


#HITB2023AMS



Upgrading Rollback-Agnostic Replay Attacks

HITB2023, Amsterdam 20-21 April 2023

Carlos Gómez Quintana
Associate Security Consultant





IOActive[®]



Teaser


LEARN HOW TO HACK A CAR!






Agenda

- ▶ # Whoami #
- ▶ Introduction
 - ▶ Software Defined Radio (SDR)
 - ▶ Arsenal
 - ▶ Radio Frequency Analysis
 - ▶ Modulation
 - ▶ Rolling Codes
- ▶ Attacks
 - ▶ Rolljam
 - ▶ Rollback
 - ▶ Upgrade
- ▶ Questions & Contact






Disclaimer



- ▶ All tests carried out have been under the permission and supervision of the legitimate owners
- ▶ Performing any of the above techniques is considered **ILLEGAL** if the necessary permission is not obtained
- ▶ All captured signals have been **erased** after the end of the investigation
- ▶ The tests comply with data protection law and the right to personal privacy



Whoami



- ▶ Associate Security Consultant at IOActive
- ▶ Software engineering
- ▶ Love cars, evade and breaks things =)



carlos.gomez@ioactive.com



@cgomezz_23




@cgomezquintana



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Radio Frequency Introduction



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





SDR Introduction



Traditional Radio





Arsenal

~~Which SDR should I buy?~~

What do I want to do?

- ▶ Signal reception
- ▶ Emitting signals
- ▶ Reception of a certain band
- ▶ Professional use



RTL-SDR: \$30



HackRF: \$300



USRP: \$1000




BladeRF: \$700



**Ubertooth:
\$130**




Yard Stick One: \$150





Disclaimer 2.0




JAMMING IS ILLEGAL





What is RKE?




- ▶ **R**emote **K**eyless **E**nter system
- ▶ Operate by radio frequencies
 - ▶ European, Asian, and British cars on **433.92** MHz
 - ▶ North American and Japanese cars on **315** MHz
- ▶ Lock/unlock doors, turn on the vehicle, etc.
- ▶ Chips with cyphers







Modulation



- ▶ Process of **modifying** an information signal so that it can be **transmitted** over a communication channel
- ▶ The modulating signal **contains** the **information** to be transmitted, such as voice, music or data




Analog Modulation




Digital Modulation




Modulation (continued)




MOST COMMON MODULATIONS



Amplitude Shift Keying




Frequency Shift Keying




Phase Shift Keying



Modulation (continued)




ASK




2-FSK

Frequency deviation





How do rolling codes work exactly?





Rolling Codes



HOW RKE WORKS?



Car is Locked

FIXED CODES

Next Value: 168



Car is Unlocked

Generated Passcode List

- 168
- 169
- 170
- 171
- 172



Rolling Codes (continued)



FIXED CODES

Next Value: 168



Car is Unlocked

Generated Passcode List

- 168
- 169
- 170
- 171
- 172

ROLLING CODES

Next Value: 940726474085962200




Car is Unlocked

Generated Passcode List

- 940726474085962200
- 288638251346168640
- 397682136877814140
- 350431964959453600
- 884465203000531000



Rolling Codes (continued)



$$169 + (\text{RANDOM HASH}) = 91231834517631724$$

ROLLING CODE GENERATED

ROLLING CODES

Next Value: 940726474085962200





Car is Unlocked 

Generated Passcode List

- 940726474085962200
- 288638251346168640
- 397682136877814140
- 350431964959453600
- 884465203000531000



Analysis





▶ **CHIP Codec: 4D70**





Analysis





- ▶ **CHIP Codec: 4D70**
- ▶ **ASK modulation**





Analysis





- ▶ **CHIP Codec: 4D70**
- ▶ ASK modulation
- ▶ Not bit codification





Analysis



- ▶ **CHIP Codec: 4D70**
- ▶ ASK modulation
- ▶ Not bit codification


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1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0			
2	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1			
3	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1		
4	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0		
5	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	
6	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	
7	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	
8	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	
9	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
10	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	
11	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	
12	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1

Rolling Codes

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
RollJam Wireless Vehicle Entry Attack





Rolljam

ROLLJAM DEVICE



Samy Kamkar


@samykamkar

<https://samy.pl/>






How Rolljam Works (continued)



ATTACK METHODOLOGY


1. Jamming + listening signal 1
2. Jamming + listening signal 2
3. Stop the jamming device + send signal 1
4. Signal 2 valid to use 😊






Executing Rolljam

Jammer





Executing Rolljam



Jammer




Hopping Program

```
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST frequency at 433900000.0 with 20 MHz bandwidth
JUMP --- Jamming FM_TEST2 frequency at 1000000.0 with 10 MHz bandwidth
```





Executing Rolljam (continued)



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Rollback Time-Agnostic Re-Synchronization Replay Attack




CVE-2022-36945
CVE-2022-37305
CVE-2022-37418

IOActive®



Original Disclosure



- ▶ Presented at **Blackhat USA 2022**
 - ▶ Authors: **Levente Csikor** & **Hoon Wei Lim**
 - ▶ [US-22-Csikor-RollBack-A-New-Time-Agnostic-Replay-Attack](#)
- ▶ Official paper
 - ▶ [Rollback Paper](#)






Demo Time

LOOSE ATTACK




ROLLBACK TIME!





