.

## CICIDS2017 Dataset:

Up to date, 5 days of traffic

Well documented

~50GB **original PCAPs**

**Monday:** Normal Traffic

**Tuesday:** Brute Force

**Wednesday:** DoS

**Thursday:** Web Attacks

**Friday:** Botnet Traffic

# Experiment takeaways

**Encoding strategies** are vital for performance

**High detection accuracy (95-99.9%)** can be achieved with a **handful of extracted features** (Flow / Connection Durations, Payload Size and Entropy)

Different approaches to labelling can be used to **increase value for analysts**

High accuracy for **protocol specific approach**

# **What's new**

# Protobuf Serialisation Performance

with golang code generator:

```
$ go test -bench=. -v ./types
=== RUN TestMarshal
--- PASS: TestMarshal (0.00s)
goos: darwin
goarch: amd64
pkg: github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types
BenchmarkMarshal-12      10000000      184 ns/op      64 B/op      1 allocs/op
BenchmarkUnmarshal-12    10000000      160 ns/op      40 B/op      2 allocs/op
PASS
ok      github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types 3.830s
```

with gogo code generator:

```
$ go test -bench=. -v ./types
=== RUN TestMarshal
--- PASS: TestMarshal (0.00s)
goos: darwin
goarch: amd64
pkg: github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types
BenchmarkMarshal-12      20000000      89.1 ns/op     64 B/op      1 allocs/op
BenchmarkUnmarshal-12    20000000      110 ns/op      40 B/op      2 allocs/op
PASS
ok      github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap/types 4.215s
```

# Payload Capture

## Payload capture

It is now possible to capture payload data for the following protocols: TCP, UDP, ModbusTCP, USB

This can be enabled with the **-payload** flag:

```
net.capture -r traffic.pcap -payload
```

Also available for live capture:

```
net.capture -iface en0 -payload
```

# USB Decoding

## USB decoding

USB live capture is now possible, currently the following Audit Records exist: USB and USBRequestBlockSetup.

To capture USB traffic live on macOS, install wireshark and bring up the USB interface:

```
sudo ifconfig XHC20 up
```

Now attach netcap and set baselayer to USB:

```
net.capture -iface XHC20 -base usb
```

To read offline USB traffic from a PCAP file use:

```
net.capture -r usb.pcap -base usb
```

# Configurable CSV Output

Configurable separators for CSV structures

The separator characters for structs in CSV output mode are now configurable via commandline flags.

Default is '(' for opening, '-' as separator for values and ')' for closing.

```
type Message struct {  
    string Text  
    bool  Secret  
    int   MagicNumber  
}
```

would appear in CSV like:

```
(Text-Secret-MagicNumber)
```

with the concrete field values:

```
(Hi-true-42)
```

# Restructured Interface

## Commandline Tools

The commandline tools have been restructured and the framework now consists of:

- **net.capture** (capture audit records live or from dumpfiles)
- **net.dump** (dump with audit records in various formats)
- **net.label** (tool for creating labeled CSV datasets from netcap data)
- **net.collect** (collection server for distributed collection)
- **net.agent** (sensor agent for distributed collection)
- **net.proxy** (http reverse proxy for capturing traffic from web services)
- **net.util** (utility tool for validating audit records and converting timestamps)
- **net.export** (exporter for prometheus metrics)



# Golang Library Improvements:

netcap.Writer

The netcap library now exposes a data structure for writing audit records to disk.

Check out the GoDocs: <https://godoc.org/github.com/dreadl0ck/netcap>

```
type Writer
func NewWriter(name string, buffer, compress, csv bool, out string, writeChan bool) *Writer
func (w *Writer) Close() (name string, size int64)
func (w *Writer) GetChan() <-chan []byte
func (w *Writer) Write(msg proto.Message) error
func (w *Writer) WriteCSV(msg proto.Message) (int, error)
func (w *Writer) WriteCSVHeader(msg proto.Message) (int, error)
func (w *Writer) WriteHeader(t types.Type, source string, version string, includesPayloads bool) error
func (w *Writer) WriteProto(msg proto.Message) error
```

Configurable gopacket.DecodeOptions

Gopackets DecodeOptions are now configurable via commandline, three options exist:

- lazy (gopacket.Lazy)
- default (gopacket.Default)
- nocopy (gopacket.NoCopy)

By default, netcap uses the the lazy decoding option.

# Protobuf type definitions in each release

Precompiled type definitions for:

- + Go
- + C++
- + Java
- + Rust
- + CSharp
- + JS
- + Python
- + Swift


# Python Support

Retrieving the audit records as pandas dataframe:

```
1  #!/usr/bin/python
2
3  import pynetcap as nc
4
5  reader = nc.NCReader('pcaps/HTTP.ncap.gz')
6
7  reader.read(dataframe=True)
8  print("[INFO] completed reading the audit record file:", reader.filepath)
9  print("DATAFRAME:")
10 print(reader.df)
```



# A proxy for web services



# Enhanced HTTP audit records

Using the http tracing functionality from the go standard library, several interesting time deltas have been added to the HTTP audit record type.


```
// Time Deltas (Nanoseconds)  
// currently only available when using the HTTP proxy with tracing enabled.  
int64 DoneAfter          = 20;  
int64 DNSDoneAfter       = 21;  
int64 FirstByteAfter     = 22;  
int64 TLSDoneAfter       = 23;
```

# Prometheus Metrics

- **NETCAP related metrics (Protocols, Decoding errors etc)**
- **Go runtime related metrics (Number of goroutines, memory usage etc)**
- **Audit record related metrics (Field values and custom metrics)**

# Prometheus metrics

## NETCAP metrics



# Overview Dashboard






# HTTP Dashboard





# TCP Dashboard



# Alpine Linux Docker Image

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## dreadl0ck/netcap ☆

By [dreadl0ck](#) • Updated 13 days ago

Netcap docker containers

Container

Manage Repository

↓ Pulls 2


[Overview](#) [Tags](#)

An alpine linux container with the netcap network security monitoring framework preinstalled.


Homepage: <https://netcap.io>

### Docker Pull Command

```
docker pull dreadl0ck/netcap
```



### Owner

 [dreadl0ck](#)

# Website

13:47 Wed 8. May

netcap.io

78 %



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
# Documentation

docs.netcap.io

[Overview](#)[GitHub](#)[Homepage](#)[GoDoc](#)[Q Search...](#)[Overview](#)[Protocol Support](#)[Specification](#)[Installation](#)[Quickstart](#)[Packet Collection](#)[Audit Record Labeling](#)[HTTP Proxy](#)[USB Capture](#)[Payload Capture](#)[Distributed Collection](#)[Workers](#)[Filtering and Export](#)[Downloads](#)[Internals](#)[Metrics](#)[Python Integration](#)[FAQ](#)[Extension](#)[Contributing](#)[License](#)[CONTENTS](#)[Design Goals](#)[Framework Components](#)[Use Cases](#)[Demos](#)[License](#)[Source Code Stats](#)

## Overview

A brief overview



01101001 01110011 00100000 01110111 01100001 01110100 01100011 01101000  
01101001 01101110 01100111 00100000 01111001 01101111 01110101 00101110

The *Netcap* (NETwork CAPture) framework efficiently converts a stream of network packets into highly accessible type-safe structured data that represent specific protocols or custom abstractions. These audit records can be stored on disk or exchanged over the network, and are well suited as a data source for machine learning algorithms. Since parsing of untrusted input can be dangerous and network data is potentially malicious, implementation was performed in a programming language that provides a garbage collected memory safe runtime.

It was developed for a series of experiments in my bachelor thesis: *Implementation and evaluation of secure and scalable anomaly-based network intrusion detection*. Currently, the thesis serves as documentation until the wiki is ready, it is included at the root of this repository (file: mied18.pdf). Slides from my presentation at the Leibniz Supercomputing Centre of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities are available on researchgate.

# Future Development

- **YARA** support for labelling
- **benchmarks** & performance optimizations
- **Deep Packet Inspection Module** that looks for certain patterns in the payload to identify the application layer
- implement **IPv6 stream reassembly**
- implement an **interface for application layer decoders that require stream reassembly**

# Questions?

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