What is Rollback Exactly?



- ▶ Rollback is **DIFFERENT** than Rolljam
- ▶ Don't need to **JAM** any signal
- ▶ Owner uses the vehicle/key fob as usual
 - ▶ Vehicle acts as **intended**, can **receive** the signals as usual
- ▶ Attack → Re-synchronize the car with **used** codes
 - ▶ 2 to 3 codes for resync
- ▶ Original affected vehicles: Kia, Hyundai, Mazda, Nissan, and Toyota
 - ▶ New discoveries: **censored** (2013), **censored** (2019) and **censored** (2022)






What is new here?

Rollback

Providing a fresh and profound
alternative perspective





Rollback



- ▶ Is it possible to carry out a **rollback** attack on **different** days?
 - ▶ Is it possible to execute the attack with obsolete codes collected on different days?



Rollback




- ▶ Is it possible to carry out a **rollback** attack on **different** days?

WHAT'S
NEW?

- ▶ Is it possible to execute the attack with obsolete codes collected on different days?
- ▶ Perform Rollback on **different** days
- ▶ Perform Rollback on a run of **50** old codes



Rollback Principles




- ▶ We **do not need** jamming
- ▶ Signals **do not need** to be sequential
 - ▶ In some cases they need to be strictly sequential
- ▶ Signals **persist** over time
- ▶ **Loose, strict, and timeframes**

What is new here?





Rollback: First New Scenario



HOW POWERFUL IS?!



▶ Bag of 20 old codes





Rollback: First New Scenario



HOW POWERFUL IS?!




- ▶ Bag of 20 **old** codes
- ▶ **Five** days of grabbing



Rollback: First New Scenario



HOW POWERFUL IS?!



- ▶ Bag of 20 **old** codes
- ▶ **Five** days of grabbing
- ▶ Replay 1, 7, and 19 → **Open**



Rollback: First New Scenario (continued)



FAIL VERSION

HOW POWERFUL IS?!



▶ Replay 1, 7, and 14





Rollback: First New Scenario (continued)



FAIL VERSION

HOW POWERFUL IS?!



▶ **Replay 1, 7, and 14 → Go Home**





Rollback: First New Scenario (continued)



FAIL VERSION

HOW POWERFUL IS?!



▶ Replay 1, 7, and 14 → Go Home




Rollback: First New Scenario (continued)



FAIL VERSION


HOW POWERFUL IS?!



- ▶ Even signal: 1
- ▶ Odd signal: 2




Rollback: First New Scenario (continued)



FAIL VERSION

HOW POWERFUL IS?!



- ▶ Even signal: 1
- ▶ Displacement of the peak
- ▶ Odd signal: 2



Rollback: First New Scenario (continued)



FAIL VERSION

HOW POWERFUL IS?!



- ▶ Odd + odd = open
- ▶ Even + even = open
- ▶ Odd + even = go home




Rollback: Second New Scenario



TIMING TIME :D

STRICT SEQUENCE!



- ▶ 3 different signals






Rollback: Second New Scenario



TIMING TIME :D

STRICT SEQUENCE!



- ▶ 3 different signals
- ▶ Timeframe of 1.5 between signals




Rollback: Second New Scenario



TIMING TIME :D


STRICT SEQUENCE!



- ▶ 3 different signals
- ▶ Timeframe of 1.5 between signals




Rollback: Second New Scenario



TIMING TIME :D

STRICT SEQUENCE!



- ▶ 3 different signals
- ▶ Timeframe of 1.5 between signals

WHAT'S NEW?




Rollback: Second New Scenario



TIMING TIME :D

STRICT SEQUENCE!




- ▶ 3 different signals
- ▶ Timeframe of 1.5 between signals
- ▶ Four days of signal capturing

WHAT'S NEW?




Rollback: Second New Scenario



TIMING TIME :D

HACKED :)

STRICT SEQUENCE!




- ▶ 3 different signals
- ▶ Timeframe of 1.5 between signals
- ▶ Four days of signal capturing
- ▶ Bag of 50 codes!

WHAT'S NEW?



Trust the Process


- ▶ No methodology
- ▶ No a priori indications
- ▶ Not access to official documentation




1



2



3







Demo Time

STRICT + TIMEFRAME




ROLLBACK TIME!






Demo Time

LOOSE ATTACK




ROLLBACK TIME!






Findings

- ▶ Modern vehicles **still** affected
- ▶ Jamming is **not** necessary
- ▶ Design flaw in some manufacturers
 - ▶ Can be "*fixed*" by vehicle manufacturers with software/firmware updates
- ▶ More powerful than we thought
 - ▶ Repeatable with jumps of up to **50** old codes!
- ▶ Depends on code hoping, not days hoping






Mitigations



- ▶ Discard old codes used by vehicle manufacturers
- ▶ Mandatory physical resynchronisation of the RKEs
- ▶ Precautionary measures for most-based jamming attacks
- ▶ Establish anti-jamming technology by manufacturers (detect jamming of signals for example)





Q & A

- ▶ IOActive ❤️
 - ▶ Alfredo Pironti
 - ▶ Jose Antonio Maldonado
- ▶ Hack In The Box
- ▶ Eduardo Arriols (@_Hykeos)
- ▶ Joel Serna (@JoelSernaMoreno)



